Lance Charles Beechener

The appellant, James McCullough, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and committing an indignity to a human body.

He admitted to killing and dismembering the victim but claimed it was a reaction to a sexual advance and not planned or deliberate.

The appeal raised two main issues: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on post-offence conduct and the admission of evidence regarding his desire to commit cannibalism and rap lyrics.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of post-offence conduct evidence, as it was relevant to planning and deliberation and alternative explanations were presented to the jury.

The court also upheld the admission of the cannibalism ideation and rap lyrics, finding their probative value on issues of motive, intention, and planning outweighed their prejudicial effect, especially with proper limiting instructions.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial judge's decisions regarding expert evidence on the cause of death.

The primary expert opinion suggested drowning based on diatom analysis, but an alternate theory of starvation was also presented.

The appellant argued that the alternate theory lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and caused confusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion on an alternate cause was properly admitted given the scientific controversy surrounding diatom analysis and other evidence supporting starvation.

The court affirmed that the jury, as the trier of fact, could consider all evidence and was not bound by expert opinions, especially when alternative explanations had an "air of reality."

The appellant, Manuel Esquivel-Benitez, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding three errors by the trial judge: (1) an R. v. W.(D.) error in assessing credibility by treating it as a contest between the complainant and the appellant, failing to consider reasonable doubt on the evidence as a whole; (2) failure to meaningfully address the complainant's possible motive to fabricate; and (3) improper reliance on the appellant's presence in the courtroom to negatively assess his credibility, suggesting he tailored his evidence.

Two appellants were convicted of first degree murder in the death of Jagtar Gill, who was beaten with a metal bar, stabbed multiple times, and had her throat slashed.

The Crown's theory was that Bhupinderpal Gill (the victim's husband) and Gurpreet Ronald (with whom Gill was having an affair) conspired to commit the murder, with Ronald as the perpetrator.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the included offence of second degree murder for Ronald, leaving only verdicts of guilty of first degree murder or not guilty.

The appellants appealed on the basis that this instruction was erroneous and prejudicial to both their defences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to leave second degree murder as a possible verdict for Ronald, and that this error tainted the verdict against Gill as well, as it undermined his defence that Ronald acted alone without planning and deliberation.

A foreign national subject to a removal order was convicted of making, distributing, and possessing child pornography after CBSA officers discovered explicit images of her children on her cell phone during a search incident to arrest.

The appellant appealed her conviction on five grounds, including Charter breaches related to the cell phone search, the reasonableness of the verdict, misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the CBSA search was authorized under section 16(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, that the evidence was admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter, and that the verdict was reasonable on the evidence.

The court also rejected claims of bias.

On sentencing, the court set aside the victim surcharge but otherwise upheld the sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder while using a firearm, arising from a planned drug robbery on July 16, 2005.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two accomplices with significant credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that while the verdicts were not unreasonable, the cumulative effect of errors in the trial judge's final instructions to the jury—particularly regarding post-offence conduct and the failure to adequately address alternative inferences—required a new trial.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder in the death of his girlfriend.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed her in a dispute about his drug abuse and theft of money to acquire drugs.

The appellant claimed he witnessed a drug dealer kill the victim.

The appeal addressed three grounds: (1) admissibility of a police statement taken in hospital; (2) jury direction regarding prior inconsistent statements as evidence of consciousness of guilt; and (3) rulings on third-party suspect evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

Three appellants appealed their convictions for a September 2015 bank robbery and related offences.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from a witness with bipolar disorder and a permanent brain injury who had given a police statement while in custody.

The appellants challenged the admissibility and reliability of her evidence, arguing she was merely reading from her police statement rather than testifying from refreshed memory, and that a Vetrovec warning should have been given.

The trial judge found her evidence reliable and corroborated by circumstantial evidence including DNA evidence and surveillance footage.

The appellants also sought to introduce the witness's criminal record as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and grounded in evidence.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a failed roadside screening test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results obtained at a police station.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to establish the statutory preconditions to the presumption of accuracy under the new Criminal Code provisions, specifically failing to prove that the alcohol standard used in the breath testing instrument was certified by an analyst.

Although the judge found the presumption of identity remained available for transitional cases and that the samples were taken as soon as practicable, the failure to establish the preconditions to the presumption of accuracy was dispositive.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his roommate.

