Monica Heine

The accused, an inmate serving a life sentence for murder, was charged with counselling another inmate to commit the murders of four individuals connected to his civil litigation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of a fellow inmate, 'Joe', an unsavoury witness with a mixed reputation for honesty.

The court found Joe's evidence unreliable and the alleged murder plot too implausible and contingent to meet the threshold for the offence of counselling.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown brought an application for an enhanced publication ban under s. 486.31 of the Criminal Code and the court's inherent jurisdiction to protect the identity of an inmate witness, 'Joe'.

The accused, serving a life sentence for a previous contract killing, allegedly attempted to solicit Joe's assistance to hire a hitman to murder four individuals.

The defence sought to interview other inmates to investigate Joe's motivations, arguing it needed to disclose Joe's identity as a witness in this proceeding.

The court granted the application in part, holding that while the defence could investigate Joe's motivations using his real name, it was prohibited from disclosing to potential witnesses that Joe was a witness in this proceeding or identifying the accused as their client, due to the serious risk to Joe's safety.

The offender was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after striking two cyclists on the shoulder of the road.

The court found the offender engaged in a prolonged pattern of dangerous driving, including speeding, tailgating, and driving while prohibited.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to four years' imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently, along with a lifetime driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and death after his vehicle struck a group of cyclists standing on the shoulder of the road.

The court found that the accused engaged in a pattern of dangerous driving, including tailgating, excessive speed, and failing to pay attention to his surroundings.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he was forced to make a split-second decision to avoid a collision, finding instead that his driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for shooting the victim in the head with a concealed handgun.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victim's family, the offender's lack of a significant criminal record, and the jury's recommendations for parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, along with non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after shooting his step-mother.

During the trial, the defence applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree murder charge, arguing there was no evidence that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's prior statements, his access to the firearm, and his post-offence conduct.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could infer planning and deliberation.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized computers containing 9,888 images and 105 videos, including depictions of violence and infants.

The Crown sought 18 to 24 months' incarceration, while the defence requested a conditional sentence, citing the offender's mental health issues, including PTSD and depression, and his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, noting the serious nature and size of the collection.

The court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 15 months' incarceration followed by three years' probation, along with DNA and sex offender registry orders.

The accused, charged with possession of child pornography, brought a Garofoli application to quash a search warrant and a Charter motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors and omissions, the warrant contained a "Branton error" (outdated form), the police failed to report to a justice as soon as practicable under s. 489.1(1) of the Criminal Code, and subscriber information was obtained without a warrant contrary to R. v. Spencer.

The court upheld the warrant on the Garofoli application after excising and amplifying the ITO.

On the Charter motion, the court found s. 8 breaches regarding the Branton error, the failure to report, and the Spencer issue.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused applied for bail while facing charges including first degree murder of a newborn child, concealing the body of a child, failing to obtain assistance in childbirth with intent to conceal birth, and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The Crown opposed release relying primarily on the accused’s statement that she had suffocated the infant.

The court reviewed psychiatric evidence suggesting serious mental health concerns and the possible applicability of the infanticide provisions, as well as the absence of a determined cause of death and uncertainty whether the child was born alive.

Considering the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code and the factors set out in R v St-Cloud, the court found the Crown’s case not strong and accepted a detailed release plan with family sureties and medical supervision.

Bail was granted subject to strict conditions including house arrest, psychiatric treatment, and supervision by sureties.

The accused applied for severance of counts in an indictment alleging historical sexual offences against two complainants: the accused’s sister and niece.

The defence argued the count involving the sister should be severed because the alleged conduct occurred when the accused was a youth and therefore engaged the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court rejected that argument but nevertheless considered severance under s. 591 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the factors set out in R. v. Last, the court found weak factual similarity between the allegations, a high risk of moral prejudice to the accused, and the likelihood of antagonistic defences.

The court concluded the interests of justice required separate trials.