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The appellant, S.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the complainant's evidence regarding her alleged financial motive to fabricate and by failing to properly consider the implausibility of the assaults given the proximity of sleeping children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the implausibility argument.

The court affirmed the trial judge's entitlement to believe the complainant's testimony.

The accused, Japdeep Randhawa, brought an application under sections 123 and 119(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) seeking access to the complainant M.S.S.'s youth records.

The court ruled that access was governed by section 123(1) of the YCJA.

The application was granted, as the court found that Randhawa had a valid and substantial interest in the records to make full answer and defence, particularly given the serious charges involving a handgun and M.S.S.'s prior youth convictions related to an imitation firearm and threats.

The court balanced M.S.S.'s privacy interests against Randhawa's constitutional right to full answer and defence, concluding that the latter prevailed.

Specific redactions were ordered for personal information and references to other non-witness young persons.

This criminal trial involved multiple allegations of sexual assault and sexual interference against A.R., a substitute teacher.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility and reliability of each child complainant's testimony, noting significant internal and external inconsistencies and pervasive evidence of collusion among the witnesses, particularly influenced by one central complainant.

The defence did not call evidence.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt for all complainants, concluding that the evidence was unreliable and insufficient to support convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, or even simple assault.

A.R. was acquitted of all charges.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose, appealed his convictions.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant and the appellant, the interpretation of text messages, and the admissibility of fresh evidence regarding the appellant's post-conviction dementia diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on credibility and the interpretation of inculpatory text messages as admissions of sexual abuse.

The court also rejected the fresh evidence application, finding it lacked cogency and due diligence.

The appellