Kofi Barnes

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, applied to introduce his exculpatory police statement made on October 20, 2017, under the *Edgar* exception.

The court granted the motion, finding that despite instances of dishonesty and manipulation during the 12-hour interview, a contextual analysis left doubt regarding the spontaneity of the statement.

In such cases, the statement should be admitted for the jury to assess its weight and the accused's credibility, not for the truth of its contents.

The jury will be instructed on how to use the statement to assess Johnson's reaction and credibility when confronted with the allegations.

This decision addresses jury instructions on modes of participation for two accused, Richard Ireland and Trayon Johnson, in a joint jury trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown's application for Ireland as a principal (s. 21(1)(a) Criminal Code) and Johnson as an aider (s. 21(1)(b) Criminal Code) was granted.

The Crown's application for Johnson as a co-principal (s. 21(2) Criminal Code) was dismissed, as was Johnson's request for the jury to be instructed only on s. 21(2) and thus preclude a second-degree murder verdict for him.

The court found an air of reality for Johnson's conviction as an aider but not as a co-principal for second-degree murder.

The applicant, Richard Ireland, jointly charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder alongside Trayon Johnson, sought to sever his trial from Johnson's.

Ireland argued that Johnson's police statement, which heavily implicated Ireland and expressed fear of him, would cause incurable prejudice despite excisions of prior discreditable conduct.

The Crown opposed the severance.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the presumption of joint trials for co-accused, even with "cut-throat" defences.

It held that proper jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice, and that the interests of justice, including efficiency and avoiding inconsistent verdicts, favoured a joint trial.

The applicant, T.D., sought a review of a detention order that had been upheld on tertiary grounds.

The application was brought during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was accepted as a material change in circumstances.

The court assessed the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, considering a new bail plan that included three sureties (parents and girlfriend) and electronic monitoring.

The court found the proposed plan sufficient to address concerns about public protection, noting the sureties' track records and the applicant's lack of prior breaches.

For the tertiary ground, the court balanced the seriousness of the offence (possessing a loaded firearm) against the applicant's personal circumstances (asthma, heightened COVID-19 risk in detention, no violent record or compliance breaches).

The court concluded that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for bail review was granted, and the applicant was ordered released on a $320,000 recognizance with conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The applicant sought a review of a detention order.

The court found material changes in circumstances due to a psychological report detailing the applicant's intellectual deficits and the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, the proposed release plan, including an unsuitable primary surety and insufficient details on electronic monitoring, failed to adequately address secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court dismissed the bail review application, finding continued detention warranted to protect the public and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, despite the applicant's asthma making him vulnerable to COVID-19.

The Crown sought a bail review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused, A.K., on a $1,500 surety release with conditions, following a charge of uttering threats to cause death.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred by denying cross-examination of the proposed surety and that the release decision was clearly inappropriate, particularly given A.K.'s criminal record for violent offences and the reverse onus situation.

The reviewing judge found no error in denying cross-examination, affirming that leave is required and was not arbitrarily denied.

The judge also found the release decision not clearly inappropriate, but varied the security amount from $1,500 to $3,500 due to A.K.'s past violent convictions.

The applicant moved for retroactive and ongoing child support, section 7 expenses, a finding that the parties' Sharia Marriage Contract is enforceable, and an order compelling the respondent to grant a religious divorce.

The court ordered the respondent to pay child support arrears and ongoing support based on his 2018 income, as well as his proportionate share of section 7 expenses.

The court found the Sharia Marriage Contract to be a valid domestic contract under the Family Law Act, making the dowry an enforceable debt for equalization purposes.

Finally, the court ordered the respondent to provide the necessary consent and recitation for a Sharia divorce once initiated.

The respondent, a criminal defence lawyer, was arrested and charged with criminal harassment following complaints from his estranged wife.

He was acquitted and subsequently successfully sued the investigating police officers and the Crown for negligent investigation in Small Claims Court.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's finding of liability.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the correct standard of care.

The court held that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the respondent and were not required to exhaust all possible avenues of investigation before laying charges.

The plaintiff brought a motion to validate service of the Statement of Claim and to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay, arguing prejudice due to the five-year delay between issuance and service.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for the delay acceptable, noting the plaintiff was pursuing a WSIB claim and attempting to consolidate discoveries with companion actions.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant, as his counsel had been involved in companion actions arising from the same accident.

The plaintiff's motions were granted, and the defendant's motion to dismiss was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The trial judge had excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the accused's rights regarding a delayed roadside screening demand and a privacy breach involving video surveillance in her cell.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the trial judge's findings on the Charter breaches but found errors in principle in the s. 24(2) analysis, specifically regarding the assessment of the seriousness of the breaches and the application of the law concerning post-discovery Charter breaches.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant brought a motion seeking credits towards an equalization payment and retroactive child support, while the respondent sought post-judgment interest on the equalization payment and the removal of a temporary restraining order.

