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A mother whose distracted parenting caused her toddler's drowning received a 90-day intermittent sentence.
A 31-year-old mother pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessities of life to her 18-month-old son, contrary to section 215(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, resulting in the child's death by drowning in a bathtub.
The mother left the child unsupervised while engaged in an 11-minute Facebook conversation.
The Crown sought a 9-month jail sentence; the defence sought a 4-month conditional sentence.
The court imposed 90 days jail to be served intermittently on weekends, plus 24 months probation, finding that actual incarceration was necessary to meet the objectives of denunciation and general deterrence, particularly given the aggravating circumstances involving abuse of a child and the emerging issue of distracted parenting through social media.
The court convicted the accused of impaired driving, rejecting expert evidence challenging breathalyzer reliability.
The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a collision on Highway 144 in October 2013.
The Crown proved the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol through evidence of the accident circumstances, observations of impairment, and breath test results of 201 and 203 milligrams.
The defence challenged the reliability of the Intoxilizer 8000C device through expert evidence regarding historical maintenance records and COBRA data.
The court rejected the defence expert's evidence as lacking proper foundation and logical relevance, finding it did not meet the threshold for admissibility.
The court convicted the accused on both charges.
The court dismissed the Attorney General's motion to set aside amicus curiae orders, affirming its jurisdiction to appoint amicus in an exceptionally complex family law trial.
This is the first known case in Canada wherein a trial judge in a family law proceeding appointed amicus curiae to represent both litigant parents and to assist the court on issues impacting the best interests of children.
The Attorney General brought a motion to set aside the amicus orders, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and misapprehended the law of amicus curiae.
The trial judge appointed amicus for the mother due to her emotional instability, pattern of dismissing counsel, and inability to self-represent in a complex, high-conflict family law matter.
The trial judge subsequently appointed amicus for the father when his counsel sought to withdraw due to unpaid accounts and inability to continue.
The court dismissed the Attorney General's motion, finding the trial judge had jurisdiction to make the orders in the exceptional and unusual circumstances of the case.
The court granted summary judgment for Crown wardship without access, finding the parents' inconsistent visitation failed to establish a beneficial and meaningful relationship.
The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking crown wardship without access to two children.
The parents conceded the issue of finding and crown wardship but sought access, which the Society opposed.
The court applied the two-pronged test under section 59 of the Child and Family Services Act, requiring that the relationship between parent and child be beneficial and meaningful, and that access not impair future adoption opportunities.
The court found no material facts requiring trial and concluded that the parents' relationship with the children was not significantly advantageous.
The parents demonstrated inconsistent and erratic access patterns, cognitive deficiencies affecting parenting capacity, and an indifferent attitude toward the relationship.
The court granted crown wardship with no access.
The accused was found guilty of sexual assault after the court rejected his cultural and lack of experience defences and found the complainant's evidence of non-consensual sex credible.
The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.
The central issue was whether the sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant was consensual.
The complainant testified that she repeatedly told the accused she did not want to have sex, but he used force and violence to overcome her resistance, causing multiple injuries.
The accused claimed the sexual intercourse was consensual and that the complainant initiated sexual interest.
The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence.
The court found that the accused knew exactly what he was doing and used force and violence when the complainant would not comply.
The court rejected the accused's defences based on lack of sexual experience and cultural differences.
The accused was found guilty.
