Halton (Regional Municipality) v. 2792814 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCJ 338

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: Halton (Regional Municipality) v. 2792814 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCJ 338

DATE: June 9, 2026

COURT FILE No. 1260-999-21-7227-03

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO

(REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF HALTON)

Respondent

— AND —

2792814 ONTARIO INC.

Appellant

Before Justice Brian G. Puddington

Heard on December 12, 2025 and January 12, 2026

Reasons for Judgment released on June 9, 2026

N. Hasan and D. Goudge counsel for the appellant

A. Guaglio counsel for the respondent

Contents

OVERVIEW... 1

The Facts. 2

ANALYSIS.. 9

The Guilty Plea Was Voluntary, Unequivocal and Informed. 9

The Sentence Complied with the Municipal Act 14

The Sentence Was Appropriate in the Circumstances. 15

PUDDINGTON J.:

OVERVIEW

1On September 12, 2022, the appellant pled guilty before Justice of the Peace Macphail to illegally clear-cutting 1.45 hectares of mature woodland on property that it owns in an environmentally sensitive and protected portion of Halton Region’s Natural Heritage System.

2Baljit Mann, the sole director of 2792814 Ontario Inc. entered the guilty plea on behalf of the corporate appellant.

3The appellant now appeals that guilty plea, submitting that the plea was uninformed and Mr. Mann was pressured into doing so after an adjournment request had been denied by the Justice of the Peace.

4The appellant also appeals the $1,000,000 fine and the additional victim fine surcharge that was imposed, claiming it exceeded the maximum allowable fine under the Municipal Act, 2001, R.S.O. 2001, c. 25 (the “Municipal Act”) and/or failed to consider and apply the parity and totality principles.

5For the reasons that follow, the appeals as to conviction and sentence are both dismissed.

6The facts, for the most part, are not in dispute on this appeal. The conviction appeal itself focuses primarily on the days leading up to and the day of the appellant’s guilty plea. The sentencing appeal raises issues of statutory interpretation and the appropriateness of the sentence itself. It is nonetheless important to provide some context with respect to how this matter came to court and what happened at the guilty plea and sentencing hearing.

The Facts

7In July 2021, the appellant, Mr. Mann, a Mr. Tony Vaccarello and others were charged with one count under section 3(a) of By-Law 121-05, “A By-Law to Prohibit or Regulate the Destruction or Injuring of Trees in the Regional Municipality of Halton” (the “By-Law”). Section 3(a) of the By-Law reads:

3. General Prohibition

a) THAT no person or corporation through their own actions or through any other person or corporation shall destroy or Injure any Tree located in Greenlands or in Woodlands 0.5ha or larger;

i. unless exempted by Section 4 of this By-law;

ii. unless in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of this By-law; or

iii. unless in possession of a valid Permit issued by the Region under Section 6 or 7 of this By-law and in accordance with its terms of conditions.

8The parties on this appeal agree that none of the exceptions or permits listed above applied in this case.

9The penalty provisions for a corporation violating section 3(a) are contained in section 10(b) of the By-Law:

10. Penalties

b) THAT any corporation who contravenes any provision of this By-law, or an Order issued under Section 9, is guilty of an offence and is liable for each occurrence of the contravention, infraction or violation:

i. on a first conviction, to a maximum fine of $50,000 or $5,000 per Tree, whichever is greater; and

ii. on any subsequent convictions, to a maximum fine of $100,000 or $10,000 per Tree, whichever is greater.

c) THAT if a person or corporation is convicted of an offence for contravening this By-law or an Order issued under Section 9, the court in which the conviction has been entered, and any court of competent jurisdiction thereafter, may order the person or corporation to rehabilitate the land, to plant or replant Trees in such a manner and within such period as the court considers appropriate and to maintain the replanted Trees as appropriate, including any Silvicultural treatment necessary to re-establish the Trees.

10The appellant, Mr. Mann and Mr. Vaccarello scheduled a 6-day trial in answer to the charge under section 3(a) of the By-Law. That trial was to commence on September 12, 2022, but on August 31, 2022, the parties appeared before Macphail J.P. because it became known that a Mr. Hamza Talpur, who had been counsel for the parties leading up to the trial dates, had now been discharged. Given the trial was to begin in less than two weeks, the parties sought direction from Macphail J.P. on how to proceed.

11At the August 31, 2022 appearance, the defendants said they intended to represent themselves at trial, though discussion of a potential resolution took place as well.

THE COURT: There are trial dates scheduled. Do you intend to be there for your trial dates?

MR. MANN: Yes.

