Kofi Barnes

Malcolm Williams was charged with assault and two counts of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He conceded the drug allegations but sought to exclude the evidence as unlawfully obtained.

The trial on the assault charge and a voir dire on the drug evidence admissibility proceeded as a blended hearing.

The court found a reasonable doubt regarding the assault charge, resulting in an acquittal.

For the drug charges, the court dismissed the motion to exclude evidence, finding that security guards were not government actors for Charter purposes and their actions, while lengthy in detention, did not render the trial unfair under common law discretion.

Consequently, Williams was found guilty of the two cocaine trafficking counts.

Mary Aquino brought a motion for a garnishment hearing under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary garnishment letters issued by the Minister of Finance.

The Minister had assessed Aquino for her common law spouse's pre-existing unpaid tax debt under the Retail Sales Tax Act (RSTA) and subsequently issued garnishment letters against her commissions and wages.

The court dismissed Aquino's motion, holding that Rule 60.08(16) does not apply to the Minister's garnishment letters issued under section 36 of the RSTA, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

Ms. Cassidy, the successful party in a family law trial, sought costs of $124,511.88.

The court awarded her $75,622.72, representing 65% of her counsel's costs, payable within four months.

The court found both parties engaged in unreasonable conduct, with Mr. Cassidy's actions constituting bad faith due to unreasonable interpretation of orders and refusal to provide disclosure, while Ms. Cassidy unreasonably declined settlement discussions.

The court also denied Ms. Cassidy costs for her self-represented period due to insufficient evidence of opportunity cost.

The plaintiff corporation, 6734111 Canada Inc. c.o.b. as Home Life Builders, brought a motion seeking leave for its director, Rakesh Mohan, a non-lawyer, to personally represent it in a construction lien matter.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while Mr. Mohan had the authority to bind the corporation, he failed to demonstrate competence to fulfill the duties of a litigant under the Rules of Civil Procedure, citing a history of non-compliance with court orders and inadequate motion materials.

The court also determined that granting leave would be unfair to the defendants given the complexity of the case and the plaintiff's alleged financial difficulties.

Natalia Giselle Smith was charged with importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

Her co-accused, Charita Maryah Johnson, was convicted.

The Crown relied on actual knowledge to establish Smith's liability, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith knew she was importing a prohibited substance.

The court admitted Johnson's videotaped statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding it necessary due to Johnson's hostile testimony and reliable due to corroborating evidence and voluntariness.

Despite circumstantial evidence linking Smith to the cocaine, including possession of luggage tags and paying excess fees, the court found that the possibility of luggage sharing and Johnson's inconsistent testimony created a reasonable doubt.

Smith was found not guilty of all charges.

M.K. sought a review of a detention order for criminal harassment and breach of recognizance, arguing the Justice of the Peace failed to adequately consider her mental illness and the necessity of treatment.

The court found no error in law or inappropriate decision by the Justice of the Peace, noting the existing supervisory and treatment plan was ineffective given M.K.'s repeated breaches and unwillingness to accept treatment.

The court dismissed the application for review, stating that M.K.'s continued detention was necessary on secondary grounds for public protection, but indicated willingness to reconsider if a more structured and effective treatment plan addressing the raised concerns was presented.

Richard Briscoe was found guilty by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and pleaded guilty to failing to comply with bail conditions.

The court accepted a joint submission for a global sentence of 12 months' imprisonment, with credit for 120 days of pre-trial custody.

The reasons for sentence extensively discuss the intersection of criminal law and drug treatment, emphasizing rehabilitation as a paramount sentencing objective for drug-addicted offenders, while also balancing denunciation and deterrence.

The court explored therapeutic jurisprudence and problem-solving approaches in sentencing, noting the accused's long history of addiction and criminal behaviour.

The appellant sought leave for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant's grounds for appeal concerned questions of fact, not law, which are not appealable under section 210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The court also varied paragraph 7 of the original Board order to extend the date for vacant possession to April 30, 2019, providing the appellant with additional time to vacate the premises.

The appellant, Uche Uduma, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The appeal raised five grounds, including failure to consider alternative explanations for indicia of impairment, misapprehension of evidence regarding the odour of alcohol and pre-arrest compelled evidence, drawing a negative inference from the appellant's silence, failure to apply the R. v. W.(D.) test, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the totality of evidence test, did not misapprehend evidence, did not improperly use the appellant's silence, and correctly applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.).

The ground of reasonable apprehension of bias was abandoned.

Osita Nweke was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and importation of heroin.

He absconded prior to sentencing and was sentenced in absentia under s. 475(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the serious nature of heroin offences, the large quantities involved (97g imported, 684.8g possessed for trafficking), the commercial enterprise, and the motive for profit as aggravating factors.

The absence of a prior criminal record was a mitigating factor.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a total sentence of 12 years imprisonment (5 years for importation and 7 years for possession for trafficking, to be served consecutively).

Additionally, a $20,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture was ordered for proceeds of crime, and a 10-year weapons prohibition was imposed.

