Nicolas M. Rouleau

Five organizations brought motions to intervene in an application challenging the constitutionality of the Safe Streets Act.

The applicant consented and the respondent did not oppose.

The court applied the test for intervention under Rule 13.02 and found that all five proposed intervenors—the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Aboriginal Legal Services, Justice for Children and Youth, the Income Security Advocacy Centre, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association—met the criteria.

Each organization demonstrated special expertise, a real and substantial interest in the proceedings, and the ability to provide an important and distinct perspective.

The motions to intervene were granted.

The appellant, Jessy Herlichka, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three errors by the trial judge: flawed instructions on the defence of intoxication, refusal to qualify a proposed defence expert in a specific area of expertise, and an inadequate curative instruction after a Crown witness suggested the appellant murdered the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on intoxication, the limitation of expert testimony, or the curative instruction, concluding that the jury was properly equipped to determine the requisite state of mind for murder.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of use of an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, two counts of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of threatening to cause death, arising from violent robberies of two victims behind the Yorkdale Subway Station in Toronto.

The appellant received a global sentence of four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of an expert forensic report authenticating Voxer App voicemail messages that would establish his absence from the scene of the robberies.

The Crown consented to the admission of the fresh evidence and conceded that the convictions amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from sentence for assault against his wife.

The respondent had pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife in 2016 and had received an absolute discharge in 2011 for a previous assault on the same victim.

The trial judge refused to grant a second discharge, citing the first discharge's failure to deter the respondent.

The appeal court allowed the respondent's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in considering the discharge, which was protected from disclosure under the Criminal Records Act.

The appeal court remitted the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The Crown appealed on two grounds: the interpretation of the Criminal Records Act and the appeal court's authority to remit the matter.

The appellant Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge on the respondent who pled guilty to importing hashish contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The trial judge had found s. 6(3)(a) of the CDSA and its combined effect with Criminal Code s. 742.1(c) to be unconstitutionally overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, rendering the respondent eligible for a conditional sentence.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and 18 months' probation.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that given the respondent's changed circumstances, time already served, and community service completed, reincarceration was not warranted, and requested the sentence be stayed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served, with the probation order remaining in effect.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant was committed on charges of fraud and possession of property obtained by crime related to his management of a pharmaceutical business that sold drugs to U.S. doctors and clinics without complying with American regulatory requirements.

The Minister surrendered the appellant on charges of conspiracy and unlicensed distribution of prescription drugs rather than fraud.

The appellant challenged the process as unfair, arguing he lacked opportunity to respond to conspiracy allegations and that there was insufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the committal judge lacked jurisdiction to compel disclosure of anonymous witness identities, the evidence supported the possession charge satisfying double criminality requirements, and the Minister had broad discretion under the Extradition Act to describe the offence as the Minister saw fit.

The appellant was involved in a rear-end motor vehicle collision when she attempted to turn left into a private driveway and was struck by the respondents' vehicle attempting to pass her.

The trial judge apportioned liability equally at 50 percent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the appellant was negligent in failing to check her mirrors and signal in time under s. 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a causation analysis.

The Court reapportioned liability, finding the respondent driver 90 percent responsible for driving too fast for the conditions and attempting an unsafe pass, and the appellant 10 percent responsible for her contributory negligence.

The appellant was convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code after violating an injunction protecting an abortion clinic.

She appealed, arguing that the injunction was unenforceable against her because she was not a named party to the original proceedings, and that she should have been charged with criminal contempt instead of a s. 127 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the injunction expressly applied to non-parties and that her argument constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

The court further held that s. 127 of the Criminal Code is a valid mechanism for enforcing court orders against non-parties, alongside the common law power of criminal contempt.

The appellant, a court-appointed interim receiver, filed a proof of claim with the respondent trustee in bankruptcy for its fees and disbursements.

The trustee disallowed the claim, and the application judge dismissed the appellant's appeal of that disallowance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an interim receiver cannot bypass the procedural requirement of passing its accounts by submitting unliquidated and non-approved fees to a trustee in the form of a proof of claim.

The appeal addressed the test for substantive equivalence under s. 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in minority language education.