THE COURT: Without counsel?

MR. VACCARELLO: Yes.

MR. MANN: Yes.

THE COURT: Realizing you’ve discharged counsel and it’s a very short time to find new counsel. You can still have someone there but you will have to move quickly.

MR. MANN: I’m going to represent myself or …

THE COURT: Mr. Vaccarello, do you intend to continue without counsel?

MR. VACCARELLO: If a trial is going to continue, yes.

THE COURT: Well, yes it is …

MR. VACCARELLO: Okay.

THE COURT: … at this point. We have no application to do otherwise before me.¹

12It was confirmed by the prosecution that disclosure had also been provided to all three parties (Mr. Mann, Mr. Vaccarello and the appellant corporation) and Mr. Vaccarello stated that he and Mr. Mann wished for the corporation to plead guilty and the individual charges against Mr. Mann and Mr. Vaccarello to be “dropped”. This prompted Macphail J.P. to recommend a Judicial Pre-Trial (“JPT”) with another Justice of the Peace to discuss resolution further:

THE COURT: My question is the prosecution, or the Region’s offer, including the penalty sought, was that communicated to you and Mr. Mann?

MR. VACCARELLO: It was communicated.

THE COURT: All right. So, you know what it was?

MR. VACCARELLO: Yes.

THE COURT: You know it may no longer be available but that’s, you know what was offered then?

MR. VACCARELLO: Yes, and I think….

THE COURT: That’s all I wanted to confirm.²

13As Macphail J.P. may have been assigned to the trial, His Worship did not want to discuss resolution further. He ensured that the defendants had a copy of the guide for self-represented litigants and cautioned them to read that guide immediately and carefully. A JPT before another Justice of the Peace, His Worship Curtis, was then scheduled for September 8, 2022. That JPT took place and when it concluded, the parties appeared close to resolving the matter. It was nonetheless adjourned to the first day of trial.³

14At the outset of the first day of the trial on September 12, 2022, Halton Region withdrew the charges against Mr. Vaccarello, leaving only Mr. Mann and the appellant facing charges. Mr. Mann and the appellant, with the assistance of Mr. Vaccarello, then requested an adjournment of the trial. When the adjournment request was first raised, Macphail J.P. stated “Well, that will almost certainly be denied but we will hear what he has to say.”⁴

15Mr. Vaccarello submitted that Mr. Mann and the appellant had hoped to come to a resolution but that had not happened, and Mr. Mann was not comfortable representing himself at trial and wanted to hire a lawyer. Macphail J.P., after hearing that the prosecution was not consenting to the adjournment, stated the following:

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Then, the motion is denied. The matter will proceed to trial this morning. When we were last together, Mr. Mann, I cautioned you as carefully as I could that you had exhausted all adjournments. That on the next occasion this matter would proceed to trial with or without counsel. I provided you, or had provided to you, a copy of the guide for defendants in the event that you had to represent yourself. It was then when you alerted me to the fact that you could neither read nor write in the English language. I requested that you find someone to review those materials with you and to bring someone to court to assist you on your trial date to assist you with literacy in the English language. I also scheduled a further judicial pre-trial so that you could explore, for a final time, resolution options. I understood that that pre-trial did occur without resolution for you. Today you must proceed to trial. The delay can no longer be accepted as realistic or reasonable or the request in good faith, the application to adjourn is denied.⁵

16Mr. Vaccarello submitted that this was the first adjournment request, but Macphail J.P. reiterated that he had warned Mr. Mann and the appellant to be ready with or without counsel. His Worship then took a break and stated:

When I return we will either hear Mr. Mann’s plea on his own behalf and on behalf of the corporate defendant. Or I will hear a resolution position. There is no other option for today. Is that clear?⁶

17Upon returning, His Worship reiterated the two options to Mr. Mann, stating “Are you going to go to trial or do you wish to resolve?”.⁷ Mr. Vaccarello requested a little more time to work out details for a plea and the court stood down again. Upon resuming, Mr. Mann, on behalf of the appellant, stated the company wished to plead guilty to section 3 of the By-Law, but that they were not in agreement on the sentence and would require a Gardiner hearing. The prosecution, given the history of the case, requested a “fulsome plea inquiry on the record.”⁸

18Macphail J.P. then confirmed the following:

1. Mr. Mann was pleading guilty on behalf of the appellant to a single count of destroying trees within a woodland 0.5 hectare or larger without a permit contrary to Halton Tree By-Law No. 121-05;

2. Mr. Mann understood that by pleading guilty on behalf of the appellant he would be acknowledging every element or fact that must be proven to support this offence beyond a reasonable doubt;

