Paul Burstein

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the accused on nine counts of historical indecent assault.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, including three to which the accused had just pled guilty, due to a 27-month delay between arrest and trial, finding a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the 16.5 months of institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines and the accused suffered only slight prejudice, primarily related to winter travel difficulties rather than the delay itself.

The stay was set aside, and the matter was remanded for trial on the not-guilty pleas and sentencing on the guilty pleas.

The appellant appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, which was entered on his consent at trial.

He alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, but the appointed amicus curiae found no basis for this claim.

The Court of Appeal held there was no evidence that the appellant's consent was involuntary, equivocal, or uninformed, and found the NCR verdict was reasonable based on the psychiatric assessment and the appellant's history.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board detaining him at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

At the hearing, the appellant conceded he obtained the placement he sought.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board was justified in rejecting the request for an absolute discharge given uncontroverted evidence that the appellant continued to present a significant threat to the public.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the respondent's cell probe comments did not amount to an adoption of a co-accused's entire recanted statement, and by refusing to admit the respondent's criminal record for violence after the defence adduced evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The Crown also argued defence counsel made inflammatory remarks in closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and concluding that while defence counsel's remarks about race were inappropriate, they did not meet the heavy onus required to overturn a jury acquittal.

The appellant telecommunications company sought an exemption from two production orders requiring it to produce call data records for criminal investigations, arguing that compliance without compensation was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Criminal Code production order scheme does not permit a judge to order compensation for compliance.

A judge can only consider the financial aspect of compliance when deciding whether to grant an exemption on the basis that the financial burden is unreasonable.

The Court found that the appellant had not established that the cost of compliance was unreasonable in this case, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal noted a six-month delay in the delivery of the Board's reasons and urged the Board to deliver reasons promptly in the future.

The Court declined to assess alleged factual errors, noting that a new hearing was scheduled for the following week where counsel could ensure the Board had a proper appreciation of the facts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the appeal was not moot, the Board's disposition was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that found he continued to suffer from a serious mental disorder and remained dangerous, ordering his detention in a minimum secure unit.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding him dangerous and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's disposition was reasonable, supported by medical evidence of the appellant's lack of insight, illicit drug use, and risk of decompensation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Board's disposition but noted a legitimate concern regarding whether the appellant might be appropriately placed in a medium security facility other than Brockville.

The Court asked the Board to consider this question at the appellant's upcoming hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and robbery and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge gave the appellant an enhanced credit of seven years for five years and three months of pre-sentence custody, effectively applying a 1.33-for-1 ratio instead of the usual 2-for-1 credit.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the judge erred by departing from the 2-for-1 practice without adequate explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's reasons clearly indicated the appellant posed a serious danger to society and was unlikely to receive early parole, which justified the departure from the normal practice.

The accused was charged with driving over the legal limit.

At trial, he argued that the warrantless seizure of his breath violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown called no evidence to establish that the police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breathalyzer demand.

The trial judge excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the accused bore the burden of proving the seizure was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, confirming that a warrantless seizure of breath is prima facie unreasonable and the burden shifts to the Crown to prove its reasonableness.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, relying on a dissent in the court below.

The appeal was brought pursuant to section 693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the matter to determine if the dissent raised a valid question of law.

The Court concluded that the dissent in the court below did not raise an issue of law as required by the statute.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The applicant's driver's licence was suspended for failing to submit a satisfactory medical report.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal declined jurisdiction to hear the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction over suspensions under s. 32(12)(b)(ii) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal could only decline jurisdiction if it was satisfied that the Minister made the order or that there was a valid delegation of power to the Registrar.

As there was no evidence of such delegation in the record, the Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal to assess its jurisdiction.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings for charges arising from incidents in 1990 and 1991.

The complainant and police had initially decided not to pursue an investigation in 1992, and charges were not laid until 2000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary decision to grant the stay.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident after deliberately driving his car into a pedestrian who had previously assaulted him.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on his mental state and automatism defence.

He also appealed his sentence of two years less a day and a five-year driving prohibition, arguing the trial judge improperly considered his intentional conduct as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and upheld the custodial sentence, finding that a sentencing judge may consider intentional conduct as an aggravating factor even for an offence based on objective fault.

However, the court reduced the driving prohibition from five years to one year.

The appellant, a store owner who sold hemp products and marihuana seedlings, was convicted of possession and trafficking of cannabis sativa.

He challenged the constitutionality of the prohibition on simple possession of marihuana under the Narcotic Control Act, arguing it infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the availability of imprisonment engages the right to liberty, the prohibition accords with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court rejected arguments based on privacy, overbreadth, and statutory interpretation regarding THC levels.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder.

He appealed on four grounds: the trial judge's failure to declare a mistrial due to mid-trial publicity about his prior murder conviction, the admission of discreditable conduct evidence regarding his habit of carrying a knife, the ruling allowing the Crown to cross-examine him on his compelled testimony from a co-accused's trial, and the jury instructions on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings or instructions.

The Crown requested a stay of the order of Lederman J. pending the release of the Court of Appeal's reasons on the main appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to grant the stay, finding that the Crown had not demonstrated sufficient potential prejudice to warrant it.

The Court relied on the Crown's stated intention to operate under its interim policy pending the decision, with leave for any party to apply for interim relief if circumstances change.