Nicolas M. Rouleau

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of Canada's federal electoral system under sections 3 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They argued that the Single Member Plurality (SMP) system violates the right to vote by creating disproportionality between votes cast and seats won, and violates equality rights by underrepresenting women, racial minorities, and small political parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the electoral system does not infringe either section 3 or section 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the right to vote is a right to participate in the electoral process, not a right to have votes translated into representation in any particular manner.

Electoral outcomes resulting from citizens' free choices cannot violate constitutional rights.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal for Abdullahi Osman, who was charged as an accessory after the fact to murder.

The court held that, although attempted murder can in rare cases be an included offence to murder, there was no air of reality to the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to attempted murder in this case, as the evidence was clear that the principal's acts caused the victim's death.

The decision clarifies the law on included offences, the requirements for accessory after the fact liability, and the rare circumstances in which attempted murder may be left to a jury as an included offence where the victim dies.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2021, arguing it was ultra vires Ontario and infringed their rights to free expression and equality under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Act, finding its dominant purpose was to affirm and commemorate the Tamil-Ontarian community's experience, which falls within Ontario's power over local matters under s. 92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court also dismissed the Charter claims, concluding the Act does not suppress expression or draw a discriminatory distinction against Sinhala-Buddhists.

This endorsement addresses thirteen motions for leave to intervene in an appeal challenging the constitutionality of Canada's single member plurality (SMP) electoral system under sections 3 and 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the test for leave to intervene, emphasizing the requirement for a useful and distinct contribution without causing duplication or unfairness.

Six motions were granted, including those from groups offering unique perspectives on Indigenous representation, international law, constitutional status of SMP, and substantive equality.

Seven motions were dismissed for largely duplicating the appellants' arguments.

The applicant, Fair Change, brought a constitutional challenge against sections 2, 3, and 5 of the Safe Streets Act, 1999, arguing they violate several Charter rights.

The court granted Fair Change public interest standing.

The court found that the deeming provisions in paragraphs 2(3)2 to 6 of the Act violate the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b), and are not saved by s. 1.

The court also found that the blanket prohibitions on solicitation in certain places under clauses 3(2)(a) to (e) violate freedom of expression and are not minimally impairing, thus not saved by s. 1.

However, the court upheld the prohibition on aggressive solicitation in s. 2(2) and the prohibition on squeegeeing in s. 3(2)(f) as justified limits on freedom of expression.

The court dismissed the challenges under ss. 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The unconstitutional provisions were declared of no force and effect.

The applicants sought to strike down sections 2(1), 24(1), and 313(1) of the Canada Elections Act, arguing they infringed sections 3 (right to vote) and 15(1) (equality rights) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The challenge contended that Canada's single member plurality (SMP) electoral system resulted in disproportionate translation of votes to seats and underrepresentation of small national parties, women, and racial minorities.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the SMP system is constitutionally valid, does not violate Charter rights, and that the Constitution does not mandate proportional representation.

The court emphasized that voting rights focus on electoral process, not specific outcomes, and that political affiliation is not an analogous ground for discrimination under section 15.

Robert Vanier, former CEO of Onco Petroleum Inc., appealed his conviction for publishing a false prospectus under s. 400 of the Criminal Code, for which he received an 8-year sentence.

The false prospectus misrepresented the company's liquid funds.

Vanier, self-represented at trial, raised several grounds of appeal, including trial unfairness (denial of a Rowbotham application, inadequate preparation assistance, language issues, and evidence presentation), errors in jury instructions (distinction between motive and intent, witness credibility), and the admissibility of evidence found on an abandoned hard drive (Charter s. 8).

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to deduct pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding trial fairness, jury instructions, or the s. 8 Charter analysis.

The court also found no error in the sentence, affirming that the trial judge's assessment of aggravating factors was appropriate and that pre-sentence custody deductions were not warranted as Vanier was incarcerated for a separate conviction.

Robert Vanier was convicted of two counts of perjury for making false statements under oath in Personal Information Forms (PIFs) submitted to the TSX and CNQ exchanges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 131 of the Criminal Code did not apply because the statements were not "permitted, authorized, or required by law" to be made under oath, and that he should have been charged under s. 134.

He also claimed a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statements were indeed permitted by law as they stemmed from the Securities Act and the exchanges' regulatory powers, and that there was no unreasonable delay.

This endorsement addresses motions for leave to intervene in a constitutional challenge brought by Fair Voting BC and Springtide Collective for Democracy Society against the Attorney General of Canada.

The challenge concerns the constitutionality of the 'first-past-the-post' electoral system under the Canada Elections Act, alleging violations of ss. 3 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Four organizations—Apathy is Boring (AIB), Canadian Constitution Foundation (CCF), Electoral Reform Society (UK) (ERS UK), and Fair Vote Canada (FVC)—sought leave to intervene.

The court granted leave to all four to intervene as friends of the court, allowing them to file factums and make time-limited oral submissions.

However, the court denied ERS UK's request to intervene as an added party and prohibited all interveners from filing additional evidence, emphasizing the existing substantial record and the risk of delay and prejudice to the parties.

