Robbie D. Gordon

The applicant sought exclusion of drugs and related items seized from a motor vehicle, arguing arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter and unreasonable seizure under s. 8.

The court held that although police attempted to detain the applicant, his immediate flight meant there was no detention engaging s. 9.

The court further held that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, but the warrantless seizure was authorized under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code and was reasonable in the circumstances.

As no Charter breach was found, the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Neighbouring property owners disputed ownership and use of three narrow strips of land including a shared driveway, a storage area, and a backyard strip.

The plaintiffs claimed adverse possession and alternatively an easement under the doctrine of lost modern grant.

The court held that adverse possession failed for the driveway and storage area because the plaintiffs’ use was not inconsistent with the true owner’s use and their claimed mistaken belief of ownership was not credible.

However, adverse possession succeeded for a backyard strip where a fence had been erected under a mutual mistake as to the boundary.

The court also recognized a prescriptive easement over the driveway under the doctrine of lost modern grant, permitting parking and related maintenance rights.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner adjudicator's decision ordering the City of Toronto to disclose portions of a software maintenance log under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant argued the log contained confidential technical information exempt from disclosure under s. 10(1).

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's decision unreasonable, noting that the adjudicator applied the three-part exemption test inconsistently and failed to provide adequate justification for concluding the information was not supplied by the applicant.

The application was allowed, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board affirming the denial of her registration as a Registered Practical Nurse.

The appellant had failed the non-exemptible licensing examination three times, despite receiving accommodations for reading difficulties on her second and third attempts.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found no evidence of testing improprieties or extraordinary circumstances to justify annulling the examinations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant tenants filed an application alleging a bad faith eviction by the respondent landlord.

The one-year limitation period under the Residential Tenancies Act ended on a holiday weekend, and the tenants filed on the next business day.

The Landlord and Tenant Board dismissed the application as untimely, finding it had no discretion to extend the limitation period.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held the Board's decision was unreasonable, as statutory computation of time rules extend deadlines falling on holidays to the next business day.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board.

The applicant father and respondent mother separated after a turbulent marriage and sought a determination of custody and access for their three young daughters.

The father sought joint or shared custody on an alternating weekly basis, while the mother sought sole custody with access reflecting the status quo.

The court found that both parents loved the children but were unable to communicate effectively or shield the children from their conflict.

Relying on the mother's role as the historical primary caregiver and the stability she provided, the court awarded sole custody to the mother.

However, to protect the father's relationship with the children, the court expanded his access to include a mid-week overnight and required his written consent for major decisions regarding relocation, education, and religion.

The court also granted a divorce and ordered the father to pay child support.

The applicants sought judicial review of four decisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, including procedural decisions denying an adjournment and change of venue, and a final decision declaring the applicants to be one employer bound to certain collective agreements.

The applicants argued the Board breached natural justice by refusing to adjourn the hearing from Toronto to Thunder Bay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's travel policy reasonable and noting the applicants failed to provide adequate reasons for their non-attendance when invited to do so.

The Court also upheld the Board's document production order.

The appellant, who sustained a severe traumatic brain injury, appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying her request for pre-approved funding for in-patient rehabilitative services at an Alberta facility.

The facility was not licensed as a hospital and did not accept public funding.

The appellant argued the denial breached her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the government to fund out-of-province medical treatments, and that the denial was based on the facility's licensing status, not the appellant's disability, thus not engaging section 15.

A third party in a motor vehicle negligence action brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a contribution and indemnity claim against him.

The motion arose from a collision involving two drivers where the only witnesses were the occupants of the vehicles and their versions of events were directly contradictory.

The court applied the test for summary judgment articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch and held that the case required the benefits of the trial process to properly assess credibility and draw factual inferences.

Given the absence of independent witnesses and physical evidence, credibility determinations could not be made on the motion record.

The motion was therefore dismissed and the third party claim was allowed to proceed to trial.

A former spouse sought determination of the continuing obligation for spousal support following a consent order that suspended support if the recipient cohabited with another person for one year and terminated it after three years.

The court determined the recipient began cohabiting with a new partner in May 2008, resulting in suspension of support after one year during that relationship, but found insufficient evidence that a later romantic partner constituted cohabitation.

The payor’s income had subsequently declined due to disability, raising the issue of variation under s. 17 of the Divorce Act.

The court held the recipient remained economically disadvantaged from a long marriage and was not proven capable of self‑sufficiency despite limited medical documentation.

Support was therefore varied downward to reflect the payor’s reduced income, with limited retrospective suspension during the earlier cohabitation period.

Following a prior trial addressing spousal support and child-related expenses, the applicant advanced claims for constructive trust based on unjust enrichment, lump sum spousal support, and post-retirement spousal support after her equalization claim became unenforceable due to the respondent’s completed consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that although the applicant had made significant indirect contributions during the marriage, the enrichment resulting from the respondent’s bankruptcy process constituted a juristic reason defeating the unjust enrichment claim.