3. That by acknowledging those facts or elements, the corporation was admitting they committed the offence;

4. That the corporation was giving up any presumption of innocence and the right to have a trial;

5. That no one was forcing the company to do this;

6. That Mr. Mann was a director of the company and authorized to enter the plea; and

7. That Mr. Mann on behalf of the appellant understood and was aware that in the end, the court would make an independent decision on how large the fine would be.⁹

19Following this, the prosecution, again given the history of the case, requested an opportunity to be “crystal clear” about what the elements of the offence were. Mr. Guaglio, on behalf of the Region, outlined that:

1. The company needed to admit that it was in fact the company that directed the tree destruction;

2. The company would need to admit that the property on which it ordered the destruction of trees was within the jurisdiction of the court;

3. The company would be admitting that it happened on the dates as set out in the agreed statement of facts – January 8 to 29, 2021;

4. The company would be admitting that it did order the destruction of the trees;

5. The company would need to admit that the trees met the definition in the By-Law, meaning they had or could reach a height of at least 4.5 metres;

6. The trees were in a woodland as defined in the By-Law; and

7. None of the exemptions or authorizations under section 3 were present.¹⁰

20After outlining the elements of the offence, Macphail J.P. continued his plea inquiry:

THE COURT: … Mr. Mann, did you understand that those are the specific elements the prosecutor would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt if there were to be a conviction?

MR. MANN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: That you give up that right to challenge all of that evidence? You do have the right to challenge the evidence and present your own if you wish. But if you plead guilty on behalf of the corporation you’ll be giving up that right.

MR. MANN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And also giving up a right to present any defences you may wish to present on behalf of your country (sic).¹¹

MR. MANN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you. Do you wish to proceed with a guilty plea?

MR. MANN: Yes.¹²

21The arraignment then took place, but before entering the plea, Mr. Vaccarello again interjected to confirm that the charges were going to be withdrawn against Mr. Mann personally and that they would have a chance to make arguments about what the sentence should be. His Worship confirmed this was the intent, and reminded Mr. Mann again that ultimately, the sentence was up to the court. Upon receiving this clarification, Mr. Mann pled guilty on behalf of the appellant.¹³

22The facts agreed upon were that the appellant owned 11429 Steeles Avenue in Halton Hills, Ontario. It was purchased for $7,000,000.00 on November 27, 2020. Between January 8 and January 29, 2021, the appellant hired two companies to destroy all of the trees on 1.45 hectares of the property. The appellant did not have a valid permit for this tree destruction and was aware that they were required to have one. It was admitted that 257 trees larger than 20 centimeters in diameter at breast height per hectare were present in the clear-cut area.

23Mr. Mann accepted these facts on behalf of the corporation and a finding of guilt was registered. The charges against Mr. Mann himself were then withdrawn and the matter was adjourned for sentencing submissions on another date.

24Within two weeks following the guilty plea, the appellant rehired Mr. Talpur as their lawyer. At no point after counsel came back on the record did the appellant or Mr. Talpur raise any concern about the guilty plea on September 12, 2022. On the first day set for the sentencing hearing on November 22, 2022, the parties filed an agreed book of documents and an agreed statement of facts confirming the facts that were admitted at the plea and further agreed facts relevant on sentence. This included an admission to clear-cutting 348 trees larger than 12 cm diameter at breast height (“DBH”) per hectare, 448 trees larger than 5 cm DBH per hectare and thousands of trees of any size, and that the appellant paid between $53,000 and $59,890 for the tree destruction. The prosecution also provided a preview of what they might be seeking at the conclusion of the hearing:

Your Worship, to some degree the Region’s position will be dependent on the remaining evidence to be heard by the Court. But we are seeking full restoration of the subject property as well as a $3,000 per tree fine calculated on the number of trees that were over 20 centimeters diameter breast height, so that’s 372 if my math – if I can remember correctly.¹⁴

25At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, on December 14, 2022, the Region sought a fine of $1,116,000, full rehabilitation of the clear-cut area and a period of probation.¹⁵ This is what they had stated back on November 22, 2022 - (372 x $3,000 = $1,116,000). The appellant sought a $17,500 fine or a fine under $50,000, but requested that no rehabilitation be ordered, or in the alternative, rehabilitation ordered, but no fine. At no point during sentencing submissions did the appellant or Mr. Talpur suggest that the fine being proposed by Halton was barred by the Municipal Act, nor did they state that they were in any way taken by surprise by the penalty being sought.

