Lance Charles Beechener

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeals of Khalid Yousuf and Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed, who were convicted of multiple offences related to drug trafficking, proceeds of crime, and possession of firearms after being found in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or err in law, and that the verdicts were reasonable based on the circumstantial and direct evidence connecting both appellants to the contraband and the operation of the safe house.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appeals of Rushawn Anderson and Nicholas Rhoden from convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements, in his rulings on Charter violations, in instructing the jury on fabrication, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The majority dismissed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction sufficient and the verdicts reasonable.

In dissent, Gomery J.A. would have allowed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction flawed and the verdicts unreasonable, and would have substituted acquittals.

The appellant, Qalid Abderezak, appealed a 12-year sentence for robbery and firearms offences, arguing that the sentence was unreasonably disparate compared to a co-accused, Zakariye Yousuf, who received a 10-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge’s analysis, noting the different roles and culpability of the offenders and the deferential standard of review for sentencing decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Wesley James’s appeal in part, setting aside his convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and crack cocaine due to Charter breaches and police misconduct, and entering acquittals on those charges.

The court found that the trial judge erred in the Grant analysis by failing to properly consider the seriousness and cumulative effect of the Charter breaches and police dishonesty, and by not conducting a final balancing of the Grant factors.

The conviction for trafficking crack cocaine was upheld as the verdict was not unreasonable on the evidence.

The appellant, B.W., appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences and his six-year global custodial sentence, which included a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order and a ten-year internet ban.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainants, alleging collusion, unaddressed inconsistencies, and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility findings or assessment of collusion risk.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, substituting the lifetime SOIRA order with a twenty-year order based on the unconstitutionality of the previous SOIRA provisions (R. v. Ndhlovu) and removing the ten-year internet ban, which was erroneously included in the prohibition order.

The appellant, Lance Burkhard, appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a co-accused's statement to police, specifically regarding the handling of prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instruction to the jury on prior consistent statements was incorrect and exacerbated the risk of the jury using them for a prohibited purpose, namely to bolster the co-accused's credibility on the central issue of who stabbed the victim.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms-related offences.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) Charter analysis by refusing to exclude evidence (firearm and ammunition) despite a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in downplaying the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's Charter rights, as the police completely denied access to counsel for a prolonged period due to carelessness.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors afresh, the Court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and acquittals entered on all counts.

The appellant, P.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving his 15-year-old niece.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's response to a jury question concerning forensic evidence and the instruction given on the complainant's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's response to the jury's request for a read-back of expert testimony was appropriate, given the practical difficulties and the lack of material prejudice.

The court also affirmed that the instruction on the s. 715.1 statement was correct, as such statements are admissible for their truth and as part of the in-court testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a provincial court judge's decision to declare a mistrial in a sexual assault case.

The mistrial was granted on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically the trial lawyer's unilateral decision not to call defence witnesses.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that certiorari is available to parties in criminal proceedings only for jurisdictional errors, not for errors of law.

The court affirmed that a trial judge has the discretion and jurisdiction to declare a mistrial, even after conviction and before sentencing, and that any error in doing so would be an error of law within jurisdiction, not a jurisdictional error.

The appellant, Shaquille Collins, was previously convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, the attempted murder conviction was set aside and a conviction for aggravated assault was substituted.

This decision addresses the sentence to be imposed for the aggravated assault.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, including the planned attack and use of a firearm, and the appellant's criminal record and misconduct.

Despite the appellant's youth, the court found that the principles of denunciation and general deterrence necessitated a sentence outside the typical range for aggravated assault with a firearm.

The court imposed the maximum sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the life sentence for first-degree murder, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and making sexually explicit materials available to a child.

The appeal challenged these convictions on grounds of the trial judge's misapprehension of the complainant's evidence regarding her mother's presence during the alleged sexual touching, and the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and ordering a new trial on those counts, finding that the trial judge had materially misapprehended key evidence and provided insufficient reasons.

However, the conviction for making sexually explicit material available was upheld.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the entire appeal, arguing that the trial judge correctly applied the common sense approach to child witnesses and that reasons were sufficient.

The appellant appealed convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for first-degree murder, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions on contemporaneity and mens rea for murder.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea for attempted murder, as it failed to specify the requirement of a specific intent to kill.

The court substituted the attempted murder conviction with aggravated assault.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to deny a mistrial application, finding that the remedial instructions were sufficient to cure any prejudice from a witness's improper reference to a previous conviction.

The appellant, R.G., appealed his convictions for sexual abuse of his daughter, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to reopen the trial based on new cell phone evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the legal test for cogency and placed excessive weight on due diligence.

The new evidence, consisting of cell phone records, significantly undermined the complainant's credibility regarding a key incident and an uncharged incident, despite the defense's lack of due diligence in obtaining it earlier.

The Court concluded that the interests of justice required the convictions to be set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, William Joles, appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on the use of bad character evidence and by failing to provide guidance to the jury on permissible inferences from after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no real risk that the jury would misuse the bad character evidence and that the jury had a functional understanding of the permissible inferences from the after-the-fact conduct, especially given the clear submissions by counsel and the single live issue of intention.

Benard Asante appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and attempted murder, challenging the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appeal focused on the admission of prior firearms convictions (Corbett application), the admissibility of a photograph of a handgun found on the appellant's cell phone, and the jury instructions on party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the Corbett application, the admission of the photograph as circumstantial evidence of access to means, or the comprehensive and balanced jury instructions on aiding and party liability.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing errors in admitting his utterance to police, the Crown's improper firearm demonstration during closing arguments, and confusing jury instructions on motive.

He also appealed his sentence as unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the admission of the utterance (appellant was not detained), no unfairness regarding the firearm demonstration, and no confusion in motive instructions.

The Court also dismissed the appeal from sentence, finding it fit and within the appropriate range, considering aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence and breach of trust.

Shane Wood appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arson, and offering an indignity to a body.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to admit defence evidence (hearsay statements of Kim Rolph-Smith), improper jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and inadequate handling of juror misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the hearsay evidence due to lack of reliability, no fatal omissions in the jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and that a juror inquiry was not warranted given the nature of the juror's note and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple firearm and drug-related offences, alleging errors by the trial judge regarding a s. 8 Charter application (warrantless cell phone tracking and search incident to arrest) and the admission of expert evidence on drug pricing and jargon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority found the warrantless cell phone tracking justified by exigent circumstances and the expert evidence properly admitted.

While a concurring judge found the search incident to arrest unconstitutional due to a lack of objective grounds, the evidence was deemed admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the seriousness of the charges and reliability of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and search.

The appeal raised issues regarding the reliability of an officer's smell evidence, the interpretation of "neutral" observed behaviours, and the consideration of a neighbourhood's character in establishing grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge was entitled to accept the officer's evidence and that the cumulative behaviours, combined with the smell of marijuana, provided objectively reasonable grounds for arrest and search.

The court also clarified that while presence in a high-crime area alone is insufficient for grounds, it did not undermine the arrest in this case given other factors.

This appeal arose from convictions for child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, stemming from Project Raphael, an undercover police investigation targeting demand for juvenile sexual services.

The appellant, Temitope Dare, appealed his convictions on two grounds: that the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding the mental element of belief (linking it to reading text messages) and that the trial judge erred in dismissing his entrapment application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the jury instructions, when read holistically, were not misleading regarding the requirement of belief, and rejecting the entrapment argument based on reasons provided in a related case.