Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his convictions for human trafficking-related offences, arguing that the application judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge double-counted a five-month period of defence delay, the error was immaterial because the deduction of 24 months for the suspension of jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic was appropriate.

As the total delay fell well under the 30-month presumptive ceiling and the Crown made efforts to move the matter forward, the exceptional remedy of a stay was not warranted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for various offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his conditional discharge with reduced reporting requirements.

He argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably relied on expert psychiatric evidence indicating that the appellant required a longer transition period in independent living to ensure medication compliance and mental stability.

The appellant, Nigel Jordan, appealed a three-year sentence for three breaches of a long-term supervision order.

He argued the sentence was too long, given the non-violent nature of the offences, and that the sentencing judge erred by considering a four-year sentence without allowing submissions and by overemphasizing the need for an exemplary sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the sentencing judge's decision, noting that the imposed sentence was within the Crown's proposed range and that the judge properly considered all circumstances, including aggravating factors related to the purpose of the supervision order.

The appeal was dismissed.

D.M. appealed convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The complainant had an intellectual disability.

The Court of Appeal found several errors in the trial judge's conduct and jury instructions, including the Crown's improper use of expert evidence to bolster the complainant's credibility, misdirection on the W.(D.) rule regarding exculpatory evidence, improper cross-examination of the accused regarding motives for false allegations, and misdirection on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

P.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-year sentence.

The appeal raised grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge, specifically the language used to refer to the unrepresented accused's evidence versus his submissions, and the sufficiency of assistance provided to the unrepresented appellant.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings at sentencing, particularly regarding penetration, and the weight given to mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge, that sufficient assistance was provided to the appellant, and that the sentencing judge was entitled to make factual findings not explicitly determined by the jury's verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, A.S., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his wife, alleging the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by misapprehending J.R.'s testimony regarding leg bruises, which was central to the conviction's corroboration finding.

Furthermore, the trial judge improperly relied on a prior consistent statement as corroboration.

This misapprehension of evidence constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Application for bail pending appeal from convictions for bribery, attempt to obstruct justice, criminal breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, with a sentence of 13 years' imprisonment less 6 months' credit.

The applicant sought to establish that his appeal was not frivolous, that he would surrender himself into custody, and that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court found that while the applicant's grounds of appeal were not frivolous and he would likely surrender himself, his detention was necessary in the public interest given the gravity of the offences, the aggravated circumstances of their commission, and the weakness of the grounds of appeal.

The application was dismissed and the appeal was expedited.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his sister-in-law, alleging the conviction was unreasonable.

The complainant alleged approximately 10-50 sexual assaults occurred between 1997 and 1999 when she was 16-17 years old.

The Court of Appeal found that important aspects of the complainant's evidence were demonstrably false, including her claims of being enslaved and controlled.

The trial judge herself had significant misgivings about the complainant's credibility and found that the Crown had not proven most of the alleged assaults beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court determined that the risk of wrongful conviction was too high and set aside the conviction, entering an acquittal.

The appellant, a 27-year-old first-time offender, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for his role in a home invasion involving robbery, unlawful confinement, and discharging a firearm.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly weigh his youth and lack of a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge gave careful reasons, considered all mitigating and aggravating factors, and imposed a sentence that was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, who was previously found NCRMD, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At the outset of his review hearing, the appellant objected to being addressed by his legal name and to the constitution of the Board.

The Chair gave the appellant a five-second ultimatum before cutting off his audio and video feed, proceeding with the hearing in his absence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Chair acted precipitously and failed to exercise the judicial patience and restraint required under section 672.5(10)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code before excluding an accused from a hearing.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences based on text messages found on his co-accused's cell phone.

The appellant challenged the search of the co-accused's phone under s. 8 of the Charter.

The application judge held that the appellant lacked standing because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages once they reached the recipient's phone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the sender loses control over the messages once received, thereby extinguishing any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

He was found asleep in the driver's seat of an inoperable vehicle stopped in a driving lane.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding no realistic risk of danger, but the summary conviction appeal judge entered convictions.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by assuming an inoperable vehicle could not create a realistic risk of danger, entitling the appeal judge to intervene.

The appellants were convicted of administering a stupefying thing to enable sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two complainants.

They appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on evidence of the complainants' out-of-character conduct, misapprehended toxicological evidence, and improperly used post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The applicant, convicted of disobeying a 1994 interim injunction by protesting outside an abortion clinic, sought state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for her application for leave to appeal.

The court found that her proposed constitutional challenge to s. 127 of the Criminal Code and her abuse of process argument were reasonably arguable.

The application for the appointment of counsel was granted.

The appellant, a family doctor, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient during an examination.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the complainant's 'suspicions evidence' when assessing her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no clear error of law and concluding the trial judge properly considered all evidence in his credibility analysis.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that a special jury instruction was required for his post-offence conduct and that simple possession should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that possession was a continuing offence and there was no air of reality to the simple possession theory.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle by refusing a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge improperly took judicial notice of male/female strength disparities, misapprehended evidence, and shifted the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) principles to assess credibility.

The Court noted that text messages and emails between the parties strongly corroborated the complainant's version of events and were tantamount to an acknowledgement of guilt.

The applicants, a natural gas utility and a locator company, sought leave to appeal a Superior Court decision that ordered a new trial on charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the Technical Standards and Safety Act.

The charges arose from a fatal natural gas explosion caused when an excavator struck an unmarked pipeline.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal did not raise questions of law alone that were essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellants, members of the Hells Angels, were convicted of extortion and extortion in association with a criminal organization after threatening a victim over an alleged debt while wearing club colours.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the criminal organization provisions of the Criminal Code are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the terms 'facilitation' and 'in association with' are well-understood and not impermissibly vague or overbroad.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants deliberately invoked their membership in the organization to inspire fear, and affirmed the sentence imposed.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed a preliminary inquiry judge's discharge on a firearm charge.

The complainant testified that during an assault over a drug debt, one of the appellants struck him with what appeared to be a .45 calibre handgun and threatened to kill him.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the appellants on the firearm count, citing a lack of evidence that the gun was pointed or that a threat to shoot was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Superior Court that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by improperly weighing the evidence and choosing among competing inferences rather than determining if a jury could reasonably conclude the gun was real.