Joseph Cheng

The plaintiff, a person with a severe neurodegenerative condition, brought an action against multiple defendants alleging Charter violations, public law breaches, and private law duties related to his hospital care, home care funding, and the constitutionality of the medical assistance in dying (MAID) provisions of the Criminal Code.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court struck the statement of claim in its entirety, finding it failed to plead material facts, asserted causes of action unknown to law (such as a freestanding Charter right to health care), and constituted an abuse of process by collaterally attacking binding Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The action was dismissed against the federal and provincial Crown defendants without leave to amend.

Leave to amend was granted on strict terms for specific claims against the hospital, the local health integration network, and the independent living centre.

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

The applicant, a former postsecondary student with disabilities, brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) and the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP).

The applicant argued that the 'time in study' structure of the programs disproportionately burdened students with disabilities, who often take longer to complete their studies and thus accrue more debt.

The court found that while the legislation establishing the CSLP did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, the operation and administration of the program infringed the applicant's equality rights by failing to redress the additional debt she accrued due to her disabilities.

The court held that this infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court granted declaratory relief and ordered the return of monies paid by the applicant pursuant to the unconstitutional operation of the CSLP, but denied her request for Charter damages.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man with advanced-stage aggressive lymphoma, brought a preliminary motion for confidentiality orders in his application for physician-assisted death under the Carter framework.

He sought orders allowing him, his family, and his physicians to proceed anonymously, a publication ban on identifying information, and a sealing order for the application record, proposing to file a redacted version for the public.

The media respondents opposed the anonymity of the physicians and requested a 'counsel's eyes only' review of the unredacted record.

The court granted the motion, finding that the applicant's proposal struck the appropriate balance between the open court principle and the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the applicant, as well as the public interest in not deterring physicians from participating in such applications.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing a motion to strike or stay an amended statement of claim.

The underlying action alleged that government representations induced the plaintiffs to invest in a telecommunications company and that subsequent government conduct destroyed the value of the investment, causing significant losses.

The moving party argued the claim was derivative in nature and that several pleaded causes of action disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the stringent test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b) was not met because there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s decision.

Although the pleadings raised novel and important legal issues, they were not plainly and obviously doomed to fail and should proceed on a full evidentiary record.