Mew

The defendants brought a motion to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim to add a $100,000 defamation claim just days before a scheduled simplified procedure trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants failed to adequately explain their delay in seeking the amendment.

The court held that adding a defamation claim would materially alter the factual framework, require further discovery, cause significant delay, and potentially push the trial beyond the five-day limit for simplified procedure actions, resulting in non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The offender, a 25-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon after stabbing a victim outside a nightclub.

The Crown sought 18 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought a sentence of time served based on pre-trial custody and strict house arrest conditions.

The court applied the restraint principle for young first offenders and sentenced the offender to 9 months' imprisonment concurrent with 6 months for the weapons offence, followed by two years' probation.

The offender pleaded guilty to nine charges, including cocaine trafficking and multiple weapons offences, after selling cocaine to undercover operators and being found with a loaded SKS assault rifle and other prohibited weapons.

The court considered the offender's Indigenous heritage, lack of criminal record, and guilty pleas as mitigating factors, balanced against the significant aggravating factor of possessing a loaded firearm for 'insurance' during drug trafficking.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 5 years' imprisonment, less 1 year credit for pre-trial custody, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, an inmate serving a life sentence for murder, was charged with counselling another inmate to commit the murders of four individuals connected to his civil litigation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of a fellow inmate, 'Joe', an unsavoury witness with a mixed reputation for honesty.

The court found Joe's evidence unreliable and the alleged murder plot too implausible and contingent to meet the threshold for the offence of counselling.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant, having previously obtained summary judgment establishing the third party's obligation to indemnify her for liabilities arising from commercial loans, sought summary judgment for $150,000, representing the amount she paid to settle the plaintiff bank's claims against her.

The court found the settlement amount to be reasonable given the risks and potential liabilities involved, and granted judgment for $150,000 plus costs.

The court also granted a temporary stay of enforcement to allow the self-represented third party, who is subject to a vexatious litigant order, an opportunity to launch an appeal.

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with dangerous driving causing death after his vehicle struck a line of stopped traffic on Highway 401, killing one driver.

The Crown argued the accused failed to observe warning signs and maintain a safe distance.

The defence argued the accused was temporarily blinded by the rising sun as he rounded a curve, making the accident unavoidable.

The court found the actus reus was established but concluded the Crown failed to prove the mens rea, as the blinding sun provided a reasonable alternative explanation for the accused's failure to stop.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order for the partition and sale of a property under the Partition Act.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by ordering the sale despite a triable issue regarding a trust claim and by failing to find the respondent's conduct was malicious, vexatious, or oppressive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's desire to untangle financial affairs was reasonable and the appellant failed to establish prejudice arising from the sale.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death after his tractor-trailer rear-ended a line of stopped traffic on a highway, killing one driver.

At trial, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing the Crown failed to adduce sufficient evidence that his driving was a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The court dismissed the application, finding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence regarding visibility, braking, and impact speed upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer guilt.

The offender was convicted of assault, sexual assault, uttering threats, and mischief against his former domestic partner.

The sexual assaults involved non-consensual anal intercourse and intercourse while the victim was tied up.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of domestic violence and the profound impact on the victim against mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, compliance with bail, and Indigenous heritage.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to a total of 3.5 years in custody, along with a DNA order, weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The applicant medical officer of health obtained a without-notice order under section 102 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act to close the respondents' pub for defying COVID-19 public health measures.

At a come-back hearing, the self-represented respondent argued the orders were invalid, breached his rights, and that the pub was his residence.

The court dismissed the respondents' arguments, finding the drastic remedy of changing the locks was proportionate to their open defiance of the law.

The original orders were continued, and the respondents were ordered to pay $20,000 in costs.

The applicant sought directions under Rule 60.17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce a prior court order requiring the closure of the respondents' business for violating COVID-19 public health measures.

The respondents had refused to comply with the initial order, claiming the business was now a residence.

The court granted the directions, authorizing the Sheriff and police to remove all persons from the premises and change the locks to ensure compliance.