The court denied the applicant's request for credits for periodic spousal support and mortgage arrears, but ordered him to pay his half of a lien and legal costs.

The court awarded the respondent post-judgment interest at 3% on the equalization payment due to the applicant's deliberate delay.

The applicant was awarded retroactive child support, which was set off against the amount he owed the respondent.

The temporary restraining order against the respondent was maintained.

The applicant, charged with robbery and firearms offences, brought an application to exclude fingerprint evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police identified the applicant by matching a fingerprint left at the crime scene to fingerprints stored in the RCMP's AFIS database from when the applicant was a young person.

The court found that the statutory access period for the youth records had expired, and the RCMP unlawfully retained the fingerprints in violation of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

This constituted a breach of the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the RCMP's failure to destroy the records was a serious violation that circumvented Parliament's clear intent, and admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The fingerprint evidence was excluded.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder after stabbing his grandfather to death and severely injuring his grandmother.

The accused admitted to the acts but raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

While the court accepted expert evidence that the accused suffered from schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder at the time of the offences, it rejected the defence experts' opinions that he was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found that the accused's post-offence conduct, which included fleeing the scene, hiding, and attempting to destroy evidence, demonstrated a rational capacity to appreciate that his actions were wrong according to societal standards.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The plaintiff sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal after missing the deadline by one day.

Her underlying Small Claims Court action against the City for property damage caused by falling tree branches had been dismissed.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had a bona fide intention to appeal, the delay was minimal with a reasonable explanation, and there was no prejudice to the City.

The court also found potential merit in the appeal because the trial judge appeared to have overlooked a letter from the plaintiff regarding the trees' history of falling branches.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to issue a writ of seizure and sale and a notice of garnishment to enforce a 2010 summary judgment against the defendant for a mortgage shortfall.

The original writ had expired in 2016.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing prejudice due to the plaintiff's nine-year delay in enforcement.

The court granted leave to issue the writ but, exercising its discretion to prevent injustice from the plaintiff's inaction, capped the accrual of interest to three years post-judgment.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The defendant argued for a significantly reduced partial indemnity award, citing mixed success and late waiver of claims.

The court found that neither party acted unreasonably and the matter proceeded in the normal course, warranting partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $6,022.44 in costs, finding the amount fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought to admit his protected statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment for the truth of their contents to support a not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) defence.

He also challenged the constitutionality of section 672.21(3)(e) of the Criminal Code, arguing that its interpretation, which prohibits the literal admission of such statements for their truth, violates his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, holding that common law evidentiary rules, including the hearsay rule and confessions rule, apply to protected statements.

While preposterous statements are admissible as original evidence of mental state, and protected statements can be used to challenge the basis of an expert's opinion or for credibility if the accused testifies, they are not admissible for the truth of their contents in an NCRMD hearing without meeting specific common law exceptions.

The court found this interpretation consistent with parliamentary intent to balance truth-seeking and accused protection, and not in violation of Charter sections 7, 11(c), 11(d), or 12.

Malcolm Williams was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court determined the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the quantity of cocaine (28 grams), commercial motive, and public location, and mitigating factors including no prior criminal record, strong family support, and admission of facts.

The Crown sought 18 months, while the defence sought 9 months minus pre-trial credit.

The court imposed an 11-month sentence after applying a reduction for exceptional circumstances, including 15 months under restrictive house arrest.

A 10-year weapons prohibition and DNA order were also issued.

Malcolm Williams was charged with assault and two counts of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He conceded the drug allegations but sought to exclude the evidence as unlawfully obtained.

The trial on the assault charge and a voir dire on the drug evidence admissibility proceeded as a blended hearing.

The court found a reasonable doubt regarding the assault charge, resulting in an acquittal.

For the drug charges, the court dismissed the motion to exclude evidence, finding that security guards were not government actors for Charter purposes and their actions, while lengthy in detention, did not render the trial unfair under common law discretion.

Consequently, Williams was found guilty of the two cocaine trafficking counts.

Mary Aquino brought a motion for a garnishment hearing under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary garnishment letters issued by the Minister of Finance.

The Minister had assessed Aquino for her common law spouse's pre-existing unpaid tax debt under the Retail Sales Tax Act (RSTA) and subsequently issued garnishment letters against her commissions and wages.

The court dismissed Aquino's motion, holding that Rule 60.08(16) does not apply to the Minister's garnishment letters issued under section 36 of the RSTA, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.