Administrative Law - OCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal on three issues arising from the acquittal of Luis Benevides, a worker charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after a workplace accident.

The case addresses the proper application of the directed verdict test, the determination of worker responsibility under the Act, and the use of private business contracts in defining statutory obligations.

The court declined to grant leave on the issue of whether the trial justice erred by considering due diligence and foreseeability at the directed verdict stage.

This endorsement addresses procedural directions for a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario from a Divisional Court decision dismissing Adam Knauff’s application for judicial review of decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The moving party seeks clarification of the test for leave to appeal, referencing recent Court of Appeal decisions, and requested a five-judge panel.

The Court directs that the motion for leave to appeal will be heard orally, and sets timelines and procedures for intervention motions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of the Attorney General of Canada, setting aside the conditional certification of a class action brought by Andrew Knisley, a veteran, regarding the administration of disability benefits by Veterans Affairs Canada.

The court found that conditional certification is not permitted under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and remitted the matter for reconsideration of whether an identifiable class exists.

The court also upheld the motion judge’s finding that the claim in negligence disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal concerning an international commercial arbitration award.

The application judge had set aside the award due to a reasonable apprehension of bias by the arbitrator, who had accepted a second, unrelated arbitration engagement from the appellants' counsel without disclosure to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred by applying a subjective test for disclosure and bias, rather than the objective test mandated by the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The Court found no breach of the arbitrator's legal duty to disclose and no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the second arbitration involved no common parties or overlapping issues, and the arbitrator was not aware of the parties' subjective disclosure expectations.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court to address other grounds for attacking the award.

The appellants, Fredrick and Patricia Kentner, appealed the summary dismissal of their first appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, which concerned convictions and a sentence for environmental offences related to unlawful fill operations.

The appeal was based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by their paralegal and errors in the original conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no ineffective assistance as the appellants' failure to pay fines (a mandatory condition for appeal) was a deliberate choice unrelated to the paralegal's conduct, and a waiver application would have had no prospect of success.

The court also found no merit in the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's reliance on regulatory maps for jurisdiction, and no basis to interfere with the sentence, which included a $25,000 fine and a property rehabilitation order.

The appellant challenged the appeal judge’s dismissal of her appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision, which had confirmed her involuntary admission to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been discharged from CAMH.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no live controversy and no special circumstances to warrant exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court rejected arguments that the appeal right would become illusory or that appellate guidance was needed on the interpretation of Box B criteria under the Mental Health Act.

This appeal concerned the constitutionality of section 12 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, which limits parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech and debate, for members of the Committee regarding the disclosure of classified information.

The application judge had declared section 12 ultra vires Parliament.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that Parliament possesses the plenary legislative authority under section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to define and limit its own privileges, including freedom of speech and debate, without requiring a constitutional amendment.

The court found that section 12 is intra vires the federal Parliament, emphasizing that Parliament can legislate to define the scope of its own powers and privileges, especially when members voluntarily accept such limits.

The appellant, Mark Roberts, sought a suspension of an Ontario Review Board order directing his transfer from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) to Waypoint Centre for Mental Health due to his difficult and harassing behaviour towards female staff at CAMH.

The court applied the specific, higher test under s. 672.76 of the Criminal Code for suspending Board dispositions, which requires compelling reasons to doubt the Board's decision's validity or soundness based on the accused's mental condition, and exceptional circumstances.

The court found the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence of the transfer's impact on his mental condition to justify a suspension, especially considering the severe adverse impact of his conduct on CAMH's operations and staff safety.

The motion for suspension was dismissed.

The appellants (Crown) appealed a Divisional Court order that declared the Math Proficiency Test (MPT) unconstitutional for infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter due to disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates, and found it not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred by relying on incomplete and preliminary data (July 2021 Data) to conclude a disproportionate adverse impact.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing more complete data (December 2021 Data), determined that the MPT did not have a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized candidates' entry to the teaching profession, nor did it reinforce existing disadvantages.

The appeal was allowed, and the Divisional Court's order, including the declaration that s. 18(1)(c) of the OCTA was unconstitutional, was set aside.

This appeal concerned the jurisdiction of a provincial court judge to hear references under s. 74 of the Firearms Act.

The respondents, firearms owners, initiated these references after receiving letters from the RCMP/Registrar stating their firearm registration certificates were "automatically nullified" due to new regulations (SOR/2020-96).

The Attorney General of Canada argued these letters were merely informational and did not constitute a "revocation" triggering s. 74 jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that the nullification of registration certificates occurred by operation of law (the new regulations), not by an individualized decision or revocation by the Registrar.

Consequently, the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction under s. 74 of the Firearms Act, and the disclosure order issued by the reference judge was invalid.

This motion concerned a request for a stay pending appeal of a lower court's dismissal of an application for leave to intervene.

The underlying matter involved the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario seeking an order to compel Dr. Kilian to provide patient files related to COVID-19 vaccine exemptions.

