David Adams

The applicant medical officer of health obtained a without-notice order under section 102 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act to close the respondents' pub for defying COVID-19 public health measures.

At a come-back hearing, the self-represented respondent argued the orders were invalid, breached his rights, and that the pub was his residence.

The court dismissed the respondents' arguments, finding the drastic remedy of changing the locks was proportionate to their open defiance of the law.

The original orders were continued, and the respondents were ordered to pay $20,000 in costs.

The applicant sought directions under Rule 60.17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce a prior court order requiring the closure of the respondents' business for violating COVID-19 public health measures.

The respondents had refused to comply with the initial order, claiming the business was now a residence.

The court granted the directions, authorizing the Sheriff and police to remove all persons from the premises and change the locks to ensure compliance.

The Medical Officer of Health for Kingston, Frontenac and Lennox and Addington brought an ex parte application for a restraining order under s. 102 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act against the respondents, who operate a restaurant.

The respondents had openly defied a s. 22 order requiring them to comply with COVID-19 public health measures, including mask mandates and vaccine passports.

The court found clear breaches of the order and the applicable regulations.

The court granted the restraining order, including a term directing the Sheriff to lock the external doors of the premises, and scheduled a come-back hearing.

The plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim to limit their damages to $200,000 and to have the action proceed under the simplified procedure pursuant to Rule 76.

The defendants opposed the application of the simplified procedure, arguing prejudice due to discovery limits.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, finding that the amended claim and the defendants' counterclaim both fell within the $200,000 limit, making the simplified procedure mandatory.

The court declined to apply the presumptive costs consequences under Rule 76.13(1), leaving the costs of the amendment to the discretion of the trial judge.

Following an uncontested personal injury trial where the defendants were noted in default and damages of $820,000 plus prejudgment interest were awarded, the plaintiffs sought costs.

The court considered the plaintiffs’ written costs submissions after the trial.

In light of the defendants’ conduct and the necessity of the litigation steps taken by the plaintiffs to pursue redress, the court found the claimed costs reasonable.

Costs were fixed at $37,202.61 inclusive of HST.

A municipality brought an application seeking declarations and an injunction against a salvage yard operation alleged to contravene municipal zoning by-laws and site plan requirements.

The respondents argued their use complied with the zoning by-law, that it was grandfathered prior to an interim control by-law under the Planning Act, and that municipal conduct and representations created estoppel or bad faith issues requiring trial.

The court held the matter could properly be determined under Rule 14 because the material facts were not in dispute and the central issue was legal interpretation of the zoning by-law.

Interpreting the by-law purposively, the court found that a lawful salvage yard required a principal building or structure and could not operate solely as open storage on bare land without site plan approval or building permits.

The respondents’ use was therefore unlawful and could not constitute a prior legal non‑conforming use.

Allegations of municipal bad faith and estoppel were unsupported by evidence and could not defeat statutory obligations.