Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed his conviction for fourteen sexual offences involving eight complainants at group homes where he worked.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a confession the appellant gave to police while he was a voluntary psychiatric patient suffering from depression.

The appellant argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated because the police did not obtain a clear waiver after he gave an equivocal response about wanting a lawyer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant understood his rights and had a reasonable opportunity to exercise them, and the police were not required to do more in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed an extradition judge's order committing him for surrender to Hungary to face charges of fraud over $5,000.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence in the Records of the Case identifying him as the perpetrator who created false car leasing documents and entered into fraudulent loan agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the summaries of evidence, including witness testimony and documentary evidence, when read as a whole, provided sufficient evidence to support the inference that the appellant was the perpetrator of the frauds.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and misapprehended the evidence of the complainant's sister regarding an alleged admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately scrutinized the sister's testimony and did not assign it undue prominence given the formidable circumstantial evidence of identity.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's acknowledgement of involvement in the altercation.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for solicitor negligence in failing to seek instructions on whether a mortgage should be registered on all three parcels of land.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any error regarding issue estoppel had no effect on the outcome, as the measure of damages would be the same.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's award of compound interest at the mortgage rate of 8.4 percent, confirming that compound interest can be awarded as compensation in a solicitor's negligence case rooted in a mortgage transaction.

The self-represented appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence regarding the condition of a brake system was fabricated, that evidence of prior audits was improperly admitted, and that evidence from an MTO investigation was improperly obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably rejected the fabrication claims, the prior audits were admissible to show a pattern of conduct, and the appellant could not raise Charter issues for the first time on appeal after failing to bring an application at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay evidence, permitting improper cross-examination about whether he found the complainant attractive, and failing to properly apply the W.D. principles for assessing credibility.

Both parties also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearsay evidence was properly used to infer state of mind, the cross-examination was permissible to rebut the appellant's assertion of good character, and the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to treat a witness's gratuitous personal opinions and the manner in which he gave evidence.

The appellant also argued that the Crown asked an improper question during re-examination about a trip to Windsor shortly after the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were correct and the re-examination question was proper given the defence's cross-examination.

Following the dismissal of the appeal and the allowance of the respondent's cross-appeal on costs, the Court of Appeal determined the costs of the trial and appeal.

The parties agreed to $10,000 for the appeal costs.

For the trial costs, the respondent sought $76,244.00 in fees.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs from the date of a Rule 49 offer because the statement of claim was amended later to add the successful cause of action under the Sale of Goods Act.

Noting that the preparation time was lengthened by unsuccessful claims and that the costs sought were disproportionate to the $66,380.39 recovery, the court fixed the respondent's trial costs at $35,000 plus disbursements.

The plaintiff's action arising from a motor vehicle accident was administratively dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14.

The status notice and dismissal order were sent to the plaintiff's former counsel due to a court error, despite a notice of change of solicitor having been filed.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the dismissal, finding unexplained delay, prejudice to the defendants, and relying on the principle of finality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of the delay, prejudice, and finality, particularly given the defendants' continued participation in discoveries for a related action.

The testator executed a will in Spain in 2002 dealing with her European property.

In 2006, she executed a Canadian will dealing with her entire estate, which contained a standard revocation clause.

The drafting solicitor was unaware of the Spanish will.

Following her death, the appellants sought to introduce third-party affidavit evidence to prove the testator did not intend to revoke the Spanish will.

The application judge ruled the evidence inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the common law rule that direct extrinsic evidence of a testator's intention is inadmissible to construe an unambiguous will.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her counterclaim for loss of profit arising from a contract for the supply of manufactured parts.

The appellant argued that the respondent's defective delivery of the first instalment of parts amounted to a repudiation of the entire contract under s. 30(2) of the Sale of Goods Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the defective delivery was a severable breach and did not constitute repudiation, as there was no reasonable inference that similar breaches would occur in future instalments.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order, reducing the trial costs awarded to the respondent from $60,000 to $40,000, finding that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted given the prominence of the counterclaim.

The appellant and respondent, former common-law partners, resolved their family law proceedings through mediation/arbitration.

The appellant subsequently issued a civil statement of claim against the respondent and her counsel, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation regarding child support and financial disclosure, and seeking damages.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim as frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of process, and barred by res judicata.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the civil action was an abuse of process attempting to circumvent the family law statutory scheme, an impermissible collateral attack on existing family court orders, and barred by cause of action estoppel and the appellant's prior consent to the settlements.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after the Crown alleged the wife hired her co-accused to kill her husband.

On appeal, the wife argued the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to cross-examine its own witness at large after declaring her adverse under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, without instructing the jury that the witness's lack of credibility could not be used to infer the accused were not credible or guilty.

The co-accused argued the trial judge erred in refusing to sever his trial, exposing him to highly prejudicial hearsay evidence admissible only against the wife.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding the lack of a limiting instruction regarding the adverse witness amounted to misdirection, and the refusal to sever the trial resulted in an injustice.

Separate new trials were ordered.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition and sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to surrender him to the United States on charges of conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence to show he was a member of the conspiracy before the drug shipment was seized.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding that wiretap communications immediately following the loss of the shipment provided sufficient evidence from which a reasonable inference of his prior involvement could be drawn.

The appellant husband appealed an order refusing his application for the partition and sale of the matrimonial home and requiring him to transfer his 50 percent interest to the respondent wife for $1.

The parties separated in 1994, and the husband unilaterally stopped making agreed-upon support payments in 2001.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the husband's arrears in support payments, with interest, exceeded the value of his share of the equity in the home.

The application judge's result was upheld on the basis of this equitable set-off.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of stolen goods and his 15-month sentence.

The Crown's case relied on video surveillance identifying the appellant supervising the export of stolen high-end vehicles.

The appellant argued the video quality was insufficient for identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the video quality was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 15-month sentence was not manifestly unfit given the appellant's prior criminal record and his directing role in the sophisticated scheme.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act against a general contractor and a subcontractor following a workplace fatality.

The trial judge had dismissed the counts on the basis that they were duplicitous and failed to disclose an offence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge confused overlapping counts with duplicitous ones, and erred in collapsing the information.

A new trial was ordered on the dismissed counts.

The appellant appealed his sentence for drug offences committed while on probation for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error with the global sentence given the appellant's record and the nature of the drugs.

However, the court agreed that the trial judge erred by failing to give credit for pre-sentence custody.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence on count 6 was reduced to 22 months' imprisonment.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the Court of Appeal for Ontario fixed the costs of the motion payable to the appellant at $12,000 for fees and $1,000 for disbursements, plus H.S.T.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that it was open to the trial judge to infer that the jacket containing drugs belonged to the appellant, given the documents found in the wallet inside the jacket.

The appeal was dismissed.