Leonard Kim

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving over the legal blood alcohol limit, arguing the trial judge erred by finding breath samples were taken as soon as practicable and by conducting his own back calculation of her blood alcohol concentration without expert evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge correctly applied judicial notice of alcohol elimination rates to determine the appellant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving, and that the failure to meet the prerequisites for the presumption of identity did not automatically exclude the breath readings.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on impaired driving and 'over 80' charges.

The trial judge had excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach, and acquitted on the impaired charge due to a reasonable doubt caused by head trauma.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors by failing to consider the accused's admission of drunkenness when assessing the officer's reasonable and probable grounds, and by improperly applying voir dire evidence to the trial proper.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge had excluded breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding multiple breaches (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)) because the police officer delayed making an ASD demand for 17 minutes to allow EMS to medically assess the respondent following a rollover collision.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by assuming the respondent was detained the moment the officer formed reasonable suspicion, without considering that the respondent was in the care of EMS for most of that time.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Krista-Lee Bruzas pleaded guilty to having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, with readings of 390 mg.

She brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences under s. 255(1) and the unavailability of conditional discharges under s. 255(5) of the Criminal Code, arguing violations of ss. 12 and 15 of the Charter, particularly for First Nations individuals in Ontario.

The court considered significant mitigating factors, including Gladue factors and extensive rehabilitation efforts.

Despite finding a conditional discharge to be in the accused's best interests, the court determined it would be contrary to the public interest given the extremely high blood alcohol readings and the paramountcy of denunciation and general deterrence in impaired driving cases.

The court imposed a fine of $2000, 12 months of probation, and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with willfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group (homosexuals) by distributing DVDs with accompanying cover jackets containing statements such as "God hates the wicked and will destroy them with war; famine and death; the wicked includes sex-perverts; Christ has cursed Ontario for turning a blind eye to sexual perversion; God's wrath is on all who show compassion to her kind and commands good government to put her to death." The Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused's defence that the statements were religious opinion based on biblical interpretation was rejected.

The court found the materials constituted a clear call to action for violence against the identifiable group and did not fall within the scope of protected religious expression or freedom of expression under the Charter.

The accused was convicted.

On Crown pre-trial applications in a prosecution alleging sexual offences against a child, the court addressed the admissibility of a child complainant's prior statements, a video-recorded statement, and computer forensic expert evidence.

The court held that the prior consistent statements to the mother and first attending officer were not admissible as narrative or as circumstantial evidence of credibility and reliability, except for limited contextual evidence surrounding the initial disclosure and certain physical-description details.

The complainant's video statement was admissible on consent if adopted at trial under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court also qualified the proposed police expert in computer forensic data extraction and admitted the forensic Xbox report in six specified subject-matter areas, finding the evidence probative and not unduly prejudicial.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal raised issues regarding the investigating officer's belief in the proper working order of an Approved Screening Device (ASD), whether breath tests were administered "as soon as practicable" a Section 8 Charter violation, and the trial judge's Section 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law on all grounds, specifically in requiring the officer to perform a self-test on the ASD, misapprehending evidence regarding delays in breath test administration, and consequently, erred in finding a Charter breach and in the Section 24(2) analysis.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and over 80mgs.

The trial judge had found that breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" because the respondent had waived his right to counsel, making police efforts to facilitate counsel contact an unreasonable delay.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by engaging in a minute-by-minute assessment of delay and misapplied the "as soon as practicable" standard.

The court also determined that the respondent's initial responses regarding counsel were ambiguous, not a clear and unequivocal waiver, and thus the police acted reasonably in facilitating counsel.

The appeal was granted, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction for over 80mgs was substituted, remitting the matter for sentencing.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused drove with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds and argued the instruments were unreliable and inaccurate.

The trial spanned 18 days over approximately two years.

The court found the police lawfully stopped the vehicle based on speeding, had reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples, and properly administered the breath tests.

Expert evidence from the Crown's toxicologist established the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 C results.

The defence expert's theory of instrument drift was rejected as unscientific and based on incomplete data.

The accused was convicted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80'.

At trial, the judge found that police breached the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights by conducting an unlawful search of his vehicle under the Liquor License Act, but admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to properly balance the Grant factors and by treating the reliability of breath samples as determinative.

The appeal court conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, finding the breach was moderately serious and had a significant impact on the appellant's privacy interests, as the evidence was not otherwise discoverable.

The breath samples were excluded, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a collision on Highway 144 in October 2013.

The Crown proved the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol through evidence of the accident circumstances, observations of impairment, and breath test results of 201 and 203 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the Intoxilizer 8000C device through expert evidence regarding historical maintenance records and COBRA data.

The court rejected the defence expert's evidence as lacking proper foundation and logical relevance, finding it did not meet the threshold for admissibility.

The court convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9, seeking exclusion of breath sample analysis.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable grounds to believe the Approved Screening Device (ASD) was functioning properly and that the "fail" reading provided sufficient grounds for an Intoxilyzer demand.

The court rejected the Charter application and admitted the breath analysis results.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while exceeding the legal blood alcohol content under section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath analysis evidence, alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 7, 8, and 9.

The court found that the investigating officers had reasonable suspicion and reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples, that the detention was not arbitrary, and that no Charter violations occurred.

The court convicted the accused based on toxicological evidence and the totality of circumstances demonstrating impairment.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting and touching a child for a sexual purpose contrary to sections 271 and 151 of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was credibility.

The complainant, an 11-year-old girl with Global Development Delay, testified that the accused sexually interfered with her in his apartment.

The accused denied the allegations and argued that opportunities for such conduct were limited.

The court found the complainant credible and convicted the accused of touching the child for a sexual purpose under section 151, staying the conviction for sexual assault under section 271 pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to admit two prior consistent statements made by the complainant in a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The court reviewed the general rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible for the truth of their contents but may be admitted for limited purposes such as narrative context or credibility assessment.

One statement to the complainant’s mother was conceded as admissible to explain how the allegations came to the attention of police.

The court also admitted a statement made to the complainant’s boyfriend, finding it necessary to explain the circumstances of disclosure and to avoid undermining the credibility of the witness whose observations prompted the disclosure.

The statements were admissible only in general terms and not for the truth of their contents.

In a criminal prosecution for sexual assault, the Crown brought a motion to admit two alleged prior consistent statements made by the complainant to third parties.

The Crown argued the statements were admissible under the narrative exception to explain the timing and fact of the complaint.

The court reviewed the governing principles that prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible except for limited purposes such as narrative context.

The statement made to one witness was found to be vague, lacking detail, and too remote in time to form part of a narrative, and was excluded.

The statement made to another witness, who was present on the night of the alleged incident and could identify the circumstances with specificity, was admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the fact and timing of the complaint.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following a single motor vehicle accident on Highway 17 near Sudbury.

The Crown alleged that the accused's manner of driving—characterized by excessive speed, alcohol consumption, fatigue, and night driving—constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The defence argued that the accused had taken appropriate evasive action to avoid a collision with an oncoming vehicle, which resulted in the loss of control.

The court found that while the actus reus of dangerous driving was established, the Crown failed to prove the necessary mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.