26On February 2, 2023, Macphail J.P. sentenced the appellant to a $1,000,000.00 fine, plus the victim fine surcharge, rehabilitation and two years of probation. In His Worship’s reasons for sentence, he found that the corporation was the most at fault in terms of the parties involved in the clear-cutting of the trees. In finding that a “substantial fine” was required, His Worship noted:

The defendant acknowledged responsibility for the complete destruction of a mature 1.4 hectare woodland. The woodland was in a key feature area of the Halton Natural Heritage System. The destruction is within the range of worst-case facts. The actions were deliberate and in clear defiance of the By-Law regime. The defendant did not seek approval despite prior actual knowledge that a regulatory regime governed and restricted this activity. It is of no assistance to submit that the area was in possible land use transition and that permission may be granted should land clarification change. The penalty must send a very strong message to the public including others who may engage in development of property. A substantial fine is required.¹⁶ (Emphasis added).

27On appeal, Mr. Mann swore to 4 affidavits and testified twice, where he was cross-examined by the prosecution. In the affidavits, he described, in general, how he was unaware of the consequences of the appellant’s guilty plea. The information in those affidavits, however, appeared to change as time went on. At one point in cross-examination, he stated that he “didn’t know … these things would happen, that there would be a fine” and “didn’t know anything” about the consequences.¹⁷ Later, in subsequent affidavits, he attempted to correct himself by saying that he knew he could be sentenced to pay a fine, as well as ordered to reforest a portion of the property, but did not know how large of a fine could be imposed, or that full reforestation would be ordered.¹⁸

28Mr. Talpur also testified after solicitor-client communications were waived. While he was unable to state specifically what was communicated to his clients and when, he confirmed that he would have discussed plea offers from the Region with them and would not have communicated counteroffers without receiving instructions to do so.

ANALYSIS

The Guilty Plea Was Voluntary, Unequivocal and Informed

29In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal and informed.

30As the Supreme Court of Canada notes in R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25:

The plea resolution process is also central to the criminal justice system as a whole. The vast majority of criminal prosecutions are resolved through guilty pleas and society has a strong interest in their finality. Maintaining their finality is therefore important to ensuring the stability, integrity, and efficiency of the administration of justice. Conversely, the finality of a guilty plea also requires that such a plea be voluntary, unequivocal and informed. And to be informed, the accused “must be aware of the nature of the allegations made against him, the effect of his plea, and the consequence of his plea”.¹⁹ (Emphasis added).

31To balance these competing interests, our Court of Appeal in R. v. Gordon, 2025 ONCA 21 recently summarized the test for striking a guilty plea:

… the court must be satisfied that (1) the appellant was misinformed about or unaware of information that he needed to have in order to give an informed plea (the “information” component), and (2) he suffered prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice (the “prejudice” component) … The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plea was uninformed and that he suffered prejudice as a result.²⁰

32The prejudice component of the test requires an appellant to demonstrate through an affidavit that they would have either opted for a trial and pleaded not guilty; or would have pleaded guilty, but with different conditions. Because the decision to plead guilty reflects deeply personal considerations, the test must be considered subjectively, from the perspective of the appellant, and not of a reasonable person or even someone like the appellant.²¹

33The appellant in this case, through Mr. Mann, asserts through affidavits that it was unaware of the possibility of such a large fine and the reforestation consequences. With respect, these claims are incredible.

34Mr. Mann and the appellant were not akin to Mr. Gordon. In Gordon the appellant was told by his lawyer that a particular sentence was all but guaranteed and it was shown that he pled guilty based on that information. Mr. Gordon was therefore prejudiced by that incorrect information provided to him by his lawyer.

35In contrast, Mr. Mann and the appellant were represented for over a year by counsel who was in constant communication and in negotiations with the Region. While it is true that counsel cannot recall every conversation he had with Mr. Mann, it defies common sense that such negotiations about the fines being sought and the plans for reforesting would not have been discussed, at some point, with Mr. Mann, the director of the company and one of the individuals charged.

36The inconsistencies in Mr. Mann’s affidavits support the finding that Mr. Mann is not believable in his claims about being unaware of the consequences of a plea. For example, on July 28, 2023, he testified that he did not know a fine or reforestation order could result.

Mr. Guaglio: Can you please explain which collateral consequences of pleading guilty you didn’t have the chance to get advice about?

Mr. Mann: I didn’t know about these things, that these things --- these things would happen, that there would be a fine.

Mr. Guaglio: Is there anything else other than the fine that you say you didn’t know about before entering a plea?

Mr. Mann: I had no idea about anything at that time. I didn’t know anything then.

