Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, common assault, and mischief, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the sexual assault and common assault convictions, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of DNA evidence, resolution of inconsistencies, or consideration of post-offence conduct.

However, the mischief conviction was quashed due to insufficient analysis by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to correct a pre-sentence custody credit error, with the overall sentence upheld as appropriate given the nature of the offences and the appellant's record.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction and sought leave to appeal her sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's jury charge adequacy and the lack of a specific direction on handwriting comparisons, finding the charge fair in context and the jury adequately equipped.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within range and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant, Abadula Biya, appealed his conviction and sentence for charges including unauthorized possession of a firearm and ammunition, possession of a Schedule I controlled substance for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence in rejecting the appellant's third-party suspect defence, specifically regarding the time available for a co-accused to hide contraband and his propensity.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence was material, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and assault against his stepson, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his explanation for a Facebook apology, reversed the burden of proof, and failed to resolve inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant's explanation for the apology.

The Court also held that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and was not required to resolve all peripheral inconsistencies in the evidence.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for three counts of assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board detaining him at a forensic hospital.

He sought an absolute discharge, arguing he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's longstanding, treatment-resistant schizophrenia, lack of insight, and severe substance abuse issues—which predictably lead to decompensation and aggressive behaviour—supported the Board's conclusion that he remained a significant threat to the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appellant contended the judge improperly attributed delay to his indecision over retaining private counsel versus Legal Aid, and erred in finding exceptional circumstances due to interpreter issues requiring multiple audits.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence for unauthorized use of credit card data, challenging the imposition of house arrest and curfew terms as conditions of probation.

The appellant argued these conditions were unreasonable and not authorized under section 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code as they were punitive rather than rehabilitative.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the traditional rehabilitative purpose of probation but noted the sentence resulted from a joint submission accepted by the sentencing judge.

The court declined to strike the conditions as illegal given the unique circumstances and the limited record before it, though it noted the sentencing judge should have articulated the basis for accepting the impugned terms.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought review of a detention order denying judicial interim release pending extradition proceedings to the United States for unauthorized use of a computer.

The applicant argued the application judge erred in principle and that material changes in circumstances warranted variation of the order.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable errors in the application judge's analysis of flight risk, public protection, and public confidence grounds.

The court rejected the argument that fresh evidence regarding the charges constituted a material change in circumstances.

The application was dismissed, with the court emphasizing the serious nature of cybercrime and the applicant's significant flight risk.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the Justice of the Peace erred in finding he was functus officio.

The appellant had tendered evidence of valid insurance, but the Crown introduced fresh evidence on appeal proving the insurance letter was false.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the Justice of the Peace erred, there was no miscarriage of justice under section 120(1)(b) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that set aside a stay of proceedings granted for a section 8 Charter breach.

The breach occurred when the appellant was videotaped using the toilet in a police holding cell.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, noting that the police force had since changed its policy to protect prisoner privacy, and a stay of proceedings is only appropriate in the clearest of cases.

The court found no clear error in the summary conviction appeal judge's decision and determined the issue no longer had significance to the administration of justice generally.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in making factual findings and rejecting the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings were well supported by the evidence and he was entitled to reject the defence.

The Crown appealed a jury acquittal on a charge of second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing in a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on reflex and voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held there was no evidentiary foundation for a defence of involuntary reflex and that the impugned instruction was erroneous.

However, applying the governing standard for Crown appeals from acquittals, the court found no reasonable basis to conclude the error materially affected the verdict in light of the defence theory, the evidence, the overall charge, and the jury questions.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed her 9-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing it was outside the appropriate range and failed to give meaningful effect to her Aboriginal status under Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered and distinguished relevant case law, and appropriately balanced rehabilitative and Gladue objectives with the paramount need for public safety given the appellant's substance abuse and risk to the community.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his knowledge of drugs found in a bedroom closet and misapplied the doctrine of wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to infer the appellant had seen the drugs and cash in the closet of the room he occupied in a house he owned.

The court held that the only available inference was that the appellant knew what was in the jar or was wilfully blind to it, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a sex trade worker, was convicted of second-degree murder after a client was found stabbed to death in his car.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, improperly allowing cross-examination on her prior assault convictions under a Corbett application, and delivering an unbalanced jury charge that failed to adequately summarize the defence's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80' and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by using his breathalyzer readings to assess the credibility of his 'evidence to the contrary' (the Carter defence).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the Supreme Court's prohibition in Boucher against using breathalyzer results to assess credibility applies only when the Crown relies on the presumption of accuracy.

Because the Crown called the breath technician and relied only on the presumption of identity, the trial judge was entitled to consider the breathalyzer readings in assessing the evidence as a whole.

The applicant was committed for extradition on a charge of second degree murder after the extradition judge found no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Minister subsequently ordered the applicant surrendered on the foreign charge of first degree murder, which requires premeditation under Arizona law.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Court of Appeal held that the Minister's decision was unreasonable because there was a total absence of evidence at the committal stage on an essential element of the foreign offence.

The surrender order was quashed and the matter remitted to the Minister.

The appellant appealed his convictions for the first-degree murder of his two-year-old son and the aggravated assault of his common-law spouse.

He argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to cross-examine Crown witnesses to show he did not commit the offences.

The Court of Appeal found the evidence of guilt overwhelming and trial counsel's tactical decisions reasonable.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct and the burden of proof.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was quashed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to uttering a death threat and received a sentence of one day in prison, two years' probation, and credit for pre-trial custody.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that his counsel coerced and misled him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant's claims incredible and concluding the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the custodial portion was moot and the sentencing judge made no error in accepting the joint submission.

The appellant stole a van and engaged in a police pursuit that damaged several cruisers, while absent without leave on parole and under a driving prohibition.

He appealed his three-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not unfit given the appellant's long and serious criminal record, and the trial judge did not overemphasize deterrence and denunciation.