CITATION: Guelph Taxi Inc. v. Guelph (Police Service), 2016 ONSC 7383
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-15-11111128-00JR DATE: 20161018
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
DAMBROT, HAMBLY and MEW JJ.
B E T W E E N :
GUELPH TAXI INC.
Moving Party
(Appellant)
– and –
GUELPH POLICE SERVICE AND GUELPH POLICE SERVICES BOARD
Respondents
M. Zafar
for the Moving Party (Appellant)
J. Stoffman
for the Respondents
HEARD in Brampton: October 18, 2016
M. DAMBROT J. (ORALLY):
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Guelph Police Services Board (the “Board”). The Board decided to uphold the decision of the Chief of the Guelph Police Service (the “Service”) to revoke Guelph Taxi’s licence to operate an accessible taxi business.
[2] While there are many issues raised by the applicant, which are for the most part without merit, we do have some concerns with the process in this case. These concerns affect the reasonableness of the decision of the Board, bearing in mind that the standard of review in this case is reasonableness.
[3] First, in the opening paragraph of the letter of the Chief of Police (the “Chief”) to the applicant notifying it of the revocation of its taxi licence, the Chief purported to revoke the taxi licence of the applicant pursuant to s. 12(b) of By-Law No. 145. That section gave the chief only the power to suspend a licence, for just cause.
[4] Second, at the conclusion of the appeal hearing before the Board, it upheld the decision of the Chief effectively without reasons. The chair stated:
Thank you for waiting and we have discussed the issues at hand and the Board has passed a motion to uphold the decision of the Chief to revoke the taxi licence under the Taxi Bylaw and we will be sending you correspondence to your office with the details of the motion and the information that you need.
[5] In the follow up notice of decision, the effective part of the notice simply reads:
During the hearing, Board members gave careful consideration to the evidence and submissions proffered on behalf of the Appellant and the Chief respectively.
At the conclusion of the Hearing, the Board's decision to uphold the decision of the Chief of Police to revoke Guelph Taxi Inc.’s licence was delivered directly to both you (Mr. Kamal) and to Mr. Asghar Aqueel Khan orally from the Chair.
This correspondence serves as written confirmation of the Guelph Police Service Board's October 15th, 2015 decision.
[6] Neither the announcement of the Board’s decision at the hearing, nor the notice of decision, resolved the conflicts in the evidence about whether the applicant had any taxis on the road without insurance during the relevant period of time, and whether or not it complied with the requirement to have an office open at all times. The Board could not assess the validity of the revocation without resolving these conflicts.
[7] With respect to the first point, a careful reading of the Chief’s letter reveals that he also relied on s. 9(r) and s. 11(b)(i) of the by-law, which gave him the power to cancel the licence. I see no difference between the power to revoke and the power to cancel. As a result, although the letter could have been clearer, I see no basis to set aside the revocation ordered by the chief.
[8] With respect to the second point, the reasons are clearly inadequate. I recognize that the inadequacy of reasons is not a stand-alone basis to conclude that there was a breach of natural justice. Rather, it is a consideration in determining the reasonableness of a decision. We approach this issue with some caution. Even if reasons do not seem wholly adequate to support a decision, this Court must first seek to supplement them before it seeks to subvert them. The notion of deference to administrative tribunal decision-making requires “a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a decision”: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 at paragraph 12.
[9] But even applying that approach in this case, in our view the decision of the Board was not reasonable. It is impossible to know whether the Board was alive to the conflicts in the evidence that it heard, and if so how it resolved them.
[10] As a result, the decision cannot stand. The decision of the Board is set aside, and a new hearing ordered. To be clear, the revocation ordered by the Chief remains in effect in the interim.
[11] I note that counsel for the Board raised, as an impediment to hearing this appeal, s. 18(1) of the Corporations Information Act, which provides as follows:
A corporation that is in default of a requirement under this Act to file a return or notice or that has unpaid fees or penalties is not capable of maintaining a proceeding in a court in Ontario in respect of the business carried on by the corporation except with leave of the court.
[12] The evidence before us suggests that the applicant is in breach of the requirement to file annual returns.
[13] While s. 18(2) of the Corporations Information Act outlines circumstances when a court must grant leave, we are of the view that it does not exhaust our discretion to do so. We grant leave in the circumstances of this case.
[14] Accordingly, the application is allowed to the extent I have indicated.
___________________________ DAMBROT J.
HAMBLY J.
MEW J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: October 18, 2016
Date of Release: November 28, 2016
CITATION: Guelph Taxi Inc. v. Guelph (Police Service), 2016 ONSC 7383
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-15-11111128-00JR DATE: 20161018
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
DAMBROT, HAMBLY and MEW JJ.
B E T W E E N :
GUELPH TAXI INC.
Moving Party
(Appellant)
– and –
GUELPH POLICE SERVICE AND GUELPH POLICE SERVICES BOARD
Respondents
ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
M. DAMBROT J.
Date of Reasons for Judgment: October 18, 2016
Date of Release: November 28, 2016