Publication ban

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence of motive to fabricate and by engaging in improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons regarding motive to fabricate, deeming them adequate when read against the record.

The court also rejected the claim of improper propensity reasoning, clarifying that the trial judge used evidence of controlling behaviour as a contextual factor to assess competing narratives, not as proof of propensity to commit the assaults.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Baba Ouedraogo, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and choking, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize certain evidence, including the complainant's injuries, toxicology report, video evidence, and identity evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's arguments primarily sought to re-weigh evidence already considered by the trial judge.

The court noted that the physical evidence strongly contradicted the appellant's account and confirmed key aspects of the complainant's testimony, despite the trial judge having some concerns about her credibility in other areas.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, with the sentence appeal proceeding separately.

The appellant, R.K., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and an eight-year sentence.

The appeal raised nine grounds, including alleged errors in refusing production of the complainant's diary, improper use of the diary to enhance credibility, misapprehension of evidence, improper cross-examination on bad acts, overvaluing demeanour, improper corroboration by peripheral details, improper reliance on lack of motive to fabricate, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding both the conviction and the sentence, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and sentencing decision to be sound.

The appellant, N.H., appealed his convictions for four counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his three-year custody sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding counsel's limited role under s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code, failure to pursue exculpatory evidence, and the appellant's seating arrangement at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the claims of unfair trial or ineffective assistance, concluding that counsel acted competently and went beyond their limited appointment.

The court also dismissed the appellant's complaint about appeal delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The trial judge had found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies and missing journals, but still convicted.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons inadequate for failing to explain how he could believe the complainant's evidence despite these identified credibility problems.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Japdeep Randhawa, brought an application under sections 123 and 119(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) seeking access to the complainant M.S.S.'s youth records.

The court ruled that access was governed by section 123(1) of the YCJA.

The application was granted, as the court found that Randhawa had a valid and substantial interest in the records to make full answer and defence, particularly given the serious charges involving a handgun and M.S.S.'s prior youth convictions related to an imitation firearm and threats.

The court balanced M.S.S.'s privacy interests against Randhawa's constitutional right to full answer and defence, concluding that the latter prevailed.

Specific redactions were ordered for personal information and references to other non-witness young persons.

The appellant, R.C., appealed convictions for sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose, and invitation to sexual touching.

The complainant, who was 15 at the time of trial, testified about incidents that occurred when she was between four and seven years old.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable.

On appeal, R.C. argued that the trial judge improperly assessed the reliability of the complainant's uncorroborated evidence and erred in dealing with recovered memories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully considered and resolved reliability issues, and did not err or reverse the onus of proof regarding recovered memories.

The trial judge's findings on reliability were entitled to deference.

This motion concerned a fresh application for a release order pending appeal after the applicant inadvertently failed to surrender on a specified date due to counsel's oversight.

The applicant, convicted of child luring and child pornography offences, promptly surrendered upon discovering the error.

While the Crown consented to release on previous terms, the Court of Appeal, exercising its discretion under s. 679(1) of the Criminal Code, imposed significantly higher financial penalties ($50,000 promise to pay and $20,000 deposit) to ensure public safety, given the nature of the offences and the lack of practical supervision for internet restrictions without sureties.

The appellant, Aamir Syed, appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the verdict was illogical, and the judge misapprehended evidence, specifically regarding an expert's toxicology report, the complainant's alcohol consumption, and a potential motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, his credibility findings were entitled to deference, and there was no misapprehension of evidence.

The court affirmed that it was open to the trial judge to accept or reject parts of a witness's testimony and to find no evidentiary basis for a motive to fabricate.

The appellant, R.V., appealed his sentence for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's restoration of his convictions, the case was remitted to the Court of Appeal for Ontario to consider the sentence appeal.

Fresh medical evidence, filed with the Crown's consent, revealed the appellant had terminal cancer with a very bleak prognosis.

In light of these exceptional circumstances, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the original term of imprisonment and probation order, and substituting an 18-month conditional sentence order.

Other orders from the trial judge remained in force.

The appellant, J.G., appealed verdicts of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, entered in 2005 when he was 16.

The appeal, consented to by the Crown, was based on fresh evidence indicating the appellant, who has significant intellectual disabilities, did not understand the consequences of an NCR verdict at the time.

The Court of Appeal found the process leading to the NCR findings unfair and a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCR verdicts, substituted findings of guilt for the original offences, and imposed a concurrent sentence of one day, with execution stayed.

The appellant, L.T., appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the imposition of a s. 161 order under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's discretionary decision.

The court emphasized that s. 161 orders are entitled to substantial deference on appeal and do not require the underlying offence to have been committed in prescribed circumstances.

The absence of an objection to the order at the time of sentencing was also noted as relevant to its fitness.

The media parties sought to terminate or vary sealing orders related to Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants in a high-profile murder and terrorism case.

The Crown and the accused, Nathaniel Veltman, sought to maintain significant restrictions to protect fair trial rights and privacy.

The court applied the Sherman test, finding a serious risk to fair trial rights and privacy due to widespread pre-trial publicity.

The court ordered a publication ban on broad swathes of evidence and a limited sealing order on highly sensitive personal and graphic information, concluding these measures were necessary and proportionate to balance open court principles with fair trial rights and privacy.

The appellant, B.G., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The main issue was whether Crown counsel invited the jury to rely on impermissible racial or cultural stereotyping during cross-examination of defence witnesses and in closing arguments.

The court found that the Crown's questioning and address created a risk of the jury applying negative stereotypes about Indian culture, particularly regarding women's agency and truthfulness, which was not supported by evidence.

The absence of a specific cautionary instruction from the trial judge resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of 10 sexual abuse offences against his former partner's daughter.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence related to pornography and his surveillance of the victim's grandmother's house, as well as the Crown's cross-examination of its own witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned evidence was relevant and properly used for material issues or credibility, and that the procedure for refreshing witness memories was appropriate given the lack of objection at trial and absence of prejudice.

The Crown brought a motion to cancel D.L.'s bail pending appeal or, alternatively, for a bail review, after D.L. was charged with new sexual offences while on release.

The court determined the matter was properly a bail review based on a material change in circumstances.

The motion to cancel bail was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction under s. 524 of the Criminal Code, as the undertaking had expired.

However, the court ordered D.L.'s release under more restrictive terms and conditions, including "house arrest" with a surety, to address public safety and public confidence concerns, finding the existing release order inadequate.

The appellant, Bradley Priestap, appealed his convictions for multiple counts of voyeurism, break and enter to commit voyeurism, possession of instruments for break and enter, and prowling.

He abandoned his sentence appeal.

The grounds of appeal were: the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons, erred by summarily dismissing an alternate suspect theory, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, no error in limiting evidence on an alternate suspect due to lack of connection, and no demonstration of prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant, S.F., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in making impermissible use of prior consistent statements, misapprehending evidence concerning disclosure to a high school counsellor, and applying an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly articulated and applied the principles governing prior consistent statements, did not misapprehend the evidence, and properly assessed witness credibility without uneven scrutiny.

The appellant, P.P., appealed convictions for sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The complainant, the appellant's nephew, testified about abuse occurring when he was a child.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings, which were amply explained and supported by the record, and dismissed the appeal.

The accused, Steven Redden-Cox, was sentenced for one count of sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved forced intercourse and fellatio on a vulnerable, mildly intoxicated 18-year-old complainant, following initial consensual intimate touching.

The court characterized the offence as "predatory" and falling within the "date rape" category, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Despite the accused's expression of regret and potential for rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of two years in penitentiary, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition, a DNA order, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a no-contact order with the complainant.