Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, S.P., appealed convictions for sexual offences against his daughters, which occurred approximately 40 years prior.

The appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but this was later abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, and rejecting the ineffective assistance claim and the admission of fresh evidence.

The Crown applied for a review of a second bail judge's decision to release the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy.

The second bail judge had found a material change in circumstances based on new evidence regarding the identity of a purchaser of GPS trackers and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's application, finding that the second bail judge made a palpable and overriding error in assessing the strength of the Crown's case and erred in law by treating the pandemic as an automatic material change without considering it in the context of the first bail judge's findings.

The accused was ordered detained pending trial.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code pending his re-trial on terrorism charges.

Before the terms of release were finalized, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the applicant's convictions, resulting in him serving a life sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 680 application as moot, noting that any future application for release must be brought under s. 679 for bail pending appeal.

A publication ban under s. 517 was also lifted.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant appealed his conviction from a judge alone trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The trial judge provided extensive and thorough reasons addressing the issues raised on appeal.

The case turned on an assessment of credibility.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of collusion allegations against Crown witnesses and objected to the use of notes created subsequent to the events.

The appellant also raised the issue of being denied a legal aid certificate and proceeding without counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and no demonstrated unfairness in the trial proceedings.

The Crown appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board regarding a respondent found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for violent offences committed at a Canadian Forces recruiting centre.

The respondent was diagnosed with schizophrenia and found incapable of knowing his conduct was morally wrong.

The Board ordered detention on a secure forensic unit but granted limited indirectly supervised privileges to attend a local college for educational purposes within a two-kilometre radius of the hospital.

The Crown challenged both the indirect supervision privilege and the Board's failure to prohibit all contact with uniformed military personnel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the Board did not err in law and its disposition was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted after a two-week jury trial of possession of a prohibited firearm without a license, possession of an over-capacity magazine, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to nine years and three months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in failing to provide limiting instructions to the jury regarding photographs of a firearm found on the appellant's cell phone, and in failing to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the testimony of the appellant's brother.

The Court set aside the convictions on the firearm-related counts and ordered a new trial on those counts, while upholding the drug and proceeds convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 22 months imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant raised issues regarding DNA testing of the complainant's underwear and challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding his alibi.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

On sentencing, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, but concluded the error did not justify a lesser sentence given the victim's young age, the breach of trust, the serious impact on the victim, and the appellant's prior criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of his step-daughter over a period of approximately nine years, from when she was five to fourteen years old.

The sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching convictions were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the appellant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing they were tainted by palpable and overriding errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to rely on police testimony regarding the seller's location in the vehicle and physical description.

The appeal was dismissed as the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm against his nephew.

The appellant admitted to kicking the complainant in the head and body after the complainant fell to the ground during a physical altercation.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's claim of self-defence, finding the kicks were administered out of anger and a desire to inflict punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence, he did not misapprehend the law of self-defence, and his reasons were adequate.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act against a general contractor and a subcontractor following a workplace fatality.

The trial judge had dismissed the counts on the basis that they were duplicitous and failed to disclose an offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge confused overlapping counts with duplicitous ones, and erred in collapsing the information.

A new trial was ordered on the dismissed counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for mens rea and that the evidence did not support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge stated and applied the correct legal test.

The Court found the evidence fully supported the finding of recklessness, as the appellant spent nine hours at the complainant's business without a legitimate purpose, was obsessed with the complainant, and was aware of the risk his conduct harassed her.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

The convictions were based on the testimony of a single complainant regarding historical sexual activities.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the criminal standard of proof, noting her inadequate treatment of significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and her problematic formulation of her ultimate conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the accused after finding him guilty of sexual assault and sexual touching.

The trial judge had granted the stay on the basis that lost police audiotapes and notes from a 1994 investigation prejudiced the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Crown had satisfactorily explained the loss of the audiotapes and that the lost evidence was not so prejudicial as to warrant a stay, given the availability of other records and evidence to challenge the complainants' credibility.

The Court set aside the stay and ordered a new trial rather than reinstating the guilty verdicts, as the trial judge had failed to factor the lost evidence into his assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his 30-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in her credibility findings and failed to consider a conditional sentence on compassionate grounds due to his poor health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principles and conducted a fair assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's medical needs could be adequately managed in custody.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that although the trial judge erred in admitting the record of arrest, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of possession.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred in finding multiple bail breaches and imposed a sentence inconsistent with her reasons.

The sentence was reduced to 8.5 months, reflecting a 12-month sentence less 3.5 months of pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed by the sentencing judge on his own motion without advance notice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay, noting a lack of evidence regarding his expenses and income.

Given that the appellant had already served his conditional sentence and probation, and had paid over $10,000 in restitution despite only receiving $5,000 from the fraud, the appeal was allowed and the restitution order was reduced to the amount already paid.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking after police stopped his car for erratic driving, smelled marijuana, and found 197 grams of marijuana during a search.

On appeal, the appellant argued the evidence should have been excluded under the Charter and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the search was justified as a valid search incident to arrest and the record supported the trial judge's inferences regarding possession for the purpose of trafficking.