Marie Henein

The applicants, solar power project developers, sought a declaration that the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) did not have the right to terminate their Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) contracts for failing to achieve commercial operation by the Milestone Date for Commercial Operation (MCOD).

The IESO had previously waived this right but issued a warning letter revoking past waivers following a government directive to wind down pre-construction energy contracts.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation and found that the FIT contracts, which included a 'time is of the essence' clause, unambiguously granted the IESO the right to terminate for failure to meet the MCOD.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought motions to discontinue the action against an individual defendant, to certify the action as a class proceeding, and for partial summary judgment.

The court approved the discontinuance as it did not prejudice the class and secured the corporate defendant's consent to certification.

The court certified the class action against the remaining defendants, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act and Competition Act, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the nature of the relationship between the defendants and the interpretation of the statutory provisions raised genuine issues requiring a full trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a seven-week jury trial.

This was his second trial on the charge; his prior conviction had been overturned by the Court of Appeal in 2013.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Mark Yegin, a witness of questionable credibility who testified that he witnessed the appellant and Shant Esrabian shoot the victim, Hussein El-Hajj Hassan, in a secluded rural area west of Ottawa in August 2004.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant orchestrated the murder in retaliation for the victim's decision to purchase drugs directly from a supplier, thereby cutting the appellant out of the sales chain.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding multiple legal errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Tribunal's Appeal Division, which upheld a Hearing Division finding of professional misconduct and a $200,000 costs award.

The misconduct related to the appellant's inadequate preparation of Personal Information Forms for Hungarian Roma refugee claimants and his failure to adequately supervise his staff.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Panel reasonably concluded the Hearing Panel's findings of fact, credibility assessments, and costs award were supported by the evidence and fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellant appealed from a contempt order under which he was ordered jailed.

On the eve of the expedited appeal hearing, the appellant accepted an offer to settle under which he agreed to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal on a full indemnity scale.

The court found the costs claimed to be wholly disproportionate and far beyond the range of anything that could be considered reasonable, even on a full indemnity basis.

The court fixed costs of the appeal at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes on a full indemnity basis.

Additionally, the appellant sought an extension of time to appeal the order underlying the contempt finding and several other orders, but was largely unsuccessful.

Costs of the motions were fixed at $7,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

No order was made as to costs in relation to the respondent's motion to deny audience to the appellant.

A lawyer and human rights advocate sued for defamation after a charitable organization published articles accusing him of supporting terrorists.

The plaintiff had met with the father of an alleged Palestinian terrorist, expressed sympathy for the father whose home was demolished, and posted about the matter on social media.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action as a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the defendant had valid defences of fair comment, justification, and qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in applying the wrong legal standard and that the plaintiff had met his burden under section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) by showing a reasonable trier could conclude none of the defences would succeed.

The court also found the balancing test under section 137.1(4)(b) favoured the plaintiff.

A professional discipline panel found that the member committed professional misconduct arising from a systemic pattern of unnecessary radiographs, false and misleading insurance billings, billing for services not performed, charging excessive or unreasonable fees, failing to collect co-payments, and failing to provide complete patient records to the regulator.

Applying the civil standard of proof from F.H. v McDougall, the panel relied heavily on documentary records and found the billing discrepancies too numerous and persistent to be explained as innocent clerical mistakes.

The panel rejected the position that responsibility for billing errors could be delegated to staff, holding the clinic owner responsible for the conduct of the office and the claims submitted under his name.

The publication restriction protecting patient identities remained in force.

The appellant, M.V., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The appeal raised four grounds: unreasonable verdict, error in dealing with demeanour, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's diary, and error in dismissing a recusal application.

The court found no unreasonable verdict and accepted the trial judge's assessment of demeanour.

However, the court found that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence concerning the child's diary and erred in dismissing the recusal application, which was based on a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the complainant's mother being a court reporter who had worked with the trial judge.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentences vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The defendant, The Walt Disney Company, previously brought a motion to seal excerpted provisions of agreements it intended to rely on in a stay motion.

The plaintiff successfully opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion regarding redactions.

In this endorsement, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs, finding no improper conduct by the defendant to warrant a higher scale, but affirming the plaintiff's right to costs for successfully defending the open court principle and adding value to the hearing.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after a head-on collision on Highway 17 that killed the other driver.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of expert opinion evidence from a police accident reconstruction officer, arguing the evidence was tainted by bias and that the Crown failed to disclose draft reports.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while there were concerns about the expert's independence, the trial judge properly circumscribed the scope of admissible evidence and that any disclosure violation did not impair the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant physician appealed an eight-month suspension imposed by the Discipline Committee for professional misconduct.

The appellant had borrowed substantial sums of money from two patients to fund a failed investment and subsequently made a consumer proposal, resulting in significant financial losses for the patients.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee reasonably considered specific and general deterrence, the appellant's lack of remorse, and the vulnerability of the patients due to shared ethnicity and language.

