Lance Charles Beechener

The appellant, Ming Ning Karl Zhao, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault.

He raised three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's psychological state, and an unreasonable verdict for unlawful confinement.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that while the trial judge's comments were at times inappropriate, they did not demonstrate bias.

The court also concluded there was no material misapprehension of evidence and that the evidence supported the unlawful confinement conviction.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting and killing Andrew Christie in the doorway of Christie's apartment on December 19, 2004.

Although charged with first degree murder, the jury convicted him of the lesser charge.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 17 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of evidence regarding an accomplice's manslaughter conviction, the deceased's ante-mortem statements, and the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct, self-defence, and provocation.

The appellant also challenged the sentence as unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and finding the sentence fit.

The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from a reverse sting operation conducted by the RCMP in August 1997.

The appellant was initially acquitted in 2000, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

At the retrial in 2014, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, alleging that the lead investigator deliberately misled his superiors and withheld disclosure.

The trial judge rejected these allegations and convicted the appellant.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10 years 10 months imprisonment and delayed parole eligibility were fit.

The accused was charged with three counts of assault and two counts of forcible confinement against his common-law partner, arising from three alleged incidents between August 2012 and August 2013.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the testimony of the complainant, who delayed reporting the incidents for over a year and had previously denied any history of domestic abuse to police during a separate incident in December 2013.

The court found numerous inconsistencies and implausibilities in the complainant's evidence, including her explanation for deleting photographic evidence of her injuries.

Concluding that the complainant's testimony lacked credibility and reliability, the court found the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals on all counts.

An innocent third party sought the return of $1.3 million allegedly provided to a lawyer for investment purposes and deposited into a bank account later restrained as offence-related property and proceeds of crime.

The court held that the Criminal Code permits such a third party to seek relief in the Superior Court before any conviction or forfeiture hearing, under both the offence-related property and proceeds of crime restraint provisions.

However, because the funds had been commingled in a heavily used account and the evidentiary record did not establish that no other person appeared lawfully entitled to the frozen funds, immediate release was not ordered.

The application was adjourned sine die to permit notice to possible claimants and more particularized evidence about the account transactions.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a minor collision in a restaurant drive-thru.

The Crown relied on breath test results and observations of impairment.

The defence challenged both the impairment evidence and the timing of the breath samples.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding impairment based on video evidence from the police station showing no signs of impairment.

Additionally, the court found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, as required by statute.

The investigating officer's explanation that the breath technician was unavailable was contradicted by the technician's own evidence.

The court excluded the breath test results and acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed a sentence of indeterminate detention following a dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was firmly grounded in the evidence, noting the appellant committed the predicate offence while on conditional release.

Following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the offender was sentenced for arranging to purchase a large quantity of cocaine through an RCMP reverse sting operation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the scale of the intended transaction, the offender’s criminal record, and evidence that he was armed and prepared to use violence to protect the drugs.

The court rejected arguments that delay between the offence and sentencing should substantially mitigate the sentence and declined to apply the totality principle based on earlier convictions arising from the same investigation.

Credit of 1.5:1 was applied for 511 days of pre-sentence custody.

A lengthy penitentiary term was imposed along with firearms prohibition, DNA order, and delayed parole eligibility.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry involving alleged drug trafficking and firearms offences connected to a stash house.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice exceeded jurisdiction by relying on speculative inferences to find some evidence of knowledge and control over the contraband necessary to establish constructive possession.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry justice properly considered the totality and context of the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, surveillance, and the conduct of alleged co-conspirators.

The inferences of knowledge and control supporting constructive possession and conspiracy were reasonably available on the record.

As a result, no jurisdictional error was established and the committal decision stood.

The young person appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped statement to police.

The first statement was inadmissible due to non-compliance with the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying the derived confessions rule, as the second statement was tainted by the first and the police failed to advise the young person that the first statement was inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault arising from a late-night truck pursuit and repeated ramming of a vehicle after an altercation at a bridge.

The court held that unidentified hearsay statements describing a plan to push Asian fishermen into the water were admissible under the principled hearsay exception because necessity and threshold reliability were established through corroborative surrounding events.

The jury charge, read as a whole, adequately limited the use of those statements to the issue of common intention and motive, and improper Crown cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, leave was granted but the sentence of two years less a day, probation, and a driving prohibition was upheld as not manifestly unfit for a youthful first offender.

The appellant was convicted of arson after representing himself at trial.

He had been denied legal aid and his Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel was dismissed by the trial judge, who held that such orders were reserved for cases posing unique challenges.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too stringent a test.

The case was complex, involving expert witnesses and similar fact evidence, and the appellant lacked the capacity to defend himself effectively.

The Court held that the erroneous denial of counsel resulted in an appearance of unfairness, constituting a miscarriage of justice without the need to prove actual prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for drug trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting his statement to the police and in relying on the evidence of a witness.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis or her assessment of the witness's evidence.

The court also rejected the appellant's request for sentence credit for time spent on bail under strict conditions, noting he was arrested for drug trafficking while on release.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction, arguing that the trial Crown's cross-examination regarding alleged money laundering and outstanding fraud charges was improper.

The respondent conceded the cross-examination was improper.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no substantial unfairness or miscarriage of justice, as the trial judge explicitly instructed herself not to consider the improper questions and provided extensive reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.