Tracey L. Hamilton

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against her former employer for wrongful dismissal and against the employer and insurers for denial of long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

The court granted summary judgment on the wrongful dismissal claim, finding a four-month notice period reasonable given the plaintiff's 15-month tenure and health vulnerabilities.

However, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment regarding the LTD claim, finding that conflicting evidence regarding coverage dates, representations made, and the plaintiff's disability status presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to produce unredacted notes from her treating psychologist.

The plaintiff cross-moved for a limited sealing order and anonymization of the parties' names, arguing the notes contained highly personal information touching on her "biographical core." The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding the redacted portions irrelevant to the LTD claim and potentially embarrassing/prejudicial.

The court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion, emphasizing the strong public interest in protecting confidential therapist-patient relationships and ensuring individuals with mental health issues can seek help without fear of public disclosure of their deepest personal information.

The defendant insurer, SSQ, Life Insurance Company Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits.

SSQ argued that the plaintiff, Judith Marlen Fricke, had waived her right to sue by agreeing to a Medical Appeals Process (MAP) which resulted in a binding decision that she was not totally disabled.

The plaintiff contended that the MAP agreement was not valid or enforceable because SSQ failed to apply the correct legal test for total disability and the independent physician may have exceeded his expertise.

The court dismissed SSQ's motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the correct test for total disability was applied during the MAP process and the enforceability of the MAP agreement given potential issues of bias and fairness.

The defendant brought a motion to quash a witness summons issued by the plaintiff to an independent medical assessor who had concluded the plaintiff was not totally disabled under a medical appeals process.

The plaintiff sought to use the examination transcript to defend an upcoming summary judgment motion.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that the evidence sought was irrelevant to the summary judgment motion, which focused on whether the plaintiff had waived her right to sue.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff improperly used Rule 39.03 to elicit expert opinion evidence without complying with the expert report requirements of Rule 53.03, constituting an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Judith Marlen Fricke, sought leave to file a reply and to set aside a binding decision from a Medical Appeals Process (MAP) concerning her long-term disability claim against SSQ, Life Insurance Company Inc. The court dismissed both applications.

It held that a new ground of claim challenging the enforceability of the MAP process should have been raised by amending the Statement of Claim under Rule 25.06(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than through a reply.

The court also denied leave to set aside the arbitral award, noting that Ms. Fricke had not filed proper pleadings in support of the requested relief.

The infant plaintiff sued the defendant for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant appealed an order striking out her third party claim against the infant plaintiff's mother.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that the plaintiff's claim was limited to the defendant's proportionate degree of negligence.

The Court of Appeal amended the formal order on consent to explicitly state that the plaintiff's claim is limited to the damages apportioned to the defendant's relative degree of fault, and otherwise dismissed the appeal.