Mr. Guaglio: Do I understand this to mean, then, that you didn’t know there was the possibility that the Court might order that you reforest the property?

Mr. Mann: I hadn’t – I didn’t know about anything at that time.

Mr. Guaglio: And when you say “at that time”, you mean on the day that you entered the plea on September 12, 2022?

Mr. Mann: Yes.²²

37Subsequent to this cross-examination, Mr. Mann provided a third affidavit on November 15, 2023, stating essentially that he misspoke during his cross-examination on July 28, 2023 and that what he meant to say was he didn’t know the fine would be so high and that there could be full reforestation ordered.

38This changing testimony undermines his credibility about not knowing the consequences of his plea, as does the evidence of his lawyer, Mr. Talpur. Mr. Talpur testified that he was advising and taking direct instructions from Mr. Mann and would have sought Mr. Mann’s approval on any resolution proposal he was making. While it is true that Mr. Talpur was unable to provide many specifics about conversations he had with Mr. Mann about the ongoing resolution discussions, it is incredible to suggest that Mr. Mann, who was the sole directing mind of the appellant corporation, was never made aware of how much of a fine the region was seeking, or their position on reforestation. It is also reasonable to believe that Mr. Talpur, a lawyer, was taking instructions from his client before negotiating hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines.

39In their factum at paragraph 48, the appellant concedes that in a January 18, 2022 email from Mr. Talpur to Mr. Mann, Mr. Mann was informed that the Region was seeking a $600,000 fine, and Mr. Talpur described this to Mr. Mann as “exorbitant” and “unrealistic”. Mr. Mann claims to not remember this specific offer from the Region. I do not believe him. It is unfathomable how discussions of such a significant fine would take place and Mr. Mann would simply not remember it.

40In a letter directed to Mr. Talpur on May 3, 2022, Mr. Fenton for the Region recounts a telephone conversation between the Region and Mr. Talpur wherein Mr. Talpur inquired if the Region would accept a fine of $400,000 plus the victim fine surcharge and for an example of what the court-ordered reforestation may look like. Mr. Fenton stated that their final offer was $425,000 plus a victim fine surcharge. With respect to reforestation, he cited section 10(c) of the By-Law and stated they could continue to discuss a joint position on what the reforestation plan would look like.²³

41The record shows Mr. Mann knew of this offer from the Region. In an email sent on August 22, 2022 – exactly three weeks before the guilty plea - Mr. Mann (or at least his email address) sent an email to Mr. Talpur, stating the following:

Dear Hamza,

Please make a last offer to Halton Region to settle the matter as follows:

1. The financial remuneration as last agreed (Halton offer of June 3)

2. RePlanting as described in the Reforestation Image of June 3 EXCEPT for the north property line area “5% of Disturbed area”;

3. Charges against Baljit Mann and Tony Vaccarello dropped;

4. If not accepted (by whatever time frame you feel appropriate) then I, Baljit Mann, in capacity for the corporation and myself will elect to continue the matter self-represented and you may remove yourself as counsel for all.

I trust this is sufficient direction for you to proceed as required.

Thank you,

Sincerely,

Baljit Mann.²⁴

42Mr. Talpur wrote the Region the day after this email, proposing exactly what was instructed by Mr. Mann the day before – the corporation pleading guilty to receive a $425,000 fine plus victim fine surcharge and an agreement to reforest the property, except for the 5% of disturbed area on the northern boundary. It also stipulated that the charges against the remaining personal defendants be dropped.²⁵

43The parties agree that Mr. Mann was illiterate in the English language, but there is no evidence that anyone had access to Mr. Mann’s email address other than him, or would send instructions to his lawyer through his email address without his knowledge or consent. Mr. Mann, in cross-examination about this email, stated that Mr. Vaccarello did not have access to his email address and that he simply doesn’t remember the email.²⁶

44With respect, it is incredible to claim, particularly in the face of these direct communications with his lawyer through his email address, that Mr. Mann had no idea that the fine would be in the range of hundreds of thousands of dollars and that a large portion of the property could be subject to reforestation. While Mr. Mann may not have drafted the email himself, I find that he clearly authorized the email to be sent to his lawyer on his behalf.

45The plea inquiry in this case was thorough. The prosecution and the Justice of the Peace walked Mr. Mann, Mr. Vaccarello and as a result, the appellant, in great detail through what they were pleading guilty to, and that the Justice of the Peace would decide the appropriate sentence.

46The claim that Mr. Mann simply pled guilty because he felt he had no choice is similarly incredible. Mr. Mann was before His Worship for his trial. His Worship mentioned on a few occasions that he had the right to a trial and, again, conducted a thorough plea inquiry. This included confirming that the Justice of the Peace would decide the ultimate sentence in the case.

