Marie Henein

The accused was charged with five sexual assault offences involving three separate complainants, with allegations spanning from 2002 to 2003.

The trial proceeded on the basis of the complainants' evidence alone, with no corroborating evidence.

The court found that each complainant engaged in significant inconsistencies between their media interviews, police statements, and trial testimony.

Each complainant also deliberately withheld material information from police and Crown counsel, including post-assault contact with the accused that contradicted their claims of trauma and fear.

The court concluded that the complainants' credibility and reliability were severely compromised by their deceptive conduct, late disclosures, and contradictory evidence.

The court found that the evidence failed to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The appellant, a criminal defence lawyer, was convicted of smuggling drugs into the Toronto Jail for a former client during a professional visit.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and erred in refusing to order the production of third party records relating to the prevalence of drug smuggling at the jail.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge subjected the appellant's evidence to a stricter level of scrutiny than the Crown's evidence, and erred in concluding that the third party records were not likely relevant.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving historic abuse of a child relative, and also appealed a six-year penitentiary sentence.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence consisting of a urologist's report because the proposed evidence merely bolstered unchallenged trial evidence and could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

Although the Crown's cross-examination about abortion risks was inflammatory and inappropriate, it did not render the trial unfair or cause a miscarriage of justice.

The court also held that the absence of a limiting instruction on one prior consistent statement was not fatal in light of the way prior statements were used at trial, and upheld the sentence as fit.

The appellants were convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

After the jury was discharged, it was discovered that the jury foreman had brought a document containing extraneous information into the jury room.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the juror misconduct caused a miscarriage of justice, that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

They also appealed their sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reasonable possibility that the extraneous information affected the verdict, no error in the jury instructions or the dismissal of the directed verdict application, and that the sentences were fit.

The appellant mother appealed a custody and access order that granted the respondent father generous access to their children, arguing that the father had attempted to kill her during a vacation in Jamaica.

The trial judge had found the mother's allegations not credible, relying heavily on hearsay evidence from a blood expert who testified at the father's Jamaican criminal trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the hearsay evidence without threshold reliability, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias through uneven scrutiny of the evidence, and failed to properly assess the best interests of the children, particularly regarding domestic violence.

A new hearing on custody and access was ordered.

The Crown applied for a review of a bail review judge's decision to release the accused pending trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had initially been denied bail, but a bail review judge later granted release based on a material change in circumstances arising from evidence at the preliminary inquiry regarding the accused's intent and level of intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's application, finding no error in the bail review judge's conclusion that the new evidence materially diminished the strength of the Crown's case and that the accused's continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in 1971 for the death of his common-law wife and served over three years in prison.

Decades later, fresh medical evidence from multiple pathologists concluded the deceased died of natural causes following a fall, contradicting the trial evidence of blunt force trauma.

The Supreme Court of Canada remanded the case to the Court of Appeal.

On a joint submission with the Crown, the Court admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the appellant was wrongly convicted.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of knowingly making a false statement in a loan application under the Canada Small Business Financing Act and sentenced to a conditional sentence and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $495,049.02.

He appealed the conviction, arguing it was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence, and the sentence, arguing the fine exceeded the proceeds he personally benefited from.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence clearly established the invoices were false and prepared by the appellant.

The court also upheld the fine, noting the appellant had possession and control of the loan proceeds and transferred them out of the country, making it unnecessary to prove he personally benefited on a dollar-for-dollar basis.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80.

At trial, the appellant argued that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated when police failed to facilitate his request to speak to a lawyer and continued to question him about his alcohol consumption.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application and convicted the appellant, rejecting his bolus drinking defence based partly on his statements to police.

On appeal, the Superior Court found that the police breached s. 10(b) by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and by eliciting evidence.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the appellant's statements under s. 24(2) and ordered a new trial.

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and arson-related offences after his hardware store was destroyed in a fire set by co-conspirators to collect insurance proceeds.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his Vetrovec warning regarding colluding witnesses, improperly admitted hearsay statements under the co-conspirator exception, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his 12-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and held the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the appellant's high degree of moral blameworthiness.

The appellant lawyer appealed the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division's decision to revoke his licence for professional misconduct.