The respondent sought to recover costs incurred in anticipation of a motion to set aside Minutes of Settlement that the applicant threatened but never brought.

The court found that costs incurred for preparing draft motion materials for a never-brought motion were not recoverable.

However, costs incurred in efforts to clarify the applicant's intention to proceed with the motion were recoverable, as the applicant's unreasonable actions caused significant delay and rendered settlement discussions unproductive.

The court awarded $3,500 in costs to the respondent.

The respondent moved to convert the applicants' breach of contract application into an action and to add her realtors as third-party defendants.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no material facts in dispute that could not be resolved by affidavit evidence and cross-examination.

The court emphasized that the main issue was the interpretation of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and a Notice of Fulfillment, which was governed by an 'entire agreement clause,' rendering realtor communications irrelevant to the primary dispute.

The request to add third parties was dismissed as there was no action to convert to, and the realtors' potential liability was not germane to the dispute between the vendor and purchaser.

The plaintiff, Piotr Klimczewski, sought summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer, Nytric Ltd. The court determined a reasonable notice period of 12 months, found that the plaintiff had adequately mitigated his damages despite his specialized and aging skill set, and ruled that the pecuniary value of lost benefits should be included in the damages calculation even if no direct expenses were incurred.

Damages were awarded to the plaintiff.

The accused, Trae Worrie, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought a ruling to permit the jury to consider his protected out-of-court statements to forensic experts for the truth of their contents, in support of his not criminally responsible (NCR) defence.

The Crown opposed, arguing the statements should only be used to assess the basis of expert opinions, not for their truth.

The court ruled that while the accused consented to the use of the statements for the NCR defence, his exculpatory statements were inadmissible for the truth of their contents unless the Crown sought to admit them.

The statements could be used for the limited purpose of assessing the basis of expert opinions and as original evidence of mental state (e.g., preposterous statements indicating delusions).

Caitlin Johannes sought certiorari to quash a committal order for trial on charges of possession of cocaine and marihuana for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The application challenged the preliminary inquiry judge's inferences regarding possession, particularly wilful blindness, based on circumstantial evidence from a shared residence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the inference of wilful blindness was speculative, other inferences drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge regarding knowledge and control were reasonable and logically supported by the evidence, thus providing sufficient evidence for committal to trial.

The respondent, Anne Cassidy, brought a motion to change final orders regarding child and spousal support, s. 7 expenses, and income disclosure.

The applicant, Robert Cassidy, sought to dismiss the motion and terminate spousal and child support.

The court found a material change in circumstances, upheld Ms. Cassidy's entitlement to compensatory spousal support despite her remarriage, ordered Mr. Cassidy to contribute to post-secondary expenses for two children, adjusted ongoing child and spousal support, and awarded retroactive arrears for child support, spousal support, and s. 7 expenses.

The court also modified the income disclosure order and passport possession.

This trial addressed the applicant's request for income imputation, ongoing and retroactive child support, and Section 7 expenses.

The court imputed an annual income of $73,000 to the respondent, finding he was intentionally underemployed and that his underemployment was unreasonable.

Consequently, the court awarded ongoing and retroactive guideline child support.

While retroactive Section 7 expenses for the children's dance activities were awarded, the respondent's share was reduced due to the unreasonableness of the high costs not contemplated in the original separation agreement, and future contributions were capped.

The proportionate shares for ongoing Section 7 expenses were also adjusted.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her Statement of Claim to add her two daughters as plaintiffs under section 61 of the Family Law Act, after the action had been set down for trial.

While leave to bring the motion was granted, the motion to amend the Statement of Claim itself was denied.

The court found that the Family Law Act claims were likely statute-barred under the Limitations Act, as the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate discoverability was a triable issue for the proposed new plaintiffs.

Additionally, the proposed amended Statement of Claim failed to plead discoverability.

Stephan Headley was charged with fraud, personation, and forgery.

The Crown applied under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of a deceased witness, Dean Karahojitis, a former Scotiabank loans officer who identified Headley as the person who impersonated Glenford Jones.

The defence argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and unfair due to new counsel and new evidence impugning Karahojitis's credibility.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary inquiry, and the defence would still be able to challenge Karahojitis's credibility through other witnesses at trial.

The court balanced the fair treatment of the accused with society's interest in admitting probative evidence, concluding that admission, with appropriate jury instructions, would ensure a fair trial.

The court delivered reasons for its ruling on limiting a previously declared mistrial and for convictions on certain charges.

The Crown sought to limit the mistrial, initially declared due to prosecutorial non-disclosure regarding a material witness, to only those charges involving the complainant (June 9 and 23, 2016 offences).

The defence opposed, arguing the mistrial should apply to all charges, including those from July 13, 2016, which involved weapons possession upon arrest.

The court granted leave to the Crown to argue for a limited mistrial, finding it would not render the trial unfair.

The court then provided reasons for convicting the accused on the July 13, 2016 offences, concluding that the impugned prosecutorial conduct was unrelated to these charges and did not taint them.

Consequently, the convictions for the July 13, 2016 offences remained, and the mistrial was limited to the June 9 and 23, 2016 offences.