John S. Poupore

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the City of Greater Sudbury on six charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, following a fatal accident at a construction site.

The trial judge found that the City was neither a "constructor" nor an "employer" under the Act, and alternatively, exercised due diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the City's oversight role for quality control did not transform it into a constructor or employer, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for invitation to sexual touching.

The trial judge had inferred an invitation from the act of touching alone, despite the child complainant's unequivocal testimony that the appellant said nothing.

The appellate court found this inference to be an error involving an essential element of the offence, as it was demonstrably incompatible with the uncontradicted evidence.

Consequently, the verdict was deemed unreasonable, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant landlord appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent tenant $25,000 in damages for illegal distraint and dismissing the landlord's claim for unpaid common area expenses.

The Divisional Court found that the landlord-tenant relationship ended when the landlord changed the locks, making the subsequent distraint of the tenant's chattels illegal.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the landlord's claim for common area expenses due to a lack of supporting evidence at trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel for his sexual assault trial.

The court found that while the accused was ineligible for Legal Aid and required counsel for complex pre-trial motions under ss. 276 and 278 of the Criminal Code, he failed to establish indigence.

The court noted the accused's high level of education and combined income with his common-law partner, concluding he could afford the estimated $3,000 fee for the pre-trial motions.

The application was denied.

The applicants brought a motion under Rule 75.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requesting a trial of issues arising from the estate of the deceased.

The court directed a trial on the single issue of the validity of the deceased's will dated May 16, 1994, noting that resolving this issue would likely resolve all other issues or determine if further proceedings are necessary.

The court ordered the affidavits to form the pleadings and permitted cross-examinations.

No costs were awarded as success was split.

The plaintiff landlord leased a commercial property to the defendant tenant.

The tenant placed excessive landfill on the property, violating conservation authority regulations.

The landlord terminated the lease and seized the tenant's entire fleet of commercial vehicles, holding them for over four years as security for future remediation costs.

The court found the landlord's distraint was illegal and constituted conversion, as a landlord cannot both terminate a lease and distrain goods, nor can they distrain for non-rent damages.

The landlord was awarded damages for the remediation and site plan costs, while the tenant was awarded damages for the converted chattels and lost income.

After set-off, the tenant was granted a net judgment of $106,771.

The applicant husband and respondent wife brought a motion and cross-motion following a 27-year relationship.

The husband sought exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and spousal support, while the wife sought the sale of the home and occupation rent.

The court ordered the immediate sale of the matrimonial home pursuant to the Partition Act, dismissing the husband's claim for exclusive possession.

The court awarded the husband interim spousal support of $2,315 per month, noting his lower income as an artist compared to the wife's income as a pharmacist, and ordered the wife to secure the support with a life insurance policy.

The wife's claim for occupation rent was dismissed because she had not paid spousal support since separation and the husband had housed their dependent children.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal raised issues regarding the investigating officer's belief in the proper working order of an Approved Screening Device (ASD), whether breath tests were administered "as soon as practicable" a Section 8 Charter violation, and the trial judge's Section 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law on all grounds, specifically in requiring the officer to perform a self-test on the ASD, misapprehending evidence regarding delays in breath test administration, and consequently, erred in finding a Charter breach and in the Section 24(2) analysis.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant mother sought leave to appeal an order requiring her to post $25,000 in security for costs for her appeal of a custody and access decision.

The court reviewed the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) and found no conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.

The motion judge had properly considered the exceptional circumstances of the high-conflict litigation and the Family Law Rules.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied under section 521 of the Criminal Code to vacate a Judicial Interim Release Order and substitute a Detention Order for the accused.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace erred by giving excessive weight to the accused's lack of sureties and insufficient weight to his extensive criminal record, particularly concerning primary and secondary grounds for detention.

The Justice of the Peace also failed to adequately analyze the accused's record, his drug problem, and the unsuitability of the proposed living arrangements.

The court granted the Crown's application, ordering the immediate detention of the accused.

Following a decision on the merits, the court requested written submissions on costs.

The defendants submitted bills of costs, but the self-represented plaintiff failed to respond within the allotted time.

The court reviewed the bills of costs, found them reasonable given the complexity of the matter and the number of parties, and awarded costs to the Crown and the police defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

A dispute arose regarding the passing of accounts of a trustee who had acted under a power of attorney for property.

Siblings of the trustee objected to certain expenditures contained in the accounts for a defined period.

