Marc Rosenberg

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 30 days' intermittent imprisonment and 11 months' probation.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for reasons set out in concurrent decisions.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, noting the appellant's uncontested medicinal use of cannabis for lumbar scoliosis and his efforts to comply with the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

With the Crown's consent, the sentence was reduced to time served and the probation order was struck out.

Five appellants appealed their convictions or the dismissal of their applications for declaratory relief regarding marijuana offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They argued that the offences of possession and production of marijuana had been judicially repealed by previous constitutional decisions regarding medical marijuana.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the offences remain in full force and effect, and that dissatisfaction with the medical marijuana regulations does not excuse disobedience of the law.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application under s. 24 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for the return of seized marihuana.

The Court of Appeal first determined that the proper route to review a s. 24 order is by way of certiorari, not an appeal under the Courts of Justice Act or the Criminal Code.

On the merits, the Court held that previous constitutional decisions did not repeal the prohibition against possession of marihuana, and the appellant, who did not hold an authorization to possess under the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations, was not lawfully entitled to possess the seized marihuana.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Home Depot, appealed orders authorizing a receiver to sell a property free and clear of Home Depot's leasehold and equitable interests.

The motion judge had refused to draw inferences regarding whether the first mortgagee had impliedly consented to Home Depot's lease, stating he could only rely on undisputed facts.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in law by applying an incorrect standard of proof and failing to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The respondent contractor was retained to construct a new home.

He performed most of the work, but the owners installed the well, septic system, and fireplaces.

The respondent was charged with failing to register as a builder under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

He was acquitted at trial and on appeal on the basis that he was not a 'builder' because he did not perform all the work.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act is consumer protection legislation requiring a broad interpretation.

A contractor who performs a significant portion of the construction is a 'builder' even if the owner is responsible for some work.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their claim against the respondent for knowing assistance in breach of fiduciary duty.

The dispute arose from the sale of the appellants' shares in a family-owned shopping mall to the remaining family members, who then sold a 50% interest to the respondent at a higher valuation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no evidence the respondent had actual knowledge of the alleged fraudulent and dishonest conduct or breach of fiduciary duties towards the appellants.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages for future loss of income in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to order disclosure of settlement amounts from two subsequent accidents and by failing to deduct those amounts from the damages award.

They also argued the statutory trust for future collateral benefits should extend to future pension benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global assessment method prevented double recovery and the claim regarding pension benefits was speculative.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after a finding of guilt for child luring, where the trial judge held the accused had been entrapped by an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl on MSN Messenger.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to determine whether the officer's initial contact actually provided an opportunity to commit the offence.

The initial request to be added as a friend, the neutral photograph, and innocuous conversation were investigative steps only, not an inducement or opportunity to commit child luring.

The accused initiated and led the sexually explicit communications after learning the purported age of the child.

The stay was set aside, a conviction was substituted, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from a decision dismissing a motion for partial summary judgment.

The appellant had sought partial summary judgment using issue estoppel offensively, based on findings from a prior Federal Court decision quashing a security certificate against him.

The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal of the summary judgment motion was a final order, as it finally determined the question of issue estoppel and deprived the appellant of a substantive right.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found that an untested informant tip and a brief, neutral observation of a meeting in a vehicle did not provide reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the arrest, subsequent searches of the respondent, his vehicle, and his residence, as well as a breach of the right to counsel, were unconstitutional.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed their conviction for robbery and an imitation firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence of party liability under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code, as the young person approached the victim knowing of the plan to rob and encouraged the principal offender by menacing the victim.

There was also ample circumstantial evidence of liability under s. 21(2) for the gun offence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

At the hearing, the Court of Appeal refused to allow the appellants' agent to make representations because a previous panel had already barred him from doing so and he was a witness in the proceeding.

After reviewing the factum of the appellants' former counsel and the application judge's reasons, the Court found no merit to the appeal and dismissed it with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that on the undisputed facts, the respondent was entitled to summary judgment based on the authority of Finlayson v. GMAC Leaseco Ltd.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons for rejecting his evidence and erred in finding wilful blindness regarding the acquisition and storage of material.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact provided a clear explanation for rejecting the appellant's evidence as incredible, and that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the finding of wilful blindness.

The appellant brought a proposed class action alleging oppression.

The motion judge found that the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) did not apply because the corporation in question, Birch Mountain, was an Alberta corporation and the appellant was not a complainant under the OBCA.

The motion judge also found that Alberta was the convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the action concerned an Alberta corporation, Alberta law applied, and the Alberta courts were already supervising the corporation's bankruptcy and asset sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, including a dangerous offender finding.

He alleged bias regarding the appointed expert and relied on his own affidavit.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's affidavit not credible and concluded that trial counsel's agreement to the expert's appointment was justified.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the police lacked articulable cause for an investigative detention and that evidence should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was a basis for the trial judge's conclusion on articulable cause and deferring to the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis under the Grant framework.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, specifically challenging the lifetime weapons prohibitions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, striking the lifetime ban under s. 109 of the Criminal Code and varying the lifetime ban under s. 110 to a ten-year prohibition, finding it appropriate given the serious circumstances of the offence.

The appellant appealed an order refusing an adjournment, after which the parties had entered into minutes of settlement.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not exercise her discretion unreasonably in refusing the adjournment.

The court declined to entertain the ineffective assistance claim because the appellant's trial lawyer was not put on notice, and the fresh evidence test was not met.

The appellant was injured in a 1991 car accident and commenced an action in 2004.

He argued the discoverability principle postponed the limitation period until May 2002, when he realized his injuries met the threshold.

The trial judge rejected this, finding the appellant ought to have known his injuries were serious and permanent well before 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the appellant's constant pain and inability to work, and dismissed the appeal.