Nader Raymond Hasan

The corporate appellant appealed its conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to illegally clear-cutting 1.45 hectares of mature woodland in violation of a municipal tree by-law.

The appellant argued the plea was uninformed and pressured, and that the $1,000,000 fine exceeded the maximum allowable under the Municipal Act.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and that the appellant's claims of ignorance were incredible given prior negotiations.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the by-law validly created a multiple offence and special fine under the Municipal Act, and the substantial fine was fit given the deliberate and egregious destruction of protected habitat.

The appellant challenged convictions on three sexual assault counts and the custodial and ancillary sentencing orders.

The court held that the trial reasons adequately applied the reasonable doubt framework, addressed credibility and reliability concerns arising from complainant incapacity, and permitted meaningful appellate review.

It further held that the custodial term was fit, declined to admit fresh evidence concerning family caregiving circumstances, and upheld the 20-year SOIRA order as properly imposed under the governing statutory regime at sentencing.

A constitutional remedy request regarding registration obligations was left to a court of first instance due to an insufficient record.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The applicant, a hedge fund shareholder, brought an urgent application under section 248 of the OBCA seeking to adjourn the respondent corporation's annual general and special meeting of shareholders and to reset the record date.

The applicant alleged the notice was non-compliant with the OBCA and that the board acted oppressively by setting a timeline that effectively prevented shareholders from nominating an alternative slate of directors.

The court found that the respondent was not an "offering corporation" and had met all statutory notice requirements under sections 95(4) and 96(1) of the OBCA.

The court held that the notice procedures followed past practice and did not breach the reasonable expectations of shareholders as established in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders.

The application was dismissed with costs of $75,000 to the respondent.

The Crown sought to cross-examine the appellant's former trial and appellate counsel, now a Superior Court judge, on his affidavit evidence submitted in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The appellant and the intervening judge opposed cross-examination, arguing that it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and proposing written interrogatories as an alternative.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion for cross-examination, holding that judicial immunity does not apply to conduct undertaken prior to judicial appointment and that cross-examination is the norm for affidavit evidence in appellate proceedings.

This criminal sentence appeal under the Youth Criminal Justice Act addressed the proper interpretation of s. 72(1) governing when a young person may receive an adult sentence.

The Court held that under s. 72(1)(a), the Crown must rebut the statutory presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, and that objective offence seriousness is not a proper factor at that first-stage developmental-age inquiry.

Applying that standard, the majority found legal errors in the sentencing analysis and concluded the Crown had not displaced the presumption on this record.

The appeal was allowed, the adult life sentence was set aside, and a youth sentence was imposed with remittal on pre-sentence custody credit and supervision conditions.

This sentencing decision concerns Noah Anderson and Junior Jahmal Harvey, who were convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of Thane Murray and the attempted murder of Allen Uthayakumaran and Tony Nguyen.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years for first-degree murder and, after considering aggravating and mitigating factors, imposed concurrent life sentences for the two counts of attempted murder.

The reasons detail the circumstances of the offence, the profound impact on the victims and community, the backgrounds of the offenders, and the applicable sentencing principles and case law.

This endorsement addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal by Antonio Caruso challenging the Law Society of Ontario’s restrictions on paralegals’ scope of practice in immigration matters.

The Court grants leave to intervene to the Ontario Paralegal Association, the Canadian Immigration Lawyers Association, and the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants, but denies leave to the Canadian Paralegal Alliance.

The decision reviews the relevant principles for intervention, the backgrounds and proposed contributions of each intervener, and the reasons for granting or denying leave.

The applicant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

He applied for bail pending his conviction appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting prior consistent statements and in her treatment of a Browne v. Dunn issue, and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the grounds of appeal were not frivolous, they were weak and did not clearly surpass the minimal standard required to outweigh the strong public interest in enforcing the sentence for serious sexual offences against a child.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The parties settled the costs of the appeal, agreeing that the respondent would pay the appellants an all-inclusive amount of $75,000.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review regarding the Law Society of Ontario's failure to accommodate him during the barrister examination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the applicant had not exhausted his opportunities to re-write the examination.

The court emphasized that judicial interference in administrative proceedings should be avoided until the process has run its course, especially since the Law Society had subsequently put the requested accommodations in place for a re-write.

The moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a prior decision, and for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but denied the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by seven youth challenging the constitutionality of Ontario's greenhouse gas emission reduction target and plan.

The application judge had dismissed their claim, characterizing it as seeking positive rights.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error, clarifying that the case concerned whether Ontario's voluntarily assumed statutory obligation to combat climate change was Charter compliant under ss. 7 (life, liberty, security of the person) and 15 (equality).

The matter was remitted for a new hearing to determine if the Target and Plan violated the Charter.

In a prosecution for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the accused brought pre-trial motions challenging the search warrants for a residence and cell phones under s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown brought a motion to adduce extrinsic misconduct evidence, including rap lyrics and videos of firearms found on the accused's phones.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter motions, finding the ITOs sufficient and admitting the evidence despite technical breaches regarding the timing of Reports to Justice.

The court partially granted the Crown's motion, admitting the rap lyrics and firearm videos as highly probative of animus and means, while excluding certain photographs due to prejudicial effect.

This endorsement addresses pre-trial applications and rulings made during jury selection for the first-degree murder trial of Umar Zameer.

The court permitted challenges for cause based on publicity, the accused's race/ethnicity/religion, and connections to police officers.

Justice Molloy rejected the defence's request for multiple-choice questions, particularly those probing jurors' opinions on the criminal propensities of racial or religious groups, deeming them inquisitorial and ambiguous.

The judge emphasized an open-ended, conversational approach to questioning jurors to better assess impartiality.

The endorsement also details the reasoning for accepting two specific jurors despite objections from the Crown and defence, respectively, finding them capable of impartiality.

The trial ultimately resulted in a "not guilty" verdict for Mr. Zameer.

Marc Gauthier appealed his conviction for first-degree murder of Tammy Avery.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of a voicemail left for his doctor (Dr. Morrison) and the voluntariness of confessions made to police and correctional officers.

The Court of Appeal found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the voicemail, as it constituted criminal harassment, and thus it was admissible.

While the court found the trial judge erred in admitting the confessions due to an inadequate evidentiary record regarding voluntariness, it applied the curative proviso, concluding that this error did not impact the verdict as the confessions only confirmed the undisputed fact of the killing, not the mens rea for first-degree murder.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses an evidentiary ruling made during a first-degree murder trial where the accused was ultimately acquitted.

The defence sought to admit prior consistent statements made by the accused's wife to police at the time of her husband's arrest, arguing they fell under an exception to the rule against prior consistent statements.

The court ruled these statements inadmissible for their truth, affirming that the Edgar exception, which allows for spontaneous statements of an accused upon arrest, does not extend to statements made by a witness, even if made under similar highly emotional and spontaneous circumstances.

The judge also made strong findings regarding the lack of credibility and collusion among certain police officers involved in the arrest.

This decision addresses the admissibility of three exculpatory statements made by the accused, Umar Zameer, who is charged with first-degree murder.

The court ruled that two spontaneous statements made at the scene of the arrest were admissible under the *Edgar* exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, but only if the accused testifies and is subject to cross-examination, and not for their truth.

A third statement made 12 hours later at the police station was deemed inadmissible due to lack of spontaneity and failure to meet any hearsay exception.

The court also clarified the distinction between *res gestae* and the *Edgar* exception, explicitly declining to follow a previous inconsistent decision (*R. v. Tavares*).

The accused, charged with first degree murder in the death of a police officer, brought an application for disclosure or third party production of police training materials and disciplinary records of a key Crown police witness.

The court dismissed the application for the training materials, finding them irrelevant to the issues at trial.

However, the court ordered the production of the disciplinary records, finding that they were relevant to the credibility and reliability of the officer, who was a pivotal witness for the Crown.

The applicant, a licensed paralegal, brought an application for judicial review seeking a declaration that he is authorized to process and file immigration applications under the federal Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) maintained that By-Law 4 restricts paralegals to providing legal services only in connection with proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the LSO's interpretation of By-Law 4 was correct, that the by-law does not conflict with the IRPA under the federal paramountcy doctrine, and that the restriction does not violate section 7 of the Charter.

The applicant sought disclosure or third-party production of Toronto Police Service investigation files regarding a tee-shirt fundraiser and police training materials.

The court found the investigation files met the first-stage likely relevance test under O'Connor/McNeil and ordered them produced for judicial review.

The request for training materials was dismissed as they were not relevant to any issue at trial.