Michael R. Dambrot

The applicant filed an application for judicial review of an OLRB decision dismissing his duty of fair representation complaint.

The applicant filed an application record containing numerous documents that were not before the OLRB.

The respondent union brought a motion to strike the application record.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, noting the general rule that judicial review is based on the record before the original decision-maker, and no exception applied to admit the new documents.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order requiring him to pay rent arrears, less an abatement for maintenance issues.

The tenant argued the Board lacked jurisdiction due to a defective notice of termination, erred in calculating arrears without viva voce evidence, and wrongly limited his abatement claim to one year.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably allowed the landlord to proceed with a claim for arrears only, properly relied on documentary evidence of arrears, and correctly applied the one-year limitation period for maintenance claims.

The Crown sought certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent on various firearms, ammunition, and drug offences.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by repeatedly assuming the role of the trier of fact, weighing evidence, drawing factual inferences, and failing to consider the circumstantial evidence cumulatively.

The preliminary inquiry judge had discounted individual pieces of evidence and failed to assess whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict.

The Superior Court quashed the discharge and ordered the preliminary inquiry judge to commit the respondent to stand trial on the specified charges.

The accused sought a review of two detention orders related to charges including attempt murder, aggravated assault, and later, obstructing a peace officer.

The initial detention was based on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court reviewed alleged errors of law regarding the admissibility of bad character evidence and the assessment of the connection between the accused and his sureties.

It also considered changes in circumstances, including additional sureties and arguments about the strength of the Crown's case.

The application for review was dismissed, affirming the detention orders.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment making her twin children Crown wards without access.

She argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider section 57(5) of the Child and Family Services Act regarding the placement of Aboriginal children, given evidence of the family's self-identified Metis heritage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the children did not meet the statutory definition of 'Indian' or 'native person' under the Act, and a constitutional challenge would be required to expand the definition.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that placement with the maternal grandmother was not in the children's best interests.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that he had no right to unilaterally set off disputed amounts against a court-ordered costs award in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that neither the Courts of Justice Act nor equitable principles permit unilateral set-off against a court order.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the motion judge's costs award, reducing it from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding the motion judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's maintained position as an additional factor justifying enhanced costs.

The moving party, a dental surgeon, sought a stay of the revocation of his licence pending his appeal of a Discipline Committee decision finding him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a patient.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay.

The court found that while there were weak but arguable grounds regarding the existence of a doctor-patient relationship at the time of one incident, the overwhelming evidence of subsequent sexual abuse made a finding of misconduct and a period of suspension inevitable.

As the moving party would not suffer irreparable harm by beginning to serve an inevitable suspension, the motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order granting an adjournment of a summary judgment motion on the condition that the respondent's application for divorce be severed from the corollary issues.

The appellant argued the motion judge failed to consider whether the severance would disadvantage her under Rule 12(6) of the Family Law Rules.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly balanced the interests of both parties and that there was no evidence the appellant would be disadvantaged by the severance, given the terms of the parties' separation agreement.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for interim possession of an Irish sport horse.

The parties had a dispute over the ownership of the horse, with the applicant claiming sole ownership and the respondent claiming a one-third interest based on a partnership agreement.

The motions judge had dismissed the interim possession motion due to competing credibility issues that needed to be resolved at trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's order.

The applicants brought two motions in relation to their application for judicial review of a decision by the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario Discipline Committee.

The first motion sought to compel the Committee to include a full transcript of the oral evidence in the record of proceedings.

The second motion sought an interim stay of the discipline proceedings pending the judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions, finding that the relevant statutes do not oblige the Committee to order and pay for a transcript if one has not been prepared, and that the application for judicial review was premature as the administrative proceedings had not yet concluded.

The appellant law firm appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent, its former legal assistant, $32,500 for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in proceeding by summary judgment and in finding the respondent reasonably mitigated her damages when she declined a new employment offer following a firm merger.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial and no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the new employment terms were sufficiently negative to justify the respondent's refusal.

The appellant appealed a License Appeal Tribunal decision revoking his registration as a gaming supplier under the Gaming Control Act, 1992.

The revocation followed the discovery of counterfeit DVDs and unmarked cigarettes at his convenience store, and his subsequent disregard for an immediate suspension order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the tribunal's reasons were adequate and that the penalty of revocation was reasonable given the appellant's pattern of dishonesty and lack of respect for the law.

The Law Society appealed a decision of the Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal ordering a new hearing and disclosure of files belonging to other lawyers involved in the real estate transactions at issue.

The Law Society argued that s. 49.12 of the Law Society Act prohibited disclosure, the files were irrelevant, and the respondent should have used an O'Connor application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 49.12 is a confidentiality provision with an exception for conduct proceedings, not a statutory privilege.

The court held that the files were potentially relevant under the Stinchcombe disclosure regime and that the Law Society's investigating and prosecuting arms are not separate entities for disclosure purposes.

The Law Society appealed a decision of the Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal ordering a new hearing due to a lack of disclosure.

The respondent lawyer, facing professional misconduct allegations related to real estate fraud, sought disclosure of the files of other lawyers involved in the transactions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 49.12 of the Law Society Act does not create a statutory privilege barring disclosure, but rather a confidentiality rule with exceptions for conduct proceedings.

The Court affirmed that the Stinchcombe disclosure regime applies, requiring the Law Society to disclose potentially relevant material from other lawyers' files, subject to resolving any solicitor-client privilege claims.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that rescinded a building permit issued by the Chief Building Official (CBO) for the construction of a riding arena on a property in the Oak Ridges Moraine.

The appeal judge had found that the arena was not a permitted agricultural use under the zoning by-law and that the CBO failed to consider the Official Plan's major development policies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge erred by applying a correctness standard instead of reasonableness to the CBO's interpretation of the home by-law.

The Court found the CBO's conclusion that the arena was a permitted principal agricultural building was reasonable and correct.

Furthermore, the Court held that conformity with the Official Plan is not 'other applicable law' under the Building Code Act that would justify refusing a permit.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her claim that her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.

The HRTO had found that the employer attempted to accommodate the applicant, but she failed to participate in the cooperative accommodation process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the adjudicator made no error of law and reached a reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision ordering him to pay $704 in unpaid wages to an employee.

On judicial review, the employer argued for the first time that he was not obliged to pay the employee because the employee lacked a valid work permit under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Divisional Court declined to hear this new constitutional and statutory argument, noting it was not raised before the arbitrator, the evidentiary record was inadequate, and no notice of a constitutional question was served.

The court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's reasons regarding the unpaid wages were transparent, consistent, and reasonable.

The defendant employer appealed a summary judgment awarding the plaintiff employee eight months' pay in lieu of notice for wrongful dismissal.

The motion judge had found the termination clause in the employment contract invalid for violating the Employment Standards Act by excluding benefits during the notice period.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's interpretation of the contract, his assessment of the plaintiff's mitigation efforts, or his costs award.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal seeking a longer notice period based on prior service with a predecessor employer was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal suspending its liquor licence for 55 days after a patron was overserved, became intoxicated, and was subsequently struck and killed by a vehicle.

The Divisional Court found that the tribunal reasonably concluded the appellant breached the Liquor Licence Act by serving an intoxicated person and permitting drunkenness on the premises.

The court held that the tribunal applied the correct legal tests, properly weighed the evidence, and imposed a reasonable penalty.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to deny his organization a special event permit to host a Canada Day event in a public park.

The City had denied the permit due to a history of serious health, safety, and by-law infractions at the applicant's previous events.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no violation of the applicant's Charter right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as the City's regulation of park use was reasonable.