Kofi Barnes

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $24,500 for the sale of furniture.

The appellant argued the transaction was a consignment and that the respondent did not own the property to sell it.

The trial judge found the respondent acted as an agent for an undisclosed principal (his wife's company) and could enforce the contract.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the trial judge erred in raising the unpleaded issue of agency because the parties were represented by paralegals, the finding was an alternative to finding the respondent was an owner.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $23,251.25 for unpaid doors.

The appellant argued the respondent fraudulently misrepresented that it would be in Ontario 'for the long run', inducing the contract.

The trial judge found no misrepresentation, preferring the respondent's evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in his factual findings.

The court also declined to hear new issues raised by the appellant on appeal, as leave was not sought under Rule 61.08(2).

The appellant mother appealed an order denying her access to her two children, who were made Crown wards without access.

The appellant argued the motions judge erred in applying the test for access under s. 59(2.1) of the repealed Child and Family Services Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly concluded that the appellant's relationship with the children was not 'significantly advantageous' to reach the threshold of 'beneficial and meaningful.' Although the motions judge erred in her analysis of whether access would impair future adoption, the court found that a court-mandated access order would indeed impair the children's opportunity for adoption.

During a jury trial for fraud, personation, and forgery, the Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across different counts involving different complainants.

The defence conceded the application for counts involving the Gametronics investment scheme, which shared a highly similar modus operandi.

However, the court dismissed the application for counts involving a GIC and an RRSP, finding insufficient similarity and concluding that the prejudicial effect of propensity reasoning outweighed any probative value.

Stephan Headley was charged with fraud, personation, and forgery.

The Crown applied under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of a deceased witness, Dean Karahojitis, a former Scotiabank loans officer who identified Headley as the person who impersonated Glenford Jones.

The defence argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and unfair due to new counsel and new evidence impugning Karahojitis's credibility.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary inquiry, and the defence would still be able to challenge Karahojitis's credibility through other witnesses at trial.

The court balanced the fair treatment of the accused with society's interest in admitting probative evidence, concluding that admission, with appropriate jury instructions, would ensure a fair trial.

The court delivered reasons for its ruling on limiting a previously declared mistrial and for convictions on certain charges.

The Crown sought to limit the mistrial, initially declared due to prosecutorial non-disclosure regarding a material witness, to only those charges involving the complainant (June 9 and 23, 2016 offences).

The defence opposed, arguing the mistrial should apply to all charges, including those from July 13, 2016, which involved weapons possession upon arrest.

The court granted leave to the Crown to argue for a limited mistrial, finding it would not render the trial unfair.

The court then provided reasons for convicting the accused on the July 13, 2016 offences, concluding that the impugned prosecutorial conduct was unrelated to these charges and did not taint them.

Consequently, the convictions for the July 13, 2016 offences remained, and the mistrial was limited to the June 9 and 23, 2016 offences.

The accused, A.G., applied for bail under s. 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code following convictions and a subsequent ruling of abuse of process by the Crown leading to an intended mistrial.

The application was a reverse onus situation as the accused was on release at the time of the alleged offences.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing a pattern of non-compliance with previous bail orders and the gravity of the offences.

The court dismissed the bail application, finding that detention was warranted on both secondary grounds (substantial likelihood of committing further offences) and tertiary grounds (to maintain confidence in the administration of justice), despite the complainant's recantations and the presumption of innocence applied for the bail hearing.

The defendant brought a motion to quash a witness summons issued by the plaintiff to an independent medical assessor who had concluded the plaintiff was not totally disabled under a medical appeals process.

The plaintiff sought to use the examination transcript to defend an upcoming summary judgment motion.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that the evidence sought was irrelevant to the summary judgment motion, which focused on whether the plaintiff had waived her right to sue.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff improperly used Rule 39.03 to elicit expert opinion evidence without complying with the expert report requirements of Rule 53.03, constituting an abuse of process.

The defendant insurer, SSQ, Life Insurance Company Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits.

SSQ argued that the plaintiff, Judith Marlen Fricke, had waived her right to sue by agreeing to a Medical Appeals Process (MAP) which resulted in a binding decision that she was not totally disabled.

The plaintiff contended that the MAP agreement was not valid or enforceable because SSQ failed to apply the correct legal test for total disability and the independent physician may have exceeded his expertise.

The court dismissed SSQ's motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the correct test for total disability was applied during the MAP process and the enforceability of the MAP agreement given potential issues of bias and fairness.

