Pierre E. Roger

The applicants, owners of a restaurant offering shisha, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the City of Ottawa from enforcing a bylaw prohibiting the use of water pipes in indoor public places, pending their Charter challenge.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm due to the corporate applicant's potential lack of standing for Charter damages.

However, the balance of convenience favoured the City, as the public interest in protecting health from second-hand smoke outweighed the applicants' financial losses and temporary limits on cultural traditions.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the City.

The plaintiff commenced 48 separate actions (38 in Superior Court, 10 in Small Claims Court) relating to various loan transactions, primarily alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against its former lawyers.

The defendant lawyers brought a motion to consolidate the actions.

The court ordered that 37 of the Superior Court actions be consolidated into a single action to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and reduce costs.

The 10 Small Claims Court actions were also consolidated and ordered to be transferred and tried together with the Superior Court action.

All actions were ordered to be case managed.

This endorsement clarifies and replaces the terms of a supervision order and access conditions previously issued in a child protection matter.

The court ordered the Children's Aid Society to devise a gradual reintegration schedule for the children M and C to return to the mother's full-time care by August 14, 2017.

It also set out detailed conditions for the mother's twelve-month supervision order, including no contact with the father or other specified individuals, cooperation with the Society, drug testing, and participation in recommended programs.

For the father, limited supervised access of one hour every two weeks was granted, subject to specific conditions including cooperation with the Society and no unsupervised contact with the children.

The applicant sought Crown wardship of two young children based on allegations of severe physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by the parents against older siblings.

The court found the children in need of protection due to a real risk of physical and emotional harm, primarily stemming from the father's historical violence and the mother's failure to protect the older siblings.

However, applying the least disruptive alternative principle, the court rejected Crown wardship.

Instead, the court ordered that the children be placed in the mother's care under a 12-month supervision order with strict conditions, including that she have no contact with the father, who was granted only limited supervised access.

This addendum to reasons for decision addresses a request by the defendant, Fraser Hillary’s Limited, to present supplementary submissions concerning compensation under s. 99 of the Environmental Protection Act, citing the Court of Appeal decision in McCann v. Environmental Compensation Corp. The court declined the request, affirming the principle of finality and finding that the issue did not warrant reconsideration.

The court also clarified its prior finding that applying s. 99(2) was not retroactive and questioned the applicability of McCann to the present case.

A respondent in a child protection trial brought a motion for the judge to recuse himself and declare a mistrial, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegation stemmed from the judge contemplating, and seeking submissions on, whether to summon additional witnesses under s. 49 of the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) to address conflicting evidence, a possibility the judge later decided against.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a reasonable, informed person would not conclude that the judge would not decide the case fairly.

The decision emphasized the high threshold for proving bias, the presumption of judicial impartiality, and the unique procedural flexibilities afforded to courts in child protection proceedings under the CFSA and Family Law Rules.

The applicant sought costs after a motion where success was divided.

The court considered factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the divided success, the importance of the issue to the respondent, and the applicant's offers to settle, which, despite minor non-compliance, could have avoided the motion.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $2,000 in all-inclusive costs to the applicant, considering the respondent's limited means and proportionality.

The applicant sought spousal support and division of family property.

A motion for interim relief was brought, which was settled by consent order on October 18, 2016, reserving costs.

The applicant sought $27,500 in costs, while the respondent argued no costs should be awarded or that the amount was exaggerated.

The court found the applicant's motion reasonable and necessary due to the respondent's conduct and insufficient disclosure of income.

The applicant's offer to settle also entitled her to full indemnity costs from August 24, 2016.

The court awarded the applicant $27,500 in costs.

The plaintiff property owner sued the adjacent dry cleaning business and its principal for environmental contamination caused by the migration of dry cleaning solvents (PCE/TCE) onto his lands.

The court dismissed claims in trespass, strict liability, and negligence, but found the corporate defendant liable in private nuisance and under section 99 of the Environmental Protection Act.

The individual defendant was not found liable as he did not own or control the pollutant at the time of the spills and his subsequent inaction did not cause the plaintiff's damages.

The court awarded the plaintiff $1,632,500 for remediation costs and $201,726.71 for engineering expenses.

The applicant sought to invalidate a separation agreement, arguing non-disclosure of assets and lack of understanding, and claimed child and spousal support.

The respondent, self-represented, argued the agreement's validity.

The court found the applicant not credible regarding financial knowledge and understanding of the agreement, upholding the separation agreement's validity under the Family Law Act.

However, the court confirmed its jurisdiction to review child support and special expenses under the Divorce Act, ordering these to be payable according to guidelines, and found no basis to deviate from the spousal support waiver in the agreement under the Miglin framework.

The offender, an 80-year-old former priest, was convicted of three counts of historical indecent assault against three altar boys between 1969 and 1974.

The Crown sought 18 months' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the aggravating factors of multiple child victims and breach of trust, alongside mitigating factors including the offender's age, lack of criminal record, and low risk of reoffending.

The court concluded that the specific facts of the case, involving less intrusive touching compared to other cases, warranted a 12-month conditional sentence followed by 18 months of probation, along with DNA and sex offender registry orders.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought release from custody pending trial.

