Nathan J.S. Gorham

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against a 17-year-old complainant.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge committed several errors, primarily misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her prior inconsistent statements and deliberate falsehoods to the police.

The trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize the complainant's explanations for these inconsistencies and omissions, which were central to her credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a nine-year sentence for unlawful act manslaughter based on failing to seek medical attention for a two-year-old child who died.

The trial judge conducted a Gardiner Hearing and found the appellant had assaulted both the mother and child, though could not determine if he inflicted the fatal blow.

The appellant argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her findings and that the sentence was disproportionate to the six-year sentence imposed on the mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and the disparity in sentences did not constitute error.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the shooting death of a drug dealer during a robbery.

The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility after 16 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on five grounds: (1) the admissibility of expert opinion evidence regarding cellphone usage patterns by drug traffickers; (2) the trial judge's refusal to admit prior out-of-court statements; (3) jury instructions cautioning the jury to consider the appellant's testimony with particular care; (4) jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence; and (5) the trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury on the significance of non-identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found merit in several grounds of appeal, particularly regarding the cellphone evidence, jury instructions on the appellant's alibi testimony, and instructions on eyewitness non-identification evidence.

The court determined that the cumulative effect of these errors was not harmless and warranted a new trial.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal on three firearms charges.

The trial judge had granted the respondent's application for a directed verdict, concluding that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to consider whether the respondent possessed an operational firearm.

The appellate court found that the trial judge made three errors of law: applying the wrong test for directed verdicts, improperly weighing competing inferences in favour of the respondent, and assessing the respondent's credibility when she was not entitled to do so.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The trial judge had refused to exclude evidence of cocaine and cash seized during a vehicle stop for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his analysis of whether the appellant's detention became unlawful (s. 9 breach) after the HTA investigation concluded and a groundless criminal investigation commenced.

The court also found a prolonged s. 10(b) breach (right to counsel) lasting over 30 minutes.

Applying the Grant factors for s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the court determined that the serious Charter breaches and their impact on the appellant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

During a criminal trial involving allegations of sexual touching, the Crown sought to introduce a redacted transcript from the accused's prior College of Psychologists disciplinary hearing.

The court ruled that admissions made by the accused's counsel at the disciplinary hearing were presumptively admissible as admissions against interest.

However, the court held that these statements should be treated as informal evidentiary admissions rather than formal admissions under s. 655 of the Criminal Code, ensuring the jury is not misled into believing the accused formally admitted the facts in the current criminal proceeding.

Joel France pleaded guilty to unlawful act manslaughter in the death of two-year-old Nicholas Cruz, stemming from a failure to provide necessities of life.

The court considered aggravating factors, including France's repeated physical abuse of Nicholas and domestic abuse of Nicholas's mother, Marleny Cruz, as well as his abuse of a position of trust.

Mitigating factors included his lack of a criminal record and difficult childhood, though his limited remorse was noted.

The Crown sought a ten-year sentence, while the defence sought four to six years.

The court imposed a nine-year sentence, with a six-year credit for pre-trial custody, and issued ancillary orders including a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items and his security guard uniform.

The Crown brought an application to introduce similar fact evidence across three counts of sexual assault involving three separate complainants against the accused, a therapist.

The accused opposed the application, alleging an air of reality to collusion among the complainants, and brought a motion to sever the counts.

The court found the similar fact evidence highly probative of the actus reus and concluded the Crown had negated the risk of collusion on a balance of probabilities.

The Crown's application was granted, and consequently, the accused's motion for severance was dismissed.

Mr. Vincent Lo, a former psychologist, faced three counts of sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit an agreed statement of facts (ASF) from a prior College of Psychologists disciplinary hearing as admissions against interest in the criminal trial.

The ASF detailed physical contact with a patient, A.M., including shoulder massage, bare chest touching, and leg massage towards the groin.

The accused argued that he did not formally admit the statements and that his counsel acted beyond authority.

The court ruled that the accused, through counsel, formally admitted the facts of touching but not the inferences of sexual abuse.

The court found the admissions highly probative and admissible, with potential prejudice mitigable by excluding certain details and providing a limiting instruction to the jury.

A two-year-old child died from blunt force trauma to the abdomen.

The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter for failing to provide necessaries of life.

This decision addresses a Gardiner hearing to determine aggravating factors for sentencing.

The Crown sought to prove that the defendant assaulted the child's mother, inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, and assaulted the child on other occasions.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant physically and emotionally abused the child's mother and repeatedly assaulted the child on various parts of the body, constituting despicable assaultive behavior.

However, the court could not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant inflicted the fatal blow to the child's abdomen, considering other possible explanations and witness credibility issues.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed his appeal from a conviction for assault, criminal harassment, and mischief to property.