This endorsement addresses motions by the Tamil Rights Group (TRG) and the Tamil Coalition (National Council of Canadian Tamils, Canadian Tamil Academy, Canadian Tamil Youth Alliance) to intervene as parties or friends of the court in two joined applications.

The original applicants are challenging the constitutionality of the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, alleging it is ultra vires and violates Charter rights.

The court granted intervener status as parties to TRG and the Tamil Coalition, finding their contributions useful for a balanced factual record, particularly given the applicants' factual assertions about the Act's basis.

The court imposed specific limitations on the interveners' participation to avoid undue delay or prejudice.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his robbery convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to misadvice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

He was led to believe that sentences under two years per count would provide a "fighting chance" from an immigration perspective, when in fact, sentences over six months rendered him inadmissible with no right to appeal a removal order.

Applying the test from R. v. Wong, the Court of Appeal found the pleas uninformed and that the appellant suffered subjective prejudice, as he would have opted for a trial or different conditions had he been properly advised.

The convictions were set aside, a new trial ordered, and further proceedings were stayed in the public interest given the served sentences, lack of re-offending, and court resource pressures.

The appellant, Carlos Pavao, appealed his convictions for fraud and his sentence.

He was convicted of defrauding ten investors and the public through the sale of non-existent shares in gold mining companies.

His appeal of conviction was based on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge and a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and that the delay was justified under the Morin transitional exception.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the restitution and fine orders by $45,000, as these amounts related to individuals who were not named complainants in the indictment.

Five organizations brought motions to intervene in an application challenging the constitutionality of the Safe Streets Act.

The applicant consented and the respondent did not oppose.

The court applied the test for intervention under Rule 13.02 and found that all five proposed intervenors—the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Legal Services, Justice for Children and Youth, the Income Security Advocacy Centre, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association—met the criteria.

Each organization demonstrated special expertise, a real and substantial interest in the proceedings, and the ability to provide an important and distinct perspective.

The motions to intervene were granted.

The appellant, Jessy Herlichka, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three errors by the trial judge: flawed instructions on the defence of intoxication, refusal to qualify a proposed defence expert in a specific area of expertise, and an inadequate curative instruction after a Crown witness suggested the appellant murdered the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on intoxication, the limitation of expert testimony, or the curative instruction, concluding that the jury was properly equipped to determine the requisite state of mind for murder.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of use of an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, two counts of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of threatening to cause death, arising from violent robberies of two victims behind the Yorkdale Subway Station in Toronto.

The appellant received a global sentence of four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of an expert forensic report authenticating Voxer App voicemail messages that would establish his absence from the scene of the robberies.

The Crown consented to the admission of the fresh evidence and conceded that the convictions amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from sentence for assault against his wife.

The respondent had pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife in 2016 and had received an absolute discharge in 2011 for a previous assault on the same victim.

The trial judge refused to grant a second discharge, citing the first discharge's failure to deter the respondent.

The appeal court allowed the respondent's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in considering the discharge, which was protected from disclosure under the Criminal Records Act.

The appeal court remitted the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The Crown appealed on two grounds: the interpretation of the Criminal Records Act and the appeal court's authority to remit the matter.

The appellant Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge on the respondent who pled guilty to importing hashish contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The trial judge had found s. 6(3)(a) of the CDSA and its combined effect with Criminal Code s. 742.1(c) to be unconstitutionally overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, rendering the respondent eligible for a conditional sentence.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and 18 months' probation.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that given the respondent's changed circumstances, time already served, and community service completed, reincarceration was not warranted, and requested the sentence be stayed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served, with the probation order remaining in effect.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant was committed on charges of fraud and possession of property obtained by crime related to his management of a pharmaceutical business that sold drugs to U.S. doctors and clinics without complying with American regulatory requirements.

The Minister surrendered the appellant on charges of conspiracy and unlicensed distribution of prescription drugs rather than fraud.

The appellant challenged the process as unfair, arguing he lacked opportunity to respond to conspiracy allegations and that there was insufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the committal judge lacked jurisdiction to compel disclosure of anonymous witness identities, the evidence supported the possession charge satisfying double criminality requirements, and the Minister had broad discretion under the Extradition Act to describe the offence as the Minister saw fit.

The appellant was convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code after violating an injunction protecting an abortion clinic.

She appealed, arguing that the injunction was unenforceable against her because she was not a named party to the original proceedings, and that she should have been charged with criminal contempt instead of a s. 127 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the injunction expressly applied to non-parties and that her argument constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court further held that s. 127 of the Criminal Code is a valid mechanism for enforcing court orders against non-parties, alongside the common law power of criminal contempt.

The appeal addressed the test for substantive equivalence under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in minority language education.

The court held equivalence must be assessed holistically from the perspective of rights holders, including facilities, programming, and travel burdens, rather than formal cost parity.

The court restored a declaration that the minority-language educational experience was not equivalent to nearby majority-language alternatives, while leaving responsibility and remedy issues to later phases.

The court also upheld phased proceedings and restored special costs for the successful public interest litigants.