Pierre E. Roger

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a motor vehicle accident claim, arguing prejudice due to the indefinite suspension of civil jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave to hear the motion and took judicial notice of the fact that while a judge-alone trial could be scheduled in the near future, the timeline for resuming civil jury trials was unknown.

Balancing the substantive right to a jury trial against the need for a timely and affordable resolution, the court struck the jury notice but allowed the parties the option to return to court if a jury trial becomes available before the scheduled judge-alone trial.

Following a costs endorsement, the plaintiffs requested a reconsideration, arguing the court omitted to deal with elements of their discovery requests.

The court declined to reconsider, noting that the costs of the plaintiffs' motions for further discovery were already assessed and regrouped under the production issues in the earlier decision.

The court issued a costs endorsement for multiple motions heard on January 9, 2020, in an insurance dispute.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs against AXA and McLeod for successful production motions, and against AXA for a successful motion regarding the "building under construction" exclusion.

The defendants Irvin Hoffman and Cohen & Lord Insurance Brokers Limited also received partial indemnity costs from AXA for their successful motion on the "building under construction" exclusion.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs against McLeod and the brokers for their unsuccessful summary judgment motions, as the moving defendants acted unreasonably by failing to adduce sufficient evidence on discoverability.

The court fixed specific amounts for each cost award.

The accused, Tyler Floyd and Amanda Mailloux, were charged with multiple offences including distribution of child pornography, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit from sexual services, recruiting for exploitation, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm.

The complainant was a 15-year-old drug-addicted girl.

The court conducted a detailed credibility and reliability assessment of the complainant's evidence, noting significant memory issues, inconsistencies, and drug use impacting her testimony.

The court also considered the co-accused Ms. Mailloux's testimony and Mr. Floyd's police statement.

Ultimately, the court found reasonable doubt on most charges against both accused due to the complainant's unreliable evidence and inconsistencies.

Mr. Floyd was found not guilty of assault causing bodily harm but guilty of the lesser included offence of simple assault.

All other charges against both accused were dismissed.

The plaintiffs' property suffered two water damage incidents, leading to claims against their insurer (AXA/Intact), an independent adjuster (McLeod), and insurance brokers (Hoffman and Cohen & Lord).

The court addressed multiple motions: the defendants' summary judgment motions regarding limitation periods and an "under construction" exclusion, and the plaintiffs' motion for better discovery and an informed representative.

The court dismissed the defendants' limitation period arguments (without prejudice to trial), found the "under construction" exclusion inapplicable, and granted the plaintiffs' discovery requests, ordering the defendants to provide better affidavits of documents and an informed representative, and for McLeod to be examined for discovery.

In a blended voir dire on voluntariness, the court considered whether post-arrest utterances and recorded police interviews were inadmissible because of trickery, oppression, implied promises, or denigration of defence counsel.

Applying the confession rule and the contextual framework from Oickle and Singh, the court held the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The interviewing techniques did not amount to community-shocking trickery, no oppressive atmosphere overbore either accused's will, and any alleged inducement arose from one accused's own attempts to negotiate.

All three statements were admitted.

During a trial for human trafficking and related offences, the accused brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant about her prior involvement in prostitution in the two weeks preceding the alleged offences.

The accused argued this evidence was relevant to whether the complainant was 'recruited' by them, which is an essential element of the offences charged.

The court granted the application, finding that the proposed evidence had significant probative value regarding the issue of recruitment and the complainant's credibility, and that this probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The offender was found guilty of sexual assault and theft under $5,000, and pled guilty to failing to comply with a SOIRA order.

The offences occurred when the offender followed an intoxicated victim into her apartment building and sexually assaulted her in the stairwell, subsequently stealing her bank cards.

At the time of the offences, the offender was on probation for a prior sexual assault conviction.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 4 years and 2 months in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity during their trial for various sexual exploitation and child pornography offences.

The court addressed whether the s. 276 regime of the Criminal Code applied, given that the charged offences were not explicitly listed in s. 276(1).

Relying on the Supreme Court's broad interpretation in R. v. Barton, the court found that the s. 276 regime applied due to a sufficient connection between the charged offences and the listed offences, requiring the accused to bring a formal application to admit such evidence.

Following a three-week trial where the plaintiff's action for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation was dismissed, the successful defendants sought costs of over $523,000.

The defendants relied on an offer to settle for $100,000.

The court found that the defendants' fees were disproportionate and that the federal government had failed to meet its document production obligations, which unnecessarily lengthened the trial.