The court assessed the proposed release plan, which included a surety (the accused's mother) and electronic monitoring, against the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

The court found the surety to be unreliable due to past inability to control the accused and a lack of understanding regarding previous bail conditions.

The electronic monitoring was deemed insufficient given the weak surety.

The court concluded that the accused failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary for public protection or to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the serious and violent nature of the alleged offence and the apparent strength of the prosecution's case.

Bail was denied.

The applicants, engineering consultants, sought a declaration that they were entitled to a defence and indemnity from the respondent insurer under a construction insurance policy for underlying actions alleging negligence and nuisance arising from a shoring system design.

The insurer denied coverage based on a professional services exclusion.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the nuisance claims were based on acts arising out of the rendering of professional services, and therefore the exclusion clause clearly and unambiguously applied to preclude the duty to defend.

The plaintiff, a 58-year-old top-performing sales manager with eight years of service, brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer.

The court found the plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, from the start of his engagement.

The court awarded a 12-month reasonable notice period, calculating damages based on base salary and an upward trend in commissions.

The court dismissed the claim for aggravated damages due to insufficient evidence of mental distress, but awarded $50,000 in punitive damages because the employer alleged just cause in bad faith as a negotiation tactic and significantly delayed paying statutory entitlements.

This endorsement addresses costs following the defendant's successful motions to strike the plaintiff's statements of claim in two actions.

The defendant, a self-represented lawyer, sought substantial costs on a partial indemnity basis, arguing lost income.

The court, applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the defendant's conduct unreasonable in refusing a reasonable adjournment request and filing excessive and unhelpful materials, which unduly complicated and lengthened the proceedings.

Despite the defendant's success on the underlying motions, the court significantly reduced the requested costs due to this unreasonable conduct and the lack of settlement efforts.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay a total of $7,200 in costs across both actions, with no costs awarded for an earlier adjournment.

The Plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that set aside a default judgment, dismissed a contempt motion, and dismissed a motion to add a guardianship application.

The court applied the strict two-part test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the original order, and no matters of general importance beyond the immediate parties.

Leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the Defendant.

The applicant, K.H., brought an application under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude all evidence seized at his residence and three statements made to the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP).

K.H. argued that the OPP breached his rights under sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, and that his statements were not voluntary.

The court found that K.H. was psychologically detained when he entered the police vehicle, and his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) were breached because he was not immediately informed of his rights.

The first and second statements were excluded due to these breaches.

The third statement was excluded because the Crown failed to prove its voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to inadequate police record-keeping during the search and subsequent interactions.

The warrantless search of K.H.'s residence was found to be unreasonable and in breach of section 8 of the Charter, as exigent circumstances were not established, and the police had sufficient grounds to obtain a warrant.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the evidence (statements, handgun, ammunition, and long guns) would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded all evidence.

The defendant, William Ndze Fuhgeh, brought a motion to strike two statements of claim filed by the plaintiff, Bruno Makoundi, in actions 16-68462 and 16-68824.

The defendant argued abuse of process, absolute privilege, and that the claims were time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court stayed action 16-68462, finding it largely an abuse of process attempting to relitigate matters already dealt with by the Federal Court and duplicative of action 16-68824.

In action 16-68824, the court allowed it to proceed but struck numerous paragraphs without leave to amend, including allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation, irrelevant facts, and time-barred defamation claims.

The plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended statement of claim in action 16-68824, incorporating non-repetitive elements from the stayed action, and was ordered to correct formatting and party names.

A corresponding counterclaim in a related action (15-64497) was prohibited to prevent duplication.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change child support and sought retroactive section 7 expenses.

The court determined the applicable retroactive period for section 7 expenses, limiting it to three years prior to formal notice, consistent with *D.B.S. v. S.R.G.* The parties' respective incomes and proportionate shares for section 7 expenses were agreed upon.

The court then assessed various claimed expenses, allowing some (e.g., swim camp, swim club, physiotherapy, orthodontic expenses, psychological counselling) and disallowing others (e.g., clothing, recreational equipment, cycling expenses, cellphone, school tutoring) based on whether they qualified as special or extraordinary expenses under the Federal Child Support Guidelines and previous court orders.

A net amount of $173.00 was ordered to be paid by the respondent to the applicant for section 7 expenses.

The applicant's requests to transfer RRSPs for payment of arrears and to transfer jurisdiction to Manitoba were dismissed.

No order was made as to costs due to insufficient evidence.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship of the child, V.T., without access, for the purpose of adoption.

The mother, C.A.T., sought the child's return to her care.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to the mother's inability to prioritize the child's needs, lack of insight into parenting deficits, and inappropriate conduct during supervised access, including delusional thoughts and threats related to the mafia.

Despite the mother's community integration and efforts to improve her lifestyle, the court determined that the risks of returning the child were real and that a supervision order would be unworkable due to the mother's lack of cooperation with the Society.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, finding it to be in the child's best interests for permanent placement through adoption.