The court held equivalence must be assessed holistically from the perspective of rights holders, including facilities, programming, and travel burdens, rather than formal cost parity.

The court restored a declaration that the minority-language educational experience was not equivalent to nearby majority-language alternatives, while leaving responsibility and remedy issues to later phases.

The court also upheld phased proceedings and restored special costs for the successful public interest litigants.

The appellant was convicted under s. 127 of the Criminal Code for breaching an interlocutory injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protests near clinics.

She appealed, arguing the prosecution was an abuse of process due to Crown delay in the civil proceeding, and that s. 127 was unconstitutional on division of powers and Charter s. 7 grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process, characterizing the argument as an impermissible collateral attack, and upholding the constitutionality of s. 127.

The appellant appealed a conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code arising from conduct outside an abortion clinic.

The alleged breach involved a civil injunction prohibiting certain activities within 500 feet of the clinic, including intimidation of patients and others.

The appeal court held that criminal liability for breach of an order requires proof that the accused violated a specific term of the order.

The evidence established only peaceful leafleting and silent protest, which did not constitute intimidation or other prohibited conduct within the meaning of the injunction.

The conviction was therefore unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

A clinic sought leave to intervene in a summary conviction appeal brought by an accused convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

The proposed intervention related only to the interpretation of a permanent injunction previously issued against demonstrators outside the clinic’s premises.

The court accepted that the clinic had a significant interest in the interpretation of the injunction but found that its proposed submissions were substantially the same as those the Crown would advance.

Given the limited scope for third‑party intervention in criminal proceedings affecting liberty interests and the lack of distinct submissions, the court concluded that intervention was unnecessary.

The motion for leave to intervene was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of disobeying a 1994 interim injunction by protesting outside an abortion clinic, sought state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for her application for leave to appeal.

The court found that her proposed constitutional challenge to s. 127 of the Criminal Code and her abuse of process argument were reasonably arguable.

The application for the appointment of counsel was granted.

The appellants sought to appeal a motion judge's decision, arguing an appeal as of right under s. 193(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent challenged the court's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found no appeal as of right because the motion judge did not make a finding that the respondent was a creditor.

The court also refused leave to appeal, finding the case failed all three components of the applicable test.

The appeal was quashed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their personal injury action following a jury verdict that awarded zero damages for a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the verdict was perverse because objective evidence showed a soft tissue injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury's assessment of credibility and conclusion that the injury was too slight to warrant compensation were entitled to great deference and supported by the evidence.

The court also found no errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The appellants, who were subjects of a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) investigation, sued the CRA, the Attorney General, and various investigators for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and negligence after criminal charges against them were discharged or stayed.

The motion judge struck most of the claims for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the malicious prosecution and Family Law Act claims, but reinstated the claims for abuse of process and negligence against the CRA investigators, finding it was not plain and obvious that CRA investigators do not owe a duty of care to suspects under investigation.

The appellant appealed her conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code, stemming from her breach of a 1994 injunction prohibiting protests outside abortion clinics.

She argued that s. 127 was ultra vires Parliament, overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, and that her prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding s. 127 to be valid criminal law and appropriately tailored.

The court also held that the appellant's attempt to challenge the enforcement of the injunction constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the original order.

The appellant, a judgment creditor, appealed an order granting partial summary judgment dismissing his claims to an interest in a property and shares in a company.

The motions judge had found that the transfer of shares in a bare trustee company effectively transferred the beneficial interest in the property it held.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge improperly conflated the transfer of shares with the transfer of the beneficial interest in the land, failing to consider the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and the lack of land transfer tax payment.

The partial summary judgment was set aside, a certificate of pending litigation was granted, and the matter was directed to trial.

The appellant franchisee appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondent franchisor for breach of the statutory duty of fair dealing under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The appellant argued that the franchisor failed to provide sufficient disclosure regarding a right of first refusal for a new restaurant location, specifically concerning the final lease terms and the size of the exclusive territory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the franchisor acted in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, and that the appellant's decision to pass on the location was an informed one based on its own financial position and lack of confidence in the landlord.