Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, S.P., appealed convictions for sexual offences against his daughters, which occurred approximately 40 years prior.

The appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but this was later abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, and rejecting the ineffective assistance claim and the admission of fresh evidence.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code pending his re-trial on terrorism charges.

Before the terms of release were finalized, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the applicant's convictions, resulting in him serving a life sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 680 application as moot, noting that any future application for release must be brought under s. 679 for bail pending appeal.

A publication ban under s. 517 was also lifted.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and indignity to human remains after confessing to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the confession was obtained through police coercion amounting to an abuse of process under the Hart framework.

He also appealed his 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the police conduct was not coercive and the appellant's will was not overborne.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was not demonstrably unfit given the horrific nature of the crimes and the aggravating factors.

Two appellants, T.F. and M.W., appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the execution-style killing of their friend Tyrone Bracken.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on text messages, video surveillance, and post-offence conduct.

The trial judge found that the appellants participated in a pre-arranged plan to murder the victim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in using post-offence conduct to infer their participation and intent, committed a Villaroman error by reversing the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly used the appellants' failure to express shock or horror at the killing as circumstantial evidence of their knowledge and participation in a planned murder.

The appellant was convicted after a two-week jury trial of possession of a prohibited firearm without a license, possession of an over-capacity magazine, possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to nine years and three months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in failing to provide limiting instructions to the jury regarding photographs of a firearm found on the appellant's cell phone, and in failing to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the testimony of the appellant's brother.

The Court set aside the convictions on the firearm-related counts and ordered a new trial on those counts, while upholding the drug and proceeds convictions.

The appellant was convicted of one count of indecent assault and one count of gross indecency relating to a complainant (TS) for events that occurred in 1978 when the complainant was 16 years old and the appellant was her skating coach.

He received a 12-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the admission of reply evidence from the complainant's boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessments and determining that the reply evidence was properly admitted as it addressed a live issue that arose from the defence case.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of his step-daughter over a period of approximately nine years, from when she was five to fourteen years old.

The sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching convictions were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the appellant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing they were tainted by palpable and overriding errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving two complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of similar fact evidence across counts, the assessment of similarities and differences in the evidence, the possibility of collusion, and the assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice in the omission of an express 'bad personhood' instruction and concluding the trial judge's instructions adequately equipped the jury to perform their adjudicative function.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm against his nephew.

The appellant admitted to kicking the complainant in the head and body after the complainant fell to the ground during a physical altercation.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's claim of self-defence, finding the kicks were administered out of anger and a desire to inflict punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence, he did not misapprehend the law of self-defence, and his reasons were adequate.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending his appeal from convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure, for which he was sentenced to three and a half years in prison.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender into custody, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court emphasized the viciousness of the offences, the applicant's history of breaching court orders, and the risk he posed to public safety, particularly given outstanding charges for a similar group attack.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The applicant applied for bail pending his appeal of an order committing him for extradition to the United States on charges relating to child pornography and child luring.

The court found that the applicant was not a flight risk and that the public interest alone did not justify his continued detention.

However, the application for bail was dismissed because the applicant failed to raise an arguable ground of appeal from his committal order.

The court found the evidence was sufficient for committal and that subscriber information obtained without a warrant would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge failed to comply with s. 16.1(6) of the Canada Evidence Act by not explicitly asking the child complainant to promise to tell the truth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no particular words are required to comply with the provision, and the complainant's agreement after the trial judge explained the importance of telling the truth was sufficient.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

The appellant appealed convictions for production of marijuana, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and theft under.

He argued the circumstantial evidence did not support the inference that he had the required knowledge and control of the grow operation.

The court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence as a whole, correctly instructed herself on circumstantial evidence, and reasonably concluded that the only reasonable inference was guilt.

The court also rejected the submission that documents seized from the appellant’s home were used improperly.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual assaults against three young girls.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference against the credibility of one appellant's testimony because the defence failed to cross-examine a complainant on alleged written consent documents, invoking the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the adverse inference was a proper part of the trial judge's fact-finding and weighing of evidence, not a penalty for a tactical error.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge misapprehended evidence or failed to give separate consideration to the co-appellant's case.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering the Ontario Provincial Police to release the respondent's seized firearms to his brother.

The respondent had been sentenced to probation with a condition to abstain from possessing weapons.

The Crown argued the firearms were automatically forfeited under s. 115 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the probation condition constituted a prohibition order, the respondent was not in possession of the firearms at the commencement of the order because they were in police custody.

Therefore, s. 115 did not apply, and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act against a general contractor and a subcontractor following a workplace fatality.

The trial judge had dismissed the counts on the basis that they were duplicitous and failed to disclose an offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge confused overlapping counts with duplicitous ones, and erred in collapsing the information.

A new trial was ordered on the dismissed counts.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the accused after finding him guilty of sexual assault and sexual touching.

The trial judge had granted the stay on the basis that lost police audiotapes and notes from a 1994 investigation prejudiced the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Crown had satisfactorily explained the loss of the audiotapes and that the lost evidence was not so prejudicial as to warrant a stay, given the availability of other records and evidence to challenge the complainants' credibility.

The Court set aside the stay and ordered a new trial rather than reinstating the guilty verdicts, as the trial judge had failed to factor the lost evidence into his assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that although the trial judge erred in admitting the record of arrest, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of possession.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred in finding multiple bail breaches and imposed a sentence inconsistent with her reasons.

The sentence was reduced to 8.5 months, reflecting a 12-month sentence less 3.5 months of pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed by the sentencing judge on his own motion without advance notice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay, noting a lack of evidence regarding his expenses and income.

Given that the appellant had already served his conditional sentence and probation, and had paid over $10,000 in restitution despite only receiving $5,000 from the fraud, the appeal was allowed and the restitution order was reduced to the amount already paid.