Nicolas M. Rouleau

A clinic sought leave to intervene in a summary conviction appeal brought by an accused convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

The proposed intervention related only to the interpretation of a permanent injunction previously issued against demonstrators outside the clinic’s premises.

The court accepted that the clinic had a significant interest in the interpretation of the injunction but found that its proposed submissions were substantially the same as those the Crown would advance.

Given the limited scope for third‑party intervention in criminal proceedings affecting liberty interests and the lack of distinct submissions, the court concluded that intervention was unnecessary.

The motion for leave to intervene was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code, stemming from her breach of a 1994 injunction prohibiting protests outside abortion clinics.

She argued that s. 127 was ultra vires Parliament, overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, and that her prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding s. 127 to be valid criminal law and appropriately tailored.

The court also held that the appellant's attempt to challenge the enforcement of the injunction constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the original order.

The appellant challenged a criminal charge under s. 127(1) for allegedly disobeying an injunction, arguing Ontario civil contempt rules provided an express alternative mode of proceeding.

The majority held the statutory exception applies only where legislation provides the legal foundation for contempt, defines contempt circumstances, and provides punishment or procedure.

The Court found Rules 60.11 and 60.12 are procedurally detailed but remain dependent on common law substratum for legal foundation and contempt definition.

Accordingly, the exception was not triggered and prosecution under s. 127(1) could proceed.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the rules themselves constituted an express legislative mode of proceeding.