The court determined that the evidentiary record was not sufficiently organized for adjudication and directed the objectors to prepare a detailed document identifying each contested expenditure, the trustee’s explanation, and any accountant’s treatment of the item.

The court ordered the document to be served on the trustee for further comment and directed the parties to obtain a judicial resolution date thereafter.

Police defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a civil action alleging multiple intentional torts and Charter breaches arising from arrests for criminal harassment.

The plaintiff had previously resolved the criminal charge by entering into a peace bond.

The court held that this outcome demonstrated reasonable and probable grounds for the police actions and prevented the plaintiff from establishing key elements of claims such as malicious prosecution and negligent investigation.

The pleadings also failed to disclose genuine issues for trial for other alleged torts including false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy, trespass to chattels, misfeasance in public office, and intentional infliction of mental distress.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action.

The Crown brought a motion under Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike and dismiss claims brought against it in tort and for alleged Charter breaches.

The court held that the tort claims were a nullity because the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

With respect to the Charter claims, the statement of claim failed to plead a concise statement of material facts capable of supporting a viable cause of action or damages claim.

The court found the allegations largely constituted a collateral attack on judicial decisions made during the plaintiff’s bail proceedings.

All claims against the Crown were dismissed.

The insurer sought leave relating to a decision refusing to appoint an appraiser under the appraisal provisions of an insurance policy following a loss.

The court noted that the insurer had not demanded an appraisal until more than six years after the loss.

The court held that the appraisal provisions under the statutory conditions in s. 148 of the Insurance Act are not mandatory in multi‑period policies.

The motion judge’s refusal to appoint an appraiser was a discretionary decision and consistent with prior case law.

Leave was denied.

The applicant sought prerogative relief challenging the Attorney General’s decision to intervene in and assume carriage of a private prosecution against a police officer for alleged assault during an arrest.

The applicant alleged bias and abuse of process, arguing that Crown counsel’s handling of prior charges against him and the disclosure of a police video demonstrated partiality.

The court held that the Attorney General has authority to intervene in private prosecutions and that such prosecutorial decisions fall within core Crown discretion, subject to review only for abuse of process.

The evidence relied on by the applicant was largely hearsay and insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias or abuse of process.

The court found no improper conduct in the Crown’s disclosure practices or earlier settlement discussions.

The bankrupt sought a discharge from bankruptcy, which was opposed by the trustee and a creditor.

The objecting creditor argued the bankrupt was dishonest, contributed to his bankruptcy by extravagant living, and failed to disclose assets.

The court found the bankrupt had transferred a property to his father at undervalue within five years of bankruptcy to defraud creditors, and failed to disclose other assets including vehicles and RRSPs.

The court suspended the discharge for two years and declared the property transfer void against the trustee.

The responding spouse brought a motion to change an existing spousal support order following retirement and reduced income.

The parties agreed that a material change in circumstances existed under s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act due to the payor’s retirement and the recipient’s inability to work because of medical issues.

The court found the recipient remained entitled to compensatory and needs‑based support given the long marriage and her role raising the children, but that the payor’s retirement justified a reduction in support.

Applying the principles in Boston v. Boston regarding double dipping and considering the recipient’s cohabitation with a new partner, the court declined to include double dipping in calculating support.

The existing order was varied to reduce spousal support to $946 per month with no retroactive adjustment.

A bankrupt applicant sought an order under s. 178(1.1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act declaring that the statutory non-dischargeability of student loan debt under s. 178(1) did not apply.

The court considered the applicant’s circumstances, including long‑term financial hardship, limited earning capacity, and significant personal and medical challenges.

Applying the statutory two‑part test, the court was satisfied the applicant had acted in good faith in connection with the student loans and continued to experience financial difficulty that would prevent repayment.

The court concluded the statutory criteria were met and granted relief permitting the discharge of the student loan debt.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion to change a consent order requiring payment of child and spousal support following the breakdown of a common-law relationship.

The applicant alleged that a prior assault by the respondent caused injuries rendering her incapable of remunerative employment and entitling her to continued spousal support despite the short duration of the relationship.

The court held that the applicant bore the onus of establishing that her alleged incapacity was caused by the assault.

Medical evidence did not establish on a balance of probabilities that the injuries were attributable to the assault or that the applicant was incapable of employment.

Child support was terminated retroactively to December 31, 2010, and spousal support was terminated effective May 31, 2013.