The moving parties, anonymous patients of Dr. Kilian, argued their s. 8 Charter privacy rights would be violated without their intervention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried.

The court held that the expectation of privacy in medical records is lower in a regulatory context, as the primary purpose of such investigations is public protection, and existing confidentiality protections within the regulatory scheme are sufficient.

This decision addresses a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the Ontario Court of Justice's jurisdiction to hear reference cases under the Firearms Act.

The proposed intervener, J.P., sought to join the appeal, arguing his unique procedural journey in a similar s. 74 application would offer an additional perspective.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the intervention, contending J.P.'s perspective would not be distinct from the existing respondents and could unduly expand the litigation's scope.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while J.P. had an interest, his position was not meaningfully different from other similarly situated individuals, and granting intervention would expand the record and present evidentiary problems.

The appellant, Stericycle ULC, appealed an order dismissing its application for a declaration that it, rather than Daniels Sharpsmart Canada Limited, was the primary supplier for Provincial Health Services Authority (PHSA) under a public tendering process.

Stericycle argued that the application judge erred in contract interpretation, allowing impermissible bid repair, and failing to properly apply the duty of good faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the "Six Month Provision" or the contract start date.

The court also found no breach of the duty of good faith or honest performance by HealthPRO or PHSA, as their actions were consistent with the contract's purpose and Stericycle's reasonable expectations.

The appellant, Ahmed Bouragba, sought to transfer an appeal from a Master's order from the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the appeal lay to the Court of Appeal under s. 6(1)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act as an order made under s. 137.1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the transfer motion, holding that an order made under s. 137.1 must be made by a "judge" of the Superior Court of Justice, and a Master is not a judge.

Therefore, the appeal did not lie to the Court of Appeal, and the proper forum was the Divisional Court.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a Provincial Offences Act decision.

The respondent argued that the motion for leave to appeal should be heard in writing, relying on the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court, acting as a case management judge, determined that motions for leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act are presumed to be heard orally, consistent with the settled practice of the Court of Appeal.

The court found that while the Rules of the Court of Appeal in Appeals Under the Provincial Offences Act (POA Rules) did not explicitly state an oral hearing for represented parties, the language used in Rule 3 and Form 1 implied an oral hearing.

The court also clarified that Rule 61.03.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies to fill the gap regarding the exchange of facta.

The plaintiff, Catalyst Capital Group Inc., appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out several of its claims against Dundee Kilmer Developments Limited Partnership (DKD), Infrastructure Ontario (IO), and the Crown.

The claims arose from Catalyst's exclusion from financing the 2015 Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village project.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating Catalyst's claims against DKD for breach of a funding term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit.

However, the court upheld the striking of unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claims against IO and the Crown, the public law duty claim against IO and the Crown, and the misrepresentation claim against the Crown, finding them either statute-barred, lacking direct benefit, or precluded by statutory immunity.

The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its second finding (unsubstantiated) regarding a police misconduct complaint by the Stanleys and ordered a third investigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the quashing of the OIPRD's second decision, but on the ground that the OIPRD was functus officio and lacked statutory or common law authority to reconsider its initial substantiated finding.

The Court set aside the Divisional Court's order for a third investigation, restoring the OIPRD's original decision to refer the matter for a disciplinary hearing, while noting that the OIPRD could now apply its newly amended rules for reconsideration.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking out a Superior Court proceeding that sought to appeal Provincial Offences Act (POA) convictions of Murray Brown, which were decided by a Justice of the Peace.

The appellants argued they had standing as the Greenworld Trust, the property owner, and that the Justice of the Peace exceeded jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Superior Court was the incorrect forum for appealing POA convictions (which should be appealed to the Ontario Court of Justice) and that the Greenworld Trust had no freestanding Charter right to assert in the Superior Court in this context.

The court also found no clear error in the costs award from the motion below.

The appellants, Daniel Tiffin and Tiffin Financial Corporation (TFC), appealed convictions for provincial offences under the Securities Act, including trading in securities without registration, distributing securities without a prospectus, and trading while prohibited.

The central issue was whether promissory notes issued by Tiffin to clients, while he was subject to a cease trade order, constituted "securities" under the Act.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellants by applying the American "family resemblance test" to conclude the notes were not securities.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, reversed this decision, declining to import the American test and finding the notes were indeed securities, thus substituting convictions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, agreeing that the "family resemblance test" should not be imported into Ontario securities law due to the distinct "catch and exclude" statutory scheme in Ontario.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, finding the six-month custodial term demonstrably unfit given mitigating factors such as the appellants' honesty in revealing their financial situation, their remorse, repayment efforts, and client support.

The probation and restitution orders were upheld.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's reasons manifestly insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review, specifically noting a lack of engagement with issues of conditional discharge or expanded community passes.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted Board for a new hearing to consider these issues expeditiously.