Balancing the defendants' success and offer to settle against their improper conduct regarding document disclosure, the court fixed costs at $100,000 all-inclusive.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a teenage complainant who was the daughter of a woman he had briefly dated.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence but held that the Crown still failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable because of significant internal inconsistencies, external contradictions with other Crown witnesses, and uncertainty about key factual details, including the number and sequence of the alleged incidents.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, robbery, and fraud.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault and fraud.

For the robbery charge, the court found the accused guilty of the lesser included offence of theft under five thousand dollars, as the timing between the theft and the subsequent sexual assault was unclear, preventing a finding of "immediate" connection required for robbery.

The decision involved a detailed analysis of consent in sexual assault cases, the reliability of witness testimony given intoxication and memory gaps, and the application of reasonable doubt principles.

The plaintiff sued for damages totalling approximately two million dollars, alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation against the Attorney General of Canada and a contract manager, Paul Piché.

The claims arose from the plaintiff's participation in a 2007 Request for Standing Offer (RFSO) where his bid was largely prepared by a competitor, leading to a bid-rigging investigation and charges (later stayed).

The plaintiff argued that negligent answers to RFSO questions induced his actions and that Piché's statements to the Competition Bureau were defamatory.

The court dismissed all claims, finding no duty of care owed by the defendants to provide legal advice on the Competition Act, no negligent misrepresentation or breach of standard of care, and no malice in the defamation claim.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's reliance was unreasonable and that his alleged damages were unproven and too remote, largely attributable to his own contributory negligence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal denying him Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefits.

The Tribunal had found that the appellant's impairments were not substantial at the time of the Director's decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in law by unreasonably disregarding a psychiatric report prepared after the Director's decision, which was admissible under s. 64(1) of O. Reg. 222/98.

The Tribunal also misapprehended medical imaging evidence regarding the appellant's physical condition and failed to consider medical opinions relating to his depression.

The matter was remitted to a new panel for a rehearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal denying him Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefits.

The Tribunal had found that the appellant's impairments were not substantial at the time of the Director's decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in law by unreasonably disregarding a psychiatrist's report prepared after the Director's decision, which corroborated the appellant's physical and mental conditions.

The matter was remitted to a new panel of the Tribunal for a rehearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal affirming the termination of his ODSP benefits.

His benefits were terminated because he was absent from Ontario for more than 30 days after travelling to Mexico and missing his return flight due to illness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Tribunal's decision and noting the appellant conceded he was ineligible for ODSP benefits during the relevant period because he was receiving OSAP.

The plaintiff, Moira Caron, sued for damages following a slip and fall in her workplace kitchenette.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendants, as occupiers, met their positive duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act by maintaining a reasonable system of cleaning, inspection, and call service.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to prove that her ongoing complaints and inability to return to work after January 2011 were caused by the slip and fall incident, attributing them instead to a pre-existing anxiety disorder.

The applicant, Daryl Earl Selkirk, sought costs following a successful application to be appointed sole estate trustee of his mother's estate, with the respondent James Loris Selkirk removed.

The court addressed the allocation of costs, departing from the traditional estate litigation approach where costs are charged to the estate, and instead applied civil litigation principles ("loser pays") subject to public policy considerations.

The court found that James acted unreasonably in part by failing to provide clear accounts, leading to a conflict of interest.

Costs were ordered to be paid partially by James personally (or from his share of the estate) to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, with the balance of the applicant's costs paid by the estate on a full indemnity basis.

A portion of James's costs, deemed reasonably necessary for estate administration, was also ordered to be paid by the estate.

The plaintiff sought damages of approximately $4.8 million for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the duty of good faith arising from a renewable energy contract.

The plaintiff acquired the secured debt of a company that had a contract with the defendant to build a biomass energy facility.

When the company filed for bankruptcy, the defendant treated the contract as automatically terminated pursuant to its terms, requiring the plaintiff to seek a new agreement.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the contract unambiguously provided for automatic termination upon bankruptcy, the defendant did not act in bad faith, and the plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages and prove an enforceable agreement for the sale of the contract.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action seeking the return of a $100,000 donation.

The plaintiffs alleged the donation was a conditional gift made for the sole purpose of purchasing a home for three young men with developmental disabilities, and claimed breach of contract and misrepresentation.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and utilized its fact-finding powers, concluding that the contemporaneous evidence and the parties' subsequent actions contradicted the plaintiffs' claim of a conditional agreement.

The court found the donation was made without strings attached and dismissed the action, awarding costs to the defendants.