The charges arose from an altercation with his girlfriend following a Raptors game, during which he spat on her, subsequently destroyed her property worth approximately $1,000, and engaged in threatening communications.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial with appointed counsel assisting in cross-examination, raised grounds including failure to provide reasonable assistance to a self-represented accused, reasonable apprehension of bias, and failure to consider essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the issues lacked significance for the general administration of justice and that the summary conviction appeal court judge had correctly articulated the governing legal principles and properly rejected each ground of appeal.

Joel France was charged with second-degree murder.

This decision concerns a voir dire ruling on the admissibility and scope of expert evidence from Dr. Michael Pollanen, a forensic pathologist, regarding the cause of death of Nicholas Cruz.

The court limited Dr. Pollanen's testimony, prohibiting opinions on whether the fatal injury was deliberately inflicted or accidental, the statistical probabilities of causes, or inferences based on other injuries.

The court also restricted the language used by the expert, disallowing terms like "significant blow" and "consistent with" to avoid misleading the jury.

The judge found Dr. Pollanen's preparation and impartiality lacking in certain aspects, highlighting the dangers of expert overreaching and bias.

The appellant, Faris Mumtaz, appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood/alcohol level.

The appeal focused on whether breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had found the breath tests were taken within a reasonably prompt time, despite inconsistencies in police officers' testimony regarding timelines and events.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings, emphasizing that the trial judge had the advantage of observing witnesses and was not obligated to reconcile all inconsistencies, particularly when the overall timeline of the investigation was reasonable.

The court reiterated that "as soon as practicable" means within a reasonably prompt time, not as soon as possible, and that police actions must be assessed for reasonableness within the totality of circumstances.

Two doctors subpoenaed to testify at a murder trial brought a motion seeking an order authorizing them to disclose the deceased child's personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that no such order is necessary because a witness compelled by law to answer relevant questions at trial is not exposed to liability for breaching confidentiality.

The accused was found guilty of unlawfully possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a weapons prohibition order.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the accused's criminal record, and his positive prospects for rehabilitation.

After applying a 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and significant credit for over four years of restrictive bail conditions, the court sentenced the accused to a total of 2.5 years in a penitentiary.

Leighton Bonnick was charged with firearms offences following a shooting incident at a barbeque.

The Crown alleged Bonnick returned to the party with a gun after being assaulted, leading to a gunfight where Donahue Bernard was shot.

The defence argued Bonnick did not possess a gun and that the Crown's witnesses were unreliable and inconsistent.

The court found the evidence of Crown witnesses to be inconsistent, unreliable, and lacking credibility, particularly regarding whether Bonnick had a gun.

Applying the third branch of R. v. W.(D.), the court was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Bonnick possessed a gun and acquitted him of all charges.

This ruling addresses the admissibility and scope of expert evidence from Det. John Margetson regarding coded language in illicit drug culture during a criminal trial for weapons and drug trafficking.

The court found Det. Margetson qualified as an expert in street-level drug distribution and allowed him to testify on general drug trafficking techniques, prices, methods, and common coded language/slang.

However, he was prohibited from providing contextual interpretations of specific intercepted private communications or offering opinions on the comparative likelihood of meanings in specific factual circumstances, to prevent the expert from usurping the jury's role as the trier of fact on the ultimate issue.

In a joint trial for firearms and drug trafficking offences associated with a criminal organization, the Crown sought to introduce non-expert recognition evidence from a police officer identifying several non-accused individuals in photographs found on the accused's electronic devices.

The accused objected, arguing the officer lacked sufficient prior acquaintance, the evidence was hearsay, and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The court applied the 'prior acquaintance/better position' test and ruled the evidence admissible for seven of the eight individuals, finding the officer had sufficient prior interactions to reliably identify them and that the self-identification fell under a recognized hearsay exception or was admissible for a non-hearsay purpose.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder in a gang-related shooting.

At their joint trial, they advanced cut-throat defences, each blaming the other.

On appeal, they raised numerous grounds relating to the jury charge, including instructions on eyewitness description evidence, bad character evidence, party liability, and the W.D. framework.

They also challenged the admission of gang expert opinion evidence that relied on confidential informants and the trial judge's refusal to review the informant files.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for child luring involving prolonged sexually explicit internet communications with a 12-year-old victim, including inducement to create and transmit child pornography.

The court held the sentencing judge erred by discounting the impact on the victim and by failing to treat the production of child pornography and grooming conduct as significant aggravating factors.

Distinguishing prior authorities where conditional sentences were imposed in police sting operations, the court found denunciation and deterrence required incarceration in a case involving an actual child victim over many months.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the appeal was allowed, and a custodial sentence of two years less a day was imposed.