Derrick Harvey, an American citizen, appealed his 2011 guilty pleas for assault and failing to comply with a recognizance, which subsequently led to his permanent residence application being refused due to criminality.

He argued his plea was not informed as his trial counsel failed to advise him of the significant immigration consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice, on summary conviction appeal, found that Harvey's plea was not informed because he was unaware of the critical ramifications, specifically the distinction between border entry and criminal inadmissibility for permanent residence.

The court emphasized that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, including collateral consequences.

It was not necessary to find counsel ineffective.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the decision to re-prosecute left to the Crown.

The defendants were charged with six counts of contravening section 154 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA) for importing motor scooters from China that violated emissions standards and lacked proper documentation.

The Crown alleged the defendants failed to comply with conditions requiring evidence of conformity and adherence to prescribed emissions standards.

The defendants argued they exercised due diligence by hiring compliance consultants, obtaining manufacturer assurances, and relying on EPA certification.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the actus reus for counts 1-3 (documentation violations) and that the defendants established due diligence as a defence for counts 4-6 (emissions violations).

All charges were dismissed.

In this professional discipline penalty decision, the panel determined the appropriate sanction after findings that the member repeatedly breached an undertaking restricting his practice, contravened terms on his certificate, misled the regulator, failed to respond appropriately to College inquiries, and engaged in disgraceful, dishonourable, unprofessional and unethical conduct.

The panel held that the misconduct demonstrated prolonged and escalating refusal to accept the regulator’s authority and rendered the member ungovernable.

Emphasizing public protection, the panel found that remedial measures would not be effective and directed revocation of the member’s certificate of registration.

A publication ban protecting patients’ identities remained in force.

The appellant physician appealed a Discipline Committee decision finding he committed professional misconduct by sexually abusing a patient and revoking his license.

The appellant argued the defence of officially induced error, abuse of process by the College Registrar, and that the mandatory revocation provisions violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on all substantive grounds, finding the sexual relationship was concurrent with the doctor-patient relationship and that the court was bound by Court of Appeal precedent upholding the constitutionality of mandatory revocation.

The court only allowed the appeal in part to vacate an order requiring the appellant to post security for the patient's potential future therapy costs.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) requiring him to complete a continuing education program and undergo a practice assessment.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the ICRC relied on a second report from an assessor that was not disclosed to him.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the failure to disclose the report breached procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the ICRC has the jurisdiction to order a practice assessment as part of a specified continuing education or remediation program.

The application was granted, the decision set aside, and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

In a professional discipline hearing, the panel found that the member repeatedly breached a practice undertaking and certificate restrictions by initiating and providing prosthodontic and implant-related treatment after agreeing not to do so.

The panel also found that the member gave inaccurate information to the regulator about the scope of post-undertaking treatment and failed to respond appropriately to a written records request concerning a patient file.

Applying the civil balance of probabilities standard, with clear, convincing and cogent evidence, the panel accepted the investigators' evidence and rejected the member's interpretation that screw-retained prostheses fell outside the undertaking.

Findings of professional misconduct were entered on all pursued allegations in both notices of hearing.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a young woman (A.Y.) and sentenced to two years less one day.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's prior consistent statement—an anonymous email sent to police the morning after the alleged assault—as corroboration of her trial testimony.

The trial judge had explicitly stated that the email was "corroboration of her evidence." The Court of Appeal held that while the email was admissible for limited purposes (to rebut the defence theory regarding motive and to assess the complainant's credibility through her conduct), it could not be used as corroboration in the legal sense because it was not from an independent source and could not confirm the veracity of the complainant's testimony unless improperly used for the truth of its contents or by treating consistency as confirmatory.

The court found the trial judge erred in law and allowed the appeal, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought trial costs of over $200,000.

The respondent opposed, arguing the appellant failed to provide detailed dockets and that costs should be reduced for various reasons, including the extra time required for a bilingual proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant's costs outline provided sufficient detail and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The Court applied a 20% discount to the claimed fees, deducted costs for a motion the respondent had won, and excluded one unsupported disbursement.

The Court awarded the appellant $162,239.25 in trial costs and amended the previous appeal costs order to include $16,683.65 in disbursements.

On a civil appeal arising from historic sexual and physical abuse allegations based largely on recovered memories, the court held that the trial judge erred by using expert psychological evidence to corroborate the truth of the respondent's allegations and resolve a credibility contest.

Expert evidence could explain memory processes and damages, but could not be used to decide the ultimate issues of credibility, reliability, and liability.

The court therefore set aside the judgment, dismissed the assault claim, and held that a new trial was unnecessary because the admissible evidence was evenly balanced.

The court also allowed the appellant's defamation counterclaim in part, finding that qualified privilege did not protect defamatory communications sent to a former friend who had no reciprocal interest or duty to receive them.