Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The applicant, convicted of firearms offences, applied for a review of a decision denying him bail pending appeal under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

Despite the Crown consenting to release, the bail judge had denied bail based on the seriousness of the offence and the perceived weakness of the sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge erred in principle by failing to consider the merit of the conviction appeal and the numerous public safety factors supporting release.

The application was granted and bail was ordered on the terms proposed by the parties.

The moving party, a youth offender convicted of assault causing bodily harm, sought bail pending his appeal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the moving party's extensive history of breaching pretrial release conditions, including fleeing police and possessing weapons, demonstrated he would not surrender into custody.

Furthermore, the court held that his detention was necessary in the public interest due to significant public safety concerns and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment for sexual assault and other offences, appealed his sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying Gladue principles by requiring a causal link between his Indigenous ancestry and offending behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it unreliable and insufficient to undermine the sentencing decision.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied Gladue principles, finding no direct link between the appellant's Indigenous background (discovered later in life) and his moral culpability, and that public protection remained the paramount objective justifying an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant, Cameron Laming, appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a weapons dangerous charge.

He argued procedural irregularities during the NCRMD hearing and sought to adduce fresh psychiatric evidence suggesting his mental state was due to drug-induced intoxication rather than a mental disorder qualifying for NCRMD.

The Court of Appeal found significant procedural deficiencies, including the appellant not having read the NCRMD report, equivocal consent, and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The fresh evidence, which cast doubt on the NCRMD diagnosis, was admitted.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Casey Matti Henry, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The central issue at trial was consent.

The appeal raised three grounds: (i) the trial judge erred in dismissing an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding the complainant's prior sexual activity; (ii) there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge due to frequent interventions; and (iii) the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the s. 276 application dismissal, no substantiation of judicial bias, and no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and no errors in principle were found.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years' imprisonment for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, producing crack cocaine, and possession of marijuana.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly consider his youthfulness, his decision to limit the trial to a Charter application, and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's age, extensive criminal record, and the large quantity of crack cocaine involved.

The appellant, a caregiver for an elderly man, was convicted of fraud and theft after withdrawing approximately $180,000 from his bank account over several years.

She was also convicted of defrauding the Department of Veterans Affairs.

She was sentenced to 20 months in custody, two years of probation, and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in finding she controlled the victim, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the restitution order failed to consider her ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions reasonable and the restitution order appropriate given the amounts taken and the modest payment schedule imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching on the sole ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He alleged his counsel incompetently refused to allow him to testify, failed to prepare him to testify, and failed to call a witness regarding an alleged prior false complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for his claims or demonstrate any prejudice resulting from his counsel's conduct.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit with the possibility of transfer to a General Forensic Unit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had absented himself from the hospital for four months before surrendering the day before the appeal hearing.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence of elopement and the resulting flight risk concerns were sufficient to sustain the Board's hybrid disposition, while urging an expedited fresh review by the Board.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of three years' imprisonment for multiple drug and firearms offences, arguing it was unfit after his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm was overturned on a previous appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the combination of drugs and guns is a serious aggravating factor and the three-year sentence remained fit and appropriate to achieve denunciation and deterrence.

The court also upheld the 30-day concurrent sentence for breaching a recognizance condition prohibiting cellphone possession.

The young person appealed their conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appellant relied on s. 34(1), but the trial judge only addressed s. 34(2).

The Court of Appeal found an air of reality to the s. 34(1) defence, noting the trial judge made no finding that the appellant intended to cause grievous bodily harm and the findings did not establish disproportionate force.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on six counts of sexual assault against a child complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior allegations against another individual without holding a hearing, and that Crown counsel's comments during the trial rendered it unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the evidentiary application and concluding that the Crown's comments did not result in trial unfairness.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, pointing a firearm, and breach of recognizance, as well as his life sentence for attempted murder.

The victim was shot six times at point-blank range and paralyzed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence, which included recognition by the victim and an independent witness.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exemplary assessment of the identification evidence.

The court also upheld the life sentence, finding it proportionate to the grave, unprovoked nature of the crime and the need to deter gun violence in public places.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that an error in the warrant of committal overstated his sentence by five months, preventing him from seeking early parole as intended by the sentencing judge.

The Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and accepted a joint submission to reduce the custodial portion of the sentence to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault as a party to the offence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly caution the jury about the frailties of the complainant's evidence.

The complainant had admitted to lying to the police in two separate statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed a reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the legal implications of these inconsistencies and by providing an unbalanced charge that unduly promoted the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and unlawful confinement.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings, finding that the 30-month delay from the date of the charge to the scheduled trial date violated the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, concluding that the delay was not unreasonable given the mutual agreement to convert the case to a superior court trial with a preliminary inquiry, and the lack of significant prejudice to the accused.

The stay was set aside and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 90 days intermittent, probation, and a five-year driving prohibition for an impaired driving offence.

The trial judge had imposed the 90-day sentence under the mistaken belief that the appellant had two prior qualifying convictions, making 90 days the mandatory minimum.

The Crown acknowledged that the actual mandatory minimum was 14 days but argued the 90-day sentence should be sustained.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the appellant's compliance with strict bail conditions for four years, and reduced the custodial sentence to 20 days intermittent.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after the victim was found sexually assaulted and beaten to death.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a first degree murder conviction under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code requires the sexual assault to precede the murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the 'single transaction' principle from Paré, holding that the exact sequence of the murder and sexual assault is immaterial provided they form a continuous sequence of events involving illegal domination.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's instructions on the appellant's statements, after-the-fact conduct, and identification evidence.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and assault arising from a real estate transaction where he allegedly misappropriated funds from the complainant.

The trial judge based her decision entirely on a credibility contest, finding the complainant credible and the appellant not credible.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding reasonable doubt and credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding whether she yelled during the incident.

The trial judge also failed to adequately address the complainant's prior inconsistent statement made under oath to the police, in which she denied any sexual activity.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.