ODC 2016

The appellants appealed a decision of the Electrical Safety Authority Review Panel suspending their Master Electrician and Electrical Contractor licences for 90 days.

The Review Panel found the appellants breached several rules of the Electrical Safety Code, including failing to obtain inspection permits, failing to obtain authorization to reconnect power, installing incorrect equipment, and charging grossly excessive fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Review Panel's interpretation of the Code was reasonable, the appellants had sufficient notice of the allegations against them, and the remaining issues were questions of fact over which the court had no jurisdiction.

The appellant car dealership appealed a Small Claims Court decision granting the respondent rescission of a motor vehicle purchase agreement and return of her $7,964 payment.

The trial judge found the transaction was a consumer purchase under the Consumer Protection Act and that the dealership engaged in an unfair practice by failing to provide a bill of sale and complete financing details.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the dealership's unfulfilled promise to provide a legally compliant bill of sale constituted a false, misleading, or deceptive representation under section 14 of the Act, entitling the buyer to rescission.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to extend the time to review an order of a single judge under Rule 61.16(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying action involved allegations of solicitor negligence against the respondents.

The court reviewed the extensive procedural history, noting numerous unpaid costs orders against the appellant and her failure to attend the previous motion.

Applying the four-part test for an extension of time, the court found the appellant failed to explain her delay, the respondents had suffered prejudice, and the intended review lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The applicant's motion for judicial review of a case management master's decision to recuse herself from construction lien proceedings was dismissed for prematurity.

The respondents sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the applicant made reckless attacks on the integrity of a judicial officer.

The Divisional Court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, noting the bias issue was not determined on its merits.

The court ordered the applicant to pay $30,000 to the respondent 229 and $3,000 to the respondent St. Clare's.

The respondent mother brought a motion to strike the appellant father's appeal of a garnishment dismissal order.

The father had a lengthy history of vexatious litigation, deliberately avoiding child support obligations, and failing to pay numerous prior costs awards totaling over $25,000.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to strike the appeal, awarded costs to the respondent, and ordered that the father may not bring any further claims or motions without leave of the court and until all outstanding support arrears and costs are paid in full.

The Law Society appealed a decision of the Appeal Division of the Law Society Tribunal ordering a new hearing and disclosure of files belonging to other lawyers involved in the real estate transactions at issue.

The Law Society argued that s. 49.12 of the Law Society Act prohibited disclosure, the files were irrelevant, and the respondent should have used an O'Connor application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 49.12 is a confidentiality provision with an exception for conduct proceedings, not a statutory privilege.

The court held that the files were potentially relevant under the Stinchcombe disclosure regime and that the Law Society's investigating and prosecuting arms are not separate entities for disclosure purposes.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review of two orders by an adjudicator of the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of records relating to the municipality's IT system and service contracts.

The municipality had denied access to portions of the records, claiming various exemptions under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the adjudicator's decisions that the exemptions for third party information, advice and recommendations, security, and valuable government information did not apply were reasonable.

The Ministry appealed a costs order awarding the plaintiffs $150,000 in partial indemnity costs following a motion to join the Ministry as a party and amend the statement of claim.

The Ministry argued the costs were excessive for a pleadings motion and that the judge failed to properly apply Rule 57.01.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion was treated as a 'mini-trial' by the Ministry, the issues were of significant importance, and the judge properly considered the relevant factors in exercising his discretion to fix costs.

The respondents in an appeal brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding subsequent actions the Township proposed to take to remedy inconsistencies in its zoning by-laws.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the potential remedial work by the Township would not assist in interpreting the by-law under review.

The court held that the proposed evidence did not meet the test for fresh evidence, as it was not necessary to deal fairly with the issues on appeal and declining to admit it would not lead to a substantial injustice.

Two moving parties, wpd White Pines and Ron Higgins, sought party or intervener status in an application for judicial review challenging the approval of a wind energy project.

The court found that wpd White Pines, the project proponent, was not a necessary party under Rule 5.03 but granted it intervener status under Rule 13.01 without the conditions requested by the applicant.

The court dismissed the motion by Ron Higgins, finding he did not meet the criteria for intervention and his participation would unduly delay the proceedings.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board that summarily dismissed her complaint against her union for failing in its duty of fair representation.

The applicant had previously settled a grievance regarding her termination, but subsequently complained about the union's representation.

The Divisional Court held that the Board was entitled to dismiss the complaint summarily without a hearing, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for partial summary judgment regarding a share option claim.

The motion judge had granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the claim, applying Quebec law to find the defendant breached its duty of good faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which was based on factual findings and expert evidence on Quebec law.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to compel answers to questions refused during cross-examination on an affidavit.

The underlying action is a proposed class action regarding a birth control device, and the affidavit was filed in response to the defendants' motion to stay the Ontario proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the issues regarding the refusals were specific to the stay motion and did not transcend the interests of the parties to involve matters of general or public importance.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the plaintiff sought costs of $40,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the offer was not a true compromise and did not trigger Rule 49.10.

Considering the complexity and significance of the litigation, the court fixed costs at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside an earlier order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The applicant claimed she failed to respond to the earlier notice due to insufficient notice.

The court accepted the lack of notice for the purpose of the motion but found the applicant failed to demonstrate any basis to set aside the order or show that the result would be different if reheard.

The motion was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision where the deputy judge awarded costs without hearing submissions from either party.

The deputy judge subsequently ruled she was functus officio and could not hear submissions regarding an unaccepted offer to settle.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the deputy judge erred in law by concluding she was functus officio before hearing costs submissions, and remitted the matter back to the deputy judge to determine costs.

The self-represented plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an order staying their civil action pending the final disposition of related criminal proceedings against one of the plaintiffs.

The civil action alleged various torts and Charter breaches arising from wiretap authorizations that led to the criminal charges.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that the fundamental issue in the civil claim—the lawfulness of the wiretap authorization—was identical to a key issue in the criminal case, making the circumstances exceptional enough to warrant a stay.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside two prior trial management orders.

The prior orders were made by a judge who later recused himself from the trial because the respondent's counsel, who was to testify as a witness, was a deputy judge under the judge's administrative responsibility.

The appellants argued the recusal retroactively tainted the prior orders due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court held that while the motion judge erred in applying issue estoppel, the result was correct.

The court found that the judge's subsequent recusal out of an abundance of caution had no retroactive impact on his previous orders, as the conflict only arose when counsel became a witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding his rental unit exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act under section 5(i).

When the tenancy began, the appellant shared a kitchen and bathroom with the respondent landlord's daughter, whom he later married.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board reasonably determined the exemption applied based on the facts at the time the tenancy agreement was entered into, and the appellant could not unilaterally change the legal nature of the relationship.

The appellant retained the respondent law firm for his divorce litigation and failed to pay his legal accounts.

The respondent obtained a writ of seizure and sale under the Creditors' Relief Act for the unpaid trial debt.

The appellant appealed, arguing the respondent required leave under the Solicitors Act to proceed and that the accounts should be assessed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that leave was not required because no assessment of the trial debt had been requested, and the motion judge reasonably exercised his discretion in refusing to order an assessment due to the appellant's undue delay.