The plaintiff, Judith Marlen Fricke, sought leave to file a reply and to set aside a binding decision from a Medical Appeals Process (MAP) concerning her long-term disability claim against SSQ, Life Insurance Company Inc. The court dismissed both applications.

It held that a new ground of claim challenging the enforceability of the MAP process should have been raised by amending the Statement of Claim under Rule 25.06(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than through a reply.

The court also denied leave to set aside the arbitral award, noting that Ms. Fricke had not filed proper pleadings in support of the requested relief.

The accused was convicted of several offences related to domestic violence after the complainant's recanted statements were admitted for their truth.

Prior to sentencing, the defence learned that the Crown had instructed police to remove a material witness warrant for the complainant from CPIC and failed to disclose that the complainant had been arrested and released.

The defence applied for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process and subpoenaed the trial Crown.

The court quashed the subpoena, finding the Crown's evidence was not strictly necessary.

The court found the Crown's conduct constituted an abuse of process by interfering with a judicial order and breaching disclosure obligations.

However, the court concluded a stay was not warranted and instead ordered a mistrial.

The accused was convicted by a jury of importing between 6.5 and 8.5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The Crown sought a sentence of 7 years' incarceration, while the defence argued for 6.5 years, citing time spent on bail as a mitigating factor.

The court found that the accused's bail conditions were not sufficiently stringent to warrant a reduction in sentence.

Applying the established sentencing range for first-time offenders importing large quantities of cocaine, the court sentenced the accused to 7 years' incarceration, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The applicant sought an order prohibiting the respondent from taking further steps in the proceeding, including his motion to set aside a previous order, until he paid $250,000 towards child support arrears or posted security.

The respondent argued he could not pay until he received his share of the proceeds from a court-ordered sale of a jointly owned property, which the applicant controlled.

The court found the record deficient and directed the applicant to provide a timetable for listing the property and the respondent to provide an updated financial statement before deciding the motion.

The appellant, Wal-Mart Canada Corporation, appealed its conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to keep a floor free of hazards or obstructions.

An employee tripped over an empty skid in an aisle while moving merchandise backwards with a manual skid jack, fell, and hit his head.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding that the empty skid constituted a hazard or obstruction under section 11 of Regulation 851.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to establish the defence of due diligence on a balance of probabilities, noting the absence of safety sweep logs for the backroom area.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff Ontario corporation sued the defendant Northern Ireland corporation for breach of contract regarding the delivery of a waste recycling facility.

The defendant moved to stay the action, arguing lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens based on a forum selection clause in its standard terms and conditions.

The court found it had jurisdiction simpliciter due to a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

However, the court stayed the action, finding that the plaintiff was bound by the forum selection clause and failed to show strong cause why it should not be enforced.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging her section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated conclusion of the trial was 64 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

Applying the transitional exceptional circumstance framework, the court found that the Crown failed to justify the delay, noting the applicant took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and suffered actual prejudice.

The motion was granted and the charges were stayed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent after accepting expert evidence that the absence of a value for 'uncertainty of measurement' raised a reasonable doubt about the proper functioning of the approved instrument.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that uncertainty of measurement is not required by law and that speculative evidence regarding potential instrument malfunction is insufficient to constitute 'evidence tending to show' under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and mischief, as well as a restitution order, arising from a road rage incident on a busy highway.

The trial judge found the appellant intentionally stopped his vehicle in front of the complainant's, causing a collision and subsequent altercation where the appellant damaged the complainant's vehicle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and met the legal tests for dangerous driving and mischief.

However, the court varied the restitution order, reducing it to exclude the cost of windshield repair, as the trial judge had not been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant caused that specific damage.

The parties sought a divorce and resolution of corollary issues including equalization of net family property, spousal support, and the partition and sale of the matrimonial home.

The court determined the date of separation to be September 1, 2010, and calculated the equalization payment owed by the applicant to the respondent, which was adjusted to account for the applicant's sole payment of the mortgage since separation.

The court denied child support for the adult child, awarded a lump sum non-compensatory spousal support payment to the respondent due to his limited income-earning capacity from motor vehicle accidents, denied the applicant's request for exclusive possession, and ordered the partition and sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge had found that the appellant struck the complainant with a doll, causing scratches.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied a lesser standard of proof and failed to provide sufficient reasons, specifically by failing to apply the second and third steps of the W.D. test.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the trial judge did not apply a lesser standard of proof, he failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite unresolved discrepancies.

The court concluded the trial judge inadvertently treated the credibility assessment as a contest and failed to apply the third step of the W.D. test.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.