The trial judge refused to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury, finding no air of reality to the defence because the accused had initiated a confrontation while armed, anticipating that the victim could react violently.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no absolute rule precluding the provocation defence merely because an accused initiates a confrontation while armed.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the contextual analysis required under the provocation defence framework and that the defence had an air of reality and should have been left with the jury.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the death of Orin Felix and attempted murder of Trevor Hunter following an altercation between two groups outside a bar.

The appellant appeals on grounds relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct evidence and a corrective instruction regarding the appellant's testimony about a witness named Latoya Dejonge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the post-offence conduct evidence or the corrective instruction, and concluding that the trial remained fair despite some unfortunate judicial decisions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder and related offences arising from a home invasion and attack on his former intimate partner.

The Crown's case relied on direct identification evidence from the victim, circumstantial evidence including the victim's blood on the appellant's shoe and a warm vehicle at his residence, and evidence of post-offence conduct.

The appellant claimed he was at home at the time of the attack.

The trial judge failed to provide express instructions to the jury regarding the proper use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while such instructions would have been preferable, their absence did not render the trial unfair given the strength of the Crown's case on identity, the peripheral role of post-offence conduct evidence, and the absence of any request for such instructions by defence counsel.

The appellant also appealed his 13-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to consider his compliance with strict bail conditions as a mitigating factor and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jonathan Chambers on March 7, 2007, north of Barrie.

The Crown's case relied heavily on evidence from three accomplices who had entered into plea agreements: Tafari Williams, Terrence Walker, and Gregory Millar.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence from Walker and Millar to confirm Williams' testimony despite potential tainting, and that the trial judge misapprehended certain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the Vetrovec principles and that any errors in misapprehension were not material to the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of Troy Hutchinson.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was the actual shooter, but the jury was also instructed on liability as an aider or abettor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea required for aiding or abetting murder.

Specifically, the jury was not properly instructed that an aider or abettor must know that the principal actor has subjective foresight of death.

The error was repeated multiple times throughout the charge and was compounded by an incorrect definition of recklessness and an inadequate answer to the jury's final question.

The curative proviso was not applied because the jury's final question demonstrated that at least one juror had a reasonable doubt about the appellant being the principal actor, making it impossible to conclude that conviction was inevitable.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of Joel Waldron.

The Crown could not prove which appellant was the shooter but argued both were guilty as one was the shooter and the other aided or abetted the killing.

The appellants appealed on grounds that the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient in relating evidence to the elements of aiding and abetting and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found the jury charge was factually unbalanced and failed to properly relate evidence to the necessary legal elements, particularly regarding aiding and abetting.

While the court did not find the verdict unreasonable, it quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial due to the deficiencies in the charge.

Three appellants convicted of first and second degree murder appealed their convictions.

Two were convicted of first degree murder and one of second degree murder.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as inconsistent and unreasonable, and raised multiple grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury charge, including issues regarding post-offence conduct instructions, circumstantial evidence instructions, and the treatment of various pieces of evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed on the acquittal of one appellant on first degree murder.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts neither inconsistent nor unreasonable, and that the trial judge committed no errors in her charge to the jury.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife, Adrienne Roberts, who was found murdered in the basement of their home.

He appealed on three grounds: (1) that the application judge erred in dismissing his O'Connor application for production of criminal investigation files relating to two other similar crimes; (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing his alternate suspect defence application; and (3) that the first degree murder verdict was unreasonable and should be substituted with second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the application judge's O'Connor ruling, no air of reality to the alternate suspect defence, and that the jury's verdict of first degree murder was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give credit for restrictive bail terms as required by R. v. Downes.

The trial judge had misapprehended the duration of the bail period, referring to 42 days of pre-bail custody rather than the actual 18 months the appellant spent on restrictive bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal found that had the trial judge understood the true duration and restrictive nature of the bail conditions, he would have granted the five months' credit requested by defence counsel.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced by five months.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the killing of Kerlon Charles.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Cleavon Springer, a Crown witness of unsavoury character, who testified that the appellant and six others lured the deceased to an apartment and that the appellant killed the deceased in an execution-style shooting.

The appellant denied being present in the apartment.

The trial judge left second degree murder with the jury despite the defence objection, instructing the jury that the appellant could be guilty as a party to the murder even if they had reasonable doubt that he was the shooter.

After conviction, a juror filed an affidavit claiming that another juror made comments about the appellant's criminal record and gang affiliation, and that the juror had sent her websites about the appellant's criminal history after the verdict.

The trial judge declined to conduct a further inquiry into jury deliberations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and dismissed the appeal on both grounds.