Michael R. Dambrot

The appellants appealed decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that they engaged in insider trading after receiving material non-public information from an administrative assistant at an investment bank.

The Commission relied on circumstantial evidence, including the proximity of telephone calls to highly profitable trades.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Commission's inferences were reasonable and that the use of compelled examination transcripts was procedurally fair.

The Court also upheld the sanctions, which included trading bans, administrative penalties, and disgorgement orders.

The Applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Regional Municipality of Niagara Police Services Board, which declined to extend the time for service of a Notice of Disciplinary Hearing on two police officers beyond the six-month period under s. 83(17) of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court found that the Board breached procedural fairness by not providing the Applicants with the officers' submissions or an opportunity to respond.

The Court also found the Board's decision unreasonable for failing to consider the causes of delay holistically.

The Board's decision was quashed and remitted for reconsideration.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their appeal of a Chief Building Official's order to demolish a house and shed located on a high-risk slope.

The appellants argued the judge below was biased and sought to introduce new oral expert evidence.

The Divisional Court denied the request to call oral evidence, finding it did not meet the test for fresh evidence and that the appeal was not a hearing de novo.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding there was no evidence of bias and the appellants failed to raise any question of law or mixed fact and law as required by section 26(3) of the Building Code Act.

The appellant sought to appeal a trial judge's order fixing costs at $4,000 against him, but failed to seek leave to appeal in his notice of appeal or factum.

The Divisional Court noted that under section 133 of the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal as to costs requires leave, which is granted sparingly.

Finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate strong grounds to interfere with the trial judge's discretionary costs order, the court refused leave and quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The maternal grandmother of a child made a Crown Ward without access sought to appeal the summary judgment order.

After failing to perfect her appeal, a motions judge dismissed her motion for an extension of time and dismissed the appeal.

The grandmother brought a motion to set aside the motions judge's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law, palpable and overriding error of fact, or breach of procedural fairness by the motions judge.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against a lawyer for conversion, breach of trust, and money had and received arising from a mortgage transaction.

The trial judge found the lawyer acted for the mortgagee, not the appellant, and had authorization from the appellant's solicitor to disburse the funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant could not raise a new argument regarding the sufficiency of authorization on appeal, and that the trial judge made no errors in principle regarding evidentiary rulings on bankruptcy documentation or the costs award.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Guelph Police Services Board upholding the Chief of Police's revocation of its accessible taxi licence.

The Divisional Court found that while the Chief had the authority to revoke the licence, the Board's decision was unreasonable because it failed to provide adequate reasons resolving conflicts in the evidence regarding insurance and office hours.

The Court also granted the applicant leave to maintain the proceeding despite being in default of filing annual returns under the Corporations Information Act.

The Board's decision was set aside and a new hearing was ordered.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order dismissing her Small Claims Court appeal for delay.

The moving party argued she had filed her materials the day before the dismissal motion and was told by court staff she did not need to attend.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, finding that the appeal was still perfected over a year late without an adequate explanation, and the underlying appeal lacked a reasonable prospect of success as it attempted to reargue the case with new evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Law Society Appeal Panel decision upholding a $17,500 costs award against him.

The costs were awarded after the applicant abandoned his third application for a paralegal license just days before the good character hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Hearing Panel retained jurisdiction to award costs despite the abandonment, properly considered the applicant's history of abandoning and reinstating applications as an abuse of process, and afforded the applicant procedural fairness.

The court fixed costs of the judicial review at $5,000.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside two prior trial management orders.

The prior orders were made by a judge who later recused himself from the trial because the respondent's counsel, who was to testify as a witness, was a deputy judge under the judge's administrative responsibility.

The appellants argued the recusal retroactively tainted the prior orders due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court held that while the motion judge erred in applying issue estoppel, the result was correct.

The court found that the judge's subsequent recusal out of an abundance of caution had no retroactive impact on his previous orders, as the conflict only arose when counsel became a witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing an application for harassment.

The Board member found the appellants were not tenants, and alternatively, that they were not harassed.

On appeal, the appellant argued the member erred in finding they were not tenants, but raised no argument regarding the harassment finding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the member erred on the tenancy issue, there was no error of law in the dismissal of the application because the harassment finding was unchallenged.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that denied its claim for damages for breach of contract and allowed the respondent employee's counterclaim for unpaid commission.

The employee had been terminated for cause after the employer discovered he was performing work for another business on company time and taking steps to start a competing business.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to order the disgorgement of the $5,152.15 the employee earned from the undisclosed work.

The award for unpaid commission was upheld, and the trial costs award against the employer was set aside due to the employee's egregious conduct.

The moving party sought to set aside a single judge's order refusing to transfer its application for judicial review of a Small Claims Court decision to a panel of the Divisional Court.

The underlying Small Claims Court claim was for less than $2,500, meaning no statutory right of appeal existed.

The Divisional Court panel held that while it has jurisdiction to judicially review Small Claims Court decisions, it retains discretion to refuse relief.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding the application was a disguised appeal and a frivolous use of court resources.

The moving party brought a motion to add the Independent Police Review Director, the Toronto Police Service, and several constables as respondents in his application for judicial review of a decision of the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The constables opposed only the addition of the Director.

The court found that the Director was already imperfectly named as a respondent in the body of the notice of application and could be added to the heading without leave.

Alternatively, the court held that the Director ought to have been named as a respondent because he had a statutory right to be heard on the appeal before the Commission and his unique oversight role under the Police Services Act made his presence necessary to effectively adjudicate the issues.

The motion was granted.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenant had accumulated significant rent arrears and failed to perfect his appeal or pay rent since the termination order was made.

The court found that the notice of appeal raised no arguable grounds and was filed solely to delay eviction and allow the tenant to live rent-free.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed as an abuse of process, and the stay of eviction was set aside.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order approving the plaintiff's discovery plan in a class action for unpaid overtime.

The defendants argued the order conflicted with established principles of relevance in class actions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision on relevance and concluding it was not desirable to grant leave.

The applicant municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that denied its motion to extend the time to appeal property assessments dating back to 2003.

The applicant argued that a palpable error occurred when the respondent incorrectly entered the height of a building as 923 feet instead of 12 feet, resulting in a 272% increase in assessed value.

The Board had refused the extension, finding no evidence of an error for the earlier taxation years.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the legal correctness of the Board's decision because the Board failed to recognize circumstantial evidence of the error and applied an unduly high standard of proof.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision finding that the parties had entered into an oral agreement whereby the respondent was a 50% beneficial shareholder in the appellant corporation and was entitled to a $2.8 million shareholder loan in exchange for his assistance in restructuring a distressed business.

The appellants argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact and erred in granting an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's factual findings regarding the oral agreement and credibility assessments.

The Court further held that the trial judge did not err in principle in granting the oppression remedy, as the respondent met the definition of a complainant and the remedy accorded with his reasonable expectations.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $11,300 for unpaid cabinet work.

The appellants alleged they had paid in cash.

During the respondent's cross-examination, the trial judge made several interventions expressing disbelief in the cash payment defence and stating he was insulted that the respondent had not been paid.

The Divisional Court found these interventions created a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the trial judge had effectively decided the case before hearing the defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim against the respondent for joint liability on a $10,000 loan.

The trial judge had found that the loan was made solely to the respondent's ex-husband, as the cheque was payable to and endorsed only by him.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact, but reduced the trial costs awarded against the appellant from $1,500 to $500.