47The appellant takes issue with the comment by Macphail J.P., upon learning that the appellant was seeking an adjournment, “well, that will almost certainly be denied”. They also object to His Worship’s statement that when the court resumed he will “either hear Mr. Mann’s plea on his own behalf and on behalf of the corporate defendant”. But as with any case, context matters. Macphail J.P. had discussed the possibility of an adjournment in great detail at the August 31, 2022 appearance, and made it clear that he expected the trial to proceed, with or without counsel on the trial date. He also provided the appellant with the guide to self-represented litigants and had confirmed with Mr. Mann that they would proceed to trial with or without counsel. It was not, therefore, a situation where Macphail J.P. was simply denying an adjournment with no prior knowledge of the matter or its history up until that point.

48Furthermore, Macphail J.P. was not saying to Mr. Mann before the break that when he returned he expected him to plead guilty. His comment to the parties was that he will hear their plea or a resolution position. It was clear to everyone on September 12, 2022 that a trial could proceed that day. The record simply does not support the contention that the appellant was pressured into pleading guilty because of a denied adjournment or because the Justice of the Peace told him that a guilty plea was the only option.

49Mr. Mann also achieved exactly what he wanted by pleading guilty, the withdrawal of the charges against him personally. Even after being arraigned, and before entering his plea, Mr. Vaccarello, on behalf of Mr. Mann, confirmed that the charges would be withdrawn against Mr. Mann and that they could argue about the appropriate sentence on a future date.

50The fact that sentencing was adjourned, conducted and no objection was ever taken to the plea of guilt before sentencing is also telling. Had the appellant been unaware of the potential consequences of the plea, the time to raise his objections would have surely been after he heard what the prosecution was seeking – the $1,116,000 fine, the full reforestation of the property and the period of probation.

51In these circumstances, I find that Mr. Mann’s plea, on behalf of the corporation, was fully informed. I simply do not believe his testimony and affidavits that he was not aware of the consequences of pleading guilty or would have not pled guilty had he known the possibility of a large fine and full reforestation. While Mr. Mann may be illiterate and unsophisticated, I do not accept his numerous assertions that he “didn’t know”. In reviewing the plea negotiations leading up to the guilty plea, Mr. Mann’s correspondence with counsel and the thorough plea inquiry conducted by Macphail J.P., I do not believe Mr. Mann when he says his plea was uninformed and I have no difficulty finding he was subjectively aware of the nature of the allegations made against him and the corporation, the effect of his plea, and the consequence of his plea.

52The appellant has not demonstrated any prejudice by establishing a reasonable possibility that he would have pleaded differently or pleaded guilty, but with different conditions had more information been provided. Given the appellant’s failure to do so, and society’s strong interest in ensuring the stability, integrity, and efficiency of the administration of justice through the finality of matters through guilty pleas, the appellant’s appeal as to conviction is dismissed.

The Sentence Complied with the Municipal Act

53Section 429(2)(b) of the Municipal Act authorizes a system of fines to designate a multiple offence and provide for a minimum and maximum fine for each offence included in the multiple offence.

429 (1) Subject to subsection (4), a municipality may establish a system of fines for offences under a by-law of the municipality passed under this Act.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), a system of fines may,

(a) designate an offence as a continuing offence and provide for a minimum and maximum fine for each day or part of a day that the offence continues;

(b) designate an offence as a multiple offence and provide for a minimum and maximum fine for each offence included in the multiple offence;

(c) establish escalating fines for a second and subsequent convictions for the same offence; and

(d) establish special fines in addition to the regular fine for an offence which are designed to eliminate or reduce any economic advantage or gain from contravening the by-law.

54The Municipal Act does not prescribe a particular format as to how an offence may be “designated” as a “multiple offence” or a “special fine”.

55The clear intent of section 10 of the By-Law is to create a multiple offence. This is clear from the wording “a maximum fine of $50,000 or $5,000 per Tree, whichever is greater”. If one were to accept the argument of the appellant, and section 10 was only to apply to each individual tree cut, then the wording “per tree” would serve no purpose.

56As mentioned, nowhere in the Municipal Act does it state that in order for a matter to be considered a “multiple offence”, specific wording must be used to designate it as such. Rather, one must look to the wording of the section to determine its intent and purpose.

