ODC 2017

The applicant, a self-represented lawyer, brought a motion within his application for judicial review regarding adoption disclosure.

He sought orders requiring the respondent Children's Aid Society to file a proper response to a Request to Admit, file a complete Record of Proceedings, permit him to file his own affidavit, and permit a 45-page factum.

The court dismissed the motion except for allowing the applicant to file his own affidavit, finding the respondent's 'not relevant' responses to the Request to Admit were proper and the Record of Proceedings was complete.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to serve and file a motion for leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment and other relief.

The Divisional Court determined that the underlying order was a final order, not interlocutory, and that the damages claimed exceeded the court's monetary jurisdiction.

Consequently, the proper route of appeal was to the Court of Appeal.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to appeal to the Court of Appeal, with no order as to costs.

The appellant's appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was entirely successful.

The court received written submissions on costs.

The court awarded the respondent costs of the appeal fixed at $3,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes, finding the amount fair, reasonable, and proportionate.

The plaintiff restoration company provided emergency water cleanup services after the defendant's basement flooded.

The plaintiff's owner assured the defendant that her insurance would cover the costs and did not provide an estimate before starting work.

When the insurer did not pay, the plaintiff invoiced the defendant for $5,070.42.

The court found the plaintiff had a duty to provide an estimate and that the invoice was exorbitant.

The court awarded the plaintiff $2,548.32, based on the defendant's concession, less $348.32 in costs awarded to the defendant.

The self-represented applicant brought an application for judicial review of a Deputy Judge's costs order.

The Divisional Court found that the Deputy Judge lacked jurisdiction to order costs for a settlement conference over which he did not preside, and erred in awarding motion costs exceeding $100 without finding special circumstances under Rule 15.07.

The court varied the costs order, requiring the applicant to pay $100 for the motion, and awarded the applicant his disbursements for the judicial review application.

The applicant City sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award that reduced the penalty imposed on two firefighters for off-duty impaired driving convictions.

The firefighters had lost their driver's licenses and were demoted for one year by the City.

The arbitrator substituted a two-day suspension, finding the demotions were disciplinary and the firefighters could still perform their core duties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's exercise of discretion to substitute the penalty was reasonable and fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant brought a statutory appeal from a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario.

The appeal raised an important issue regarding the jurisdiction of a Discipline Committee over a member's prior conduct.

As the respondents did not participate, the Divisional Court adjourned the appeal and granted leave under Rule 13.03 to request Pro Bono Law Ontario to appoint amicus curiae to assist the court.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of an unredacted forensic investigation report.

The Commissioner found that the report contained personal information exempt from disclosure under s. 14 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, but ordered full disclosure based on the public interest override in s. 16.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, holding that the Commissioner's failure to identify the specific personal information exempted under s. 14 made it impossible to assess the reasonableness of the s. 16 balancing analysis.

The wife brought a motion to quash the husband's appeal of an order dismissing his motion for the partition and sale of the matrimonial home pending trial.

The husband had appealed to the Divisional Court without seeking leave, arguing that section 7 of the Partition Act provided an absolute right of appeal for any order.

The court held that the order dismissing the partition and sale pending trial was interlocutory.

Applying jurisprudence interpreting similar provisions in the Ontario Business Corporations Act, the court concluded that leave to appeal is required for interlocutory orders under the Partition Act.

The motion to quash was granted, with costs awarded to the wife.

The self-represented appellant sought leave to appeal a costs decision where he was denied costs for his time spent on the litigation.

The trial judge had relied on binding precedent requiring a self-represented lay litigant to demonstrate lost opportunity costs to be awarded costs for their time.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to exercise discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, holding that lower courts are bound by principles articulated by higher courts, and the trial judge committed no error in applying the established principle.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board not to proceed with a review of his complaint against his niece, a physician.

The Board had found the complaint to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as it arose from ongoing family litigation and was essentially the same as a previous complaint that had been dismissed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable and concluding there was no breach of procedural fairness.

The appellants, former tenants, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent landlord rental arrears, repair costs, and costs.

The appellants argued the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction because the landlord had served a Form N4 Notice to End a Tenancy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that under section 87 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, the Board loses jurisdiction to hear an application for rental arrears once the tenants vacate the premises, thereby giving the Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award.

The respondents brought a motion to stay a $50,000 costs order pending their motion for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

Specifically, they did not establish a serious issue to be tried regarding the correctness of the costs order, nor did they demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured them.

The tenant appealed a consent order from the Landlord and Tenant Board that terminated her tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Divisional Court found that the appeal did not raise any question of law and was an attempt to resile from a consent order.

The court quashed the appeal but granted the tenant a brief grace period to pay the arrears and costs to avoid eviction.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating the tenancy for the landlord's own use.

The tenant had failed to order the hearing transcript within the required time under the Rules of Civil Procedure and had taken no steps to pursue the appeal.

The Divisional Court found that the grounds of appeal lacked merit, raised no extricable questions of law, and that the appeal was merely a delaying tactic.

The motion to quash was granted and the stay of eviction was vacated.

The former wife brought a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a procedural order dismissing her motion for valuations, and for a stay pending appeal.

The motion was brought approximately 90 days after the deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence explaining the delay was inadequate and uncorroborated.

Furthermore, as the underlying order was procedural, the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the former husband.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent damages for the wrongful termination of a six-month fixed-term consulting contract.

The appellant argued that damages should be limited to the two-week early termination notice period provided in the contract, and that the respondent had a duty to mitigate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant never actually invoked the early termination clause until two days before the contract expired, effectively keeping the respondent on call.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondent was entitled to the balance of the fixed-term contract price without a duty to mitigate.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his Small Claims Court appeal for delay.

The court applied the four-part test from Paulsson v. Cooper.

While the appellant demonstrated an intention to appeal and provided a mental health explanation for the significant delay, he failed to provide a trial transcript or demonstrate that the appeal had merit.

The court concluded that the justice of the case did not warrant setting aside the dismissal order, and the motion was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of commercial benchmarking data provided to the Treasury Board Secretariat.

The applicant argued the adjudicator misapprehended evidence and applied too high a standard of proof for the third-party records exemption under s. 17(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator reasonably concluded the applicant failed to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of probable harm to its competitive position if the redacted information was disclosed.

The respondents brought a motion for security for costs regarding the appellant's appeal of a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed most of his claims.

The appellant, a former director of a housing co-operative, sued the co-operative, its manager, former directors, and sector organizations after being removed from the board.

The Divisional Court found good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous, vexatious, and devoid of merit.

Given the appellant's reliance on ODSP and unpaid prior costs awards, the court concluded he had insufficient assets.

Balancing access to justice against protecting the respondents from unmeritorious claims, the court ordered the appellant to post $10,000 in security for costs.