David M. Miller

The appellant was involved in a rear-end motor vehicle collision when she attempted to turn left into a private driveway and was struck by the respondents' vehicle attempting to pass her.

The trial judge apportioned liability equally at 50 percent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the appellant was negligent in failing to check her mirrors and signal in time under s. 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a causation analysis.

The Court reapportioned liability, finding the respondent driver 90 percent responsible for driving too fast for the conditions and attempting an unsafe pass, and the appellant 10 percent responsible for her contributory negligence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order regarding the commencement of limitation periods for insurance benefits.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge failed to clearly assess whether and when the applicable limitation periods commenced in relation to the notices delivered.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside paragraph 1 of the motion judge's order, and remitted the issue to the lower court for determination on a more fulsome evidentiary record.