The Medical Officer of Health for Kingston, Frontenac and Lennox and Addington brought an ex parte application for a restraining order under s. 102 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act against the respondents, who operate a restaurant.

The respondents had openly defied a s. 22 order requiring them to comply with COVID-19 public health measures, including mask mandates and vaccine passports.

The court found clear breaches of the order and the applicable regulations.

The court granted the restraining order, including a term directing the Sheriff to lock the external doors of the premises, and scheduled a come-back hearing.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a mortgage and for possession of the defendant's property, as well as to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim.

The defendant raised various defences, including claims that the property was on unceded indigenous land and that he held unredeemed certificates of deposit.

The court found the indigenous land defence untenable as the property was not on a reserve, and the certificate of deposit claim was barred by the ultimate limitation period.

The court granted summary judgment for possession, dismissed the counterclaim as frivolous and vexatious, but declined to make a vexatious litigant order as it required a separate application.

The parties brought motions under Rule 59.06(1) to amend a 2000 judgment regarding the removal of gates across a right-of-way.

The original judgment contained an error referring to a gate at the 'road' instead of the 'barn'.

The moving party sought a further amendment to clarify that a 'gate at the lake' was also excepted from removal, to reflect the original trial judge's manifest intention.

The court granted the motion, finding that the amendment was necessary to accurately reflect the original decision and prevent further disputes.

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused persons to police.

One of the accused opposed the application, arguing his statement was involuntary and obtained in violation of his section 10 Charter rights because he was not informed of all the investigations for which he was a suspect.

The accused also challenged the admissibility of incriminating videos found on a co-accused's phone, alleging a section 8 Charter breach.

The court found the police questioning did not violate section 10 and the statement was voluntary.

Furthermore, the court held the accused lacked standing to challenge the search of the co-accused's phone as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the videos.

The Crown's applications were granted and the accused's applications to exclude evidence were dismissed.

Following summary judgment motions where the Bank successfully enforced a personal guarantee against one defendant (Kechichian) but faced triable issues against another (Jarada), the court determined costs.

The Bank was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $23,459.52 against Kechichian based on the terms of the guarantee.

Jarada, who succeeded on her crossclaim for indemnity against Kechichian, sought substantial indemnity costs but was awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $7,500.

The court also commented on the inappropriate practice of filing voluminous compendia for routine costs submissions.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff obtained a monetary award of approximately $936,000, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff relied on the terms of its loan agreements with the defendants, which provided for costs associated with enforcement proceedings to be paid on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court noted it retains discretion over costs despite contractual agreements, but found the amount sought proportionate and reasonable.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $45,733.98 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff sought costs on a full indemnity basis following a successful summary judgment motion regarding commercial lease agreements and a personal guarantee.

The plaintiff relied on a contractual right to full indemnity costs.

The court acknowledged the contractual right but emphasized the principle of proportionality, noting the high costs claimed relative to the principal amount recovered and the involvement of ten fee earners.

The court fixed costs at $55,000, balancing the contractual agreement with the need for proportionate and reasonable costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for default judgment after the defendants misappropriated $325,000 in investment funds and failed to defend the action.

The defendants, acting as financial advisors, repeatedly evaded requests to return the funds and provided fabricated portfolio reports.

The court granted judgment for the represented portfolio value of $345,071.45, continued a Mareva injunction, and awarded $100,000 in punitive damages due to the defendants' deceitful and callous conduct.

The accused, charged with sexual offences, brought a motion for directions seeking a declaration that the court was bound by a previous Superior Court decision (R. v. Reddick) which struck down sections 278.92, 278.94(2), and 278.94(3) of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional.

The accused argued this would bypass the need to file a formal Notice of Constitutional Question under Rule 27.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the Court of Appeal's reasoning in R. v. Sullivan that the ordinary principles of stare decisis apply to declarations of invalidity by trial courts, and directed the accused to follow the formal procedure to challenge the provisions.