57Section 3 of the By-Law speaks to the cutting of any Tree, and then section 10 goes on to stipulate that a corporation that cuts any tree is guilty of an offence and is liable for each occurrence of the contravention, infraction or violation to a potential penalty of up to $5,000 per tree. Short of stating “Section 3 is a Multiple Offence”, the legislation could not have been any clearer. A plain and reasoned reading of the By-Law is that it is an offence to cut down trees without the proper authorization, and the fine imposed can be calculated based on how many trees are cut. I find this wording designates section 3 as a “multiple offence”.

58The appellant points to the Regional Municipality of Halton By-Law No. 47-20 as an example of where the Region chose to specifically designate an offence as a “multiple offence”. In By-Law 47-20, a law enacted during the pandemic to mandate the wearing of facial masks, section 11.6 states “All contraventions of any provision of this By-Law are designated as multiple offences and continuing offences pursuant to subsections 429(2) and (5) of the Municipal Act, 2001”. As the respondent notes, this By-Law came after the enactment of the “multiple offences” provisions of the Municipal Act, whereas the By-Law in the case at bar predates them. The wording, however, is also important. In By-Law 47-20, the offence is not wearing a medical mask inside an enclosed space and the penalty provision makes no mention of what would occur if there were multiple infractions. In the By-Law in this case, it is clear that the offence is cutting any tree on a property and that the penalty for doing so is on a per tree basis, clearly outlining what would happen in the case of multiple infractions.

59It would be absurd to require each individual tree destroyed in a forest to be a separate count. If that were the case, in this matter, an information alleging at least 372 separate counts would have been necessary. Clearly that was not the intent of the Region in drafting the By-Law, nor the Provincial Legislature in drafting the Municipal Act.

60While section 429(3) of the Municipal Act places restrictions on the amount of fines that may be imposed, it does allow for a multiple offence fine to exceed $100,000, so long as each offence contained in the multiple offence does not exceed $10,000. Section 10 of the By-Law complies with this restriction, capping the per tree fine at $5,000.00.

61I note that the offence and penalty provisions in the By-Law also meet the definition of a “special fine” under the Municipal Act. As stated, a municipality is entitled to “establish special fines in addition to the regular fine for an offence which are designed to eliminate or reduce any economic advantage or gain from contravening the by-law.” In creating a per tree fine in the By-Law, the Region has sought to prevent individuals and parties such as the appellant from destroying vast amounts of habitat and then chalking it up simply as a “cost of doing business” because the fine cannot be greater than $100,000 under the Municipal Act.

62Having found that sections 3(a) and 10 of the By-Law read together clearly create a “multiple offence” and/or a “special fine”, the amount of the fine imposed by Macphail J.P. was authorized in this case.

The Sentence Was Appropriate in the Circumstances.

63Justice of the Peace Macphail found that the appellant’s clear-cutting of trees in the Halton Natural Heritage System, knowing full well it was prohibited, was deliberate and in clear defiance of the By-Law regime. In doing so, it was one of the “worst-case scenarios”.

64Macphail J.P. was clear in his reasons for sentence that the court did not receive sufficient information about the appellant’s financial situation, except that it had purchased the property for over $7,000,000, suggesting it at least had assets suitable enough to finance or obtain finance for that amount.

65In suggesting that the fine must be significant to deter others in the business of developing properties from destroying vast amounts of habitat, His Worship found that a substantial fine was required and the reforestation of the property necessary. He was not wrong.

66The fines suggested by the appellant in this case were wholly inadequate and a lack of a reforestation order would be perceived by others as simply a cost of doing business and an invitation to ignore all By-Laws and regulations set down by the citizens of the community.

67The sentence imposed by the Justice of the Peace is deserving of great deference and this court should only interfere where it is demonstrably unfit or where the sentencing judge makes an error of law or an error in principle that affects the sentence.²⁷ The Court of Appeal in R. v. Cotton Felts Ltd., 1982 3695 suggests a lower standard of review for Provincial Offences Act matters, perhaps allowing this court to form its own opinion with respect to the fitness of the sentence. On either standard, however, I cannot say that I find the sentence imposed by the Justice of the Peace in this case to be unfit, nor are there any errors of law or principle. I agree with the Justice of the Peace that the flagrant disregard for the By-Law in this case, and the admitted number of trees destroyed on this protected piece of land warrant a fine that is, in essence, 1/7 of the purchase price of the land.

68I would go further than the Justice of the Peace and state that the actions of the appellant were egregious and deserving of the fine imposed, if not more. The appellant in this case intentionally destroyed a large parcel of land, likely killing and displacing countless animals and other species, all to satisfy their own greed. They did this in the face of clear legislation seeking to prevent them from doing so. The community upon hearing these facts would be, and should be, outraged by the conduct of the appellant, and the courts should treat such a flagrant disregard to the democratically enacted laws of the Region seriously.