The appellant argued that the penalty was disproportionate because the most serious charge of misappropriation was dismissed, and his misconduct was caused by severe depression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable.

The Court noted that the appellant's failure to acknowledge his dishonest conduct undermined his psychiatric evidence and failed to reassure the public and the profession of his integrity.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual and related offences arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's utterances during a later seizure-like episode as independent corroboration, because they were not admissible for the truth of their contents under the hearsay and prior consistent statement rules.

The court further held that the Crown expert's opinion linking the episode to the alleged assault was inadmissible because it exceeded the expert's qualifications and depended on unproven foundational facts.

As the impugned evidence was central to the credibility assessment, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

In a first degree murder appeal arising from a joint trial with antagonistic defences, the appellant's counsel was required to withdraw mid-trial and no replacement counsel could be found despite extensive efforts.

The trial judge refused severance or a mistrial and instead appointed amicus curiae with an expanded mandate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge asked the wrong question, relied on unsupported considerations, failed to consider highly relevant factors, and thereby unreasonably exercised discretion under the interests of justice standard.

Amicus was not an adequate substitute for counsel in a complex murder trial, and the resulting loss of representation deprived the appellant of a fair trial and caused a miscarriage of justice.

A pharmacist who owned and operated a pharmacy pleaded guilty to breach of trust contrary to the Criminal Code.

He admitted to submitting billings to the Ontario Drug Benefits Program for medications without proof of dispensation, receiving benefits knowing the claims could not be substantiated.

The audit revealed discrepancies in drug quantities billed versus purchased, with unsubstantiated claims totalling $155,466, though actual loss recovered was $46,506.04.

The defendant faced suspension of billing privileges and termination of his subscription agreement.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation and specific conditions, considering the defendant's exemplary personal antecedents, community contributions, full restitution, genuine remorse, and the aberrant nature of the conduct.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting the preliminary inquiry testimony of a co-accused who refused to testify at trial, failing to properly instruct the jury on the evidence, and improperly answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to properly exercise his discretion under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, failed to relate the evidence to the issues in his jury charge, and provided a procedurally and substantively flawed response to a jury question.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography following a major police investigation into international child pornography distribution.

The defendant's collection comprised over 100,000 photographs and 1,900 movies of child pornography across multiple devices.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months in custody, with a strong recommendation for placement at the Ontario Correctional Institute in Brampton to facilitate continued treatment.

The defendant was placed on probation for three years with extensive conditions, including restrictions on internet and electronic device access, prohibition from seeking employment involving children, DNA registration, and firearm prohibition.

Following a jury conviction for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, a document was discovered in the jury room containing excerpts from an online article criticizing a high-profile acquittal and model jury instructions from the Canadian Judicial Council.

The accused sought a mistrial or stay of proceedings, alleging juror misconduct and a violation of their Charter rights after it appeared that at least one juror had consulted external legal materials contrary to the trial judge’s instructions.

The court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant a mistrial or stay after the jury had been discharged, as the trial judge was functus officio except in narrow circumstances not present here.

However, relying on appellate authority recognizing the ability to create an evidentiary record for appeal, the court concluded it retained jurisdiction to conduct a limited post-verdict inquiry into extrinsic influences affecting the jury.

Because the document suggested independent legal research and potential dissemination among jurors, an inquiry was ordered while preserving the jury secrecy rule.

The appellant physician was found guilty of professional misconduct involving sexual abuse of young boys.

He appealed the Discipline Committee's decision, arguing that the summons power under s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code violated his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and that the College's delay in prosecuting the case amounted to an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the summons power is constitutional in the regulatory context as it is properly constrained by relevance and privilege.

The Court also found that the delay was not inordinate given the concurrent criminal proceedings, and the appellant did not suffer significant prejudice.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of three prior incidents of discreditable conduct by the accused at his trial for arson.

The Crown argued the evidence was admissible to rebut innocent association, counter third-party propensity, corroborate an unsavoury witness, show a pattern of behaviour, and complete the narrative.

The court applied the principled approach from Handy and found that the probative value of the evidence was limited, partly due to collusion between witnesses, and was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The application was dismissed.