The court also declined to award lump sum spousal support because the respondent lacked financial means and such an order would effectively redistribute assets.

However, the court ordered that spousal support be subject to review upon the respondent’s retirement, with consideration of pension income accrued during the marriage.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence seized under a search warrant for computers and storage devices allegedly containing child pornography.

He argued the information to obtain the warrant lacked full, frank, and fair disclosure, that the warrant lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that the search was overly broad.

The court found that certain information in the information to obtain should be excised or amplified, including surveillance obtained through an unlawful entry onto private property and references to prior charges that had not resulted in conviction.

However, even after excision and amplification, sufficient grounds remained to support the issuance of the warrant.

Applying the section 24(2) framework, the court held the Charter breaches were not sufficiently serious to justify excluding the evidence.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash committals for trial on charges of manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death following a preliminary inquiry.

The case arose from the accused leaving a bottle of methadone with a third party as collateral for a loan; the drug was later consumed by another person who died of acute methadone intoxication.

The applicant argued that there was no evidence of objective foreseeability or causation and that voluntary consumption by the deceased severed the chain of causation.

The court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a properly instructed trier of fact could find that trafficking in methadone under the circumstances was dangerous and that bodily harm was objectively foreseeable.

The court further held that the consumption of the methadone did not necessarily break the chain of causation and that the evidence supported committal for trial on the challenged counts.

The plaintiffs appealed a jury verdict that dismissed their personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident in a parking lot and assessed their damages at zero.

The plaintiffs argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the Highway Traffic Act and that the zero damages assessment was perverse.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge on the standard of care was correct and sufficient, and that the jury's assessment of damages was open to them based on the competing medical evidence.

Former business associates disputed financial obligations arising from a commercial lease, alleged tax arrears, a purported deposit toward a contemplated property purchase, and a counterclaim for vehicle repair work.

The court found the tenant was responsible for property taxes but concluded that a portion of the increased monthly payments was intended to cover ongoing tax obligations, leaving only a small balance outstanding.

The tenant failed to prove that the deposit exceeded the amount admitted by the landlord.

The counterclaim for historic vehicle repair work was dismissed on the merits despite the absence of a pleaded limitations defence.

After set‑off of the parties’ obligations, judgment was granted in favour of the defendant for the balance.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing claims against several individual defendants on the basis that all contractual dealings were with a corporate entity operating under a business name.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known it was contracting with a corporation rather than individuals.

The court reviewed evidence including cheques, website references, and business name registration and applied the summary judgment framework under Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the evidence did not establish that the plaintiff had sufficient notice that it was dealing with a corporation, leaving a genuine issue requiring a trial.

However, the claim against one individual defendant was dismissed for lack of any evidence of involvement in the transactions.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to admit two prior consistent statements made by the complainant in a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The court reviewed the general rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible for the truth of their contents but may be admitted for limited purposes such as narrative context or credibility assessment.

One statement to the complainant’s mother was conceded as admissible to explain how the allegations came to the attention of police.

The court also admitted a statement made to the complainant’s boyfriend, finding it necessary to explain the circumstances of disclosure and to avoid undermining the credibility of the witness whose observations prompted the disclosure.

The statements were admissible only in general terms and not for the truth of their contents.

In a defamation action arising from letters published in a newspaper criticizing veterinary services, the defendants brought a motion seeking production of additional documents before examinations for discovery.

The court considered the relevance and proportionality of the requested records under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It ordered production of appointment records for the key date, client files relating to 33 clients allegedly lost due to the publication, and financial and client records underlying the plaintiffs’ damages expert report.

Requests for predecessor financial records and a mailing list were denied as premature or irrelevant.

The court rejected claims of confidentiality over client records due to lack of evidence establishing privilege and ordered the plaintiffs to serve a fresh affidavit of documents and proceed under a litigation timetable.

The applicant sought mandamus compelling a justice of the peace to issue process following a pre‑enquête hearing concerning a proposed private prosecution against a police officer for intimidation of a justice system participant under the Criminal Code.

The justice of the peace had declined to issue process after determining that the evidence failed to establish essential elements of the offence.

The Superior Court held that where a justice of the peace exercises discretion within jurisdiction during a pre‑enquête hearing, mandamus is unavailable and review may only occur by certiorari.

Treating the application as one for certiorari, the court found no jurisdictional error, denial of natural justice, or procedural irregularity.

The justice of the peace properly identified the elements of the offence and reasonably concluded there was no evidence of threats of violence or intent to impede a justice participant.

The defendant sought leave under Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to proceed with a previously served motion for summary judgment after the parties had consented to place the action on the trial list.

The underlying action involved claims of negligence and breach of contract relating to allegedly improper industrial laundry systems and advice.

The court held that once parties consent to placing an action on the trial list, further motions require leave and such leave should only be granted where justified in the interests of justice.

The moving party had not notified the opposing party or the trial coordinator of its intention to continue the summary judgment motion when consenting to the trial listing, and there was no substantial change in circumstances warranting leave.

The court therefore refused leave and dismissed the motion.