69The appellant was the one who directed the trees to be cut and the Justice of the Peace was correct that they carry the bulk of the responsibility for the devastating nature of the clear-cutting in this case.

70No one disputes the principle of parity that requires that sentences should be similar to other sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.²⁸

71The appellant cites the case of Hamilton (City) v. McNiven, 2018 ONCJ 974, wherein an individual defendant was convicted of cutting down 56 heritage trees and was fined $6,000 per tree. The appellant submits this case to show that the $336,000 total fine was significantly lower than the $1,000,000 fine imposed by Macphail J.P. In fact, however, the case demonstrates a per tree fine that was approximately $3,300 more than the fine imposed by Macphail J.P. in the case at bar. Had Macphail J.P. followed the McNiven decision, the total fine in this case could have been approximately $2,232,000.

72The totality principle must also be considered. The totality principle acknowledges that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender. The appellant again cites New Mex Canada Inc., this time for the proposition that in that case, where an individual died, the directors of the corporation received a $250,000 fine that our Court of Appeal later found to be excessive. Comparing the present case to New Mex Canada Inc., however, is misguided. In New Mex Canada Inc., the two directors of the company pleaded guilty to offences under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after an employee, who was known to the defendants to be epileptic, fell to his death while working on an elevated order picker without fall protection. The Court agreed that the defendants displayed “the highest level of negligence" in that case.

73The offences in the case at bar, of course, had nothing to do with “negligence”. The appellant corporation in this case blatantly ignored the regulatory scheme that was in place and for no reason other than profit and greed, clear-cut 372 trees. It was an intentional and deliberate act. I do not find the decision of New Mex Canada Inc. to be of any assistance in determining the appropriate fine or assessing the appropriate principles of sentencing. The By-Law and the Occupational Health and Safety Act are two distinct pieces of legislation seeking to achieve two distinct objectives.

74The Justice of the Peace did not impose the maximum sentence. In fact, despite finding the facts of this case to be one of the worst cases he imposed a per tree fine equivalent to approximately $2,688 per tree. There is nothing in the reasons of the Justice of the Peace to suggest a fine of this nature to be unfit or excessive.

75There was no authority to cut down the trees that the appellant destroyed. Ordering that those trees be replanted and that habitat restored to a state similar to what it was prior to the appellant’s selfish and destructive actions is reasonable in the circumstances.

76In all the circumstances, there is no basis for this court to interfere with the decision of the Justice of the Peace who presided over the sentencing hearing, heard the witnesses and submissions, and considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The appeal as to sentence, therefore, is similarly dismissed.

Released: June 9, 2026

Justice B.G. Puddington

Footnotes

1. 1Transcript of Proceedings, August 31, 2022, Respondent’s Appeal Book, page 25.
2. 2Transcript of Proceedings, August 31, 2022, Respondent’s Appeal Book, page 36.
3. 3Transcript of Proceedings, September 8, 2022, Respondent’s Appeal Book, pages 42 to 49.
4. 4Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 8.
5. 5Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 11.
6. 6Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 12.
7. 7Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 13.
8. 8Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 115
9. 9Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, pages 16 to 18.
10. 10Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, pages 19 to 21.
11. 11It reads “country” in the transcript of September 12, 2022, but it is clear that what it should say is “company”.
12. 12Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 21.
13. 13Transcript of Proceedings, September 12, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, pages 22 to 23.
14. 14Transcript of Proceedings, November 22, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 72.
15. 15Transcript of Proceedings, December 14, 2022, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 274.
16. 16Transcript of Proceedings, February 2, 2023, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 48.
17. 17Examination for Discovery of Baljit Mann, July 28, 2023, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 683.
18. 18Third Affidavit of Baljit Mann, November 15, 2023, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 480.
19. 19R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25 at paragraph 3.
20. 20R. v. Gordon, 2025 ONCA 21 at paragraphs 20 – 21.
21. 21R. v. Gordon, 2025 ONCA 21 at paragraph 32 and R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25 at paragraph 19.
22. 22Examination for Discovery of Baljit Mann, July 28, 2023, Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 683.
23. 23Appellant’s Appeal Book, pages 1292 to 1295.
24. 24Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 1304.
25. 25Appellant’s Appeal Book, page 1305.
26. 26Appellant’s Appeal Book, pages 722 to 725.
27. 27R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64.
28. 28Ontario (Labour) v. New Mex Canada Inc., 2019 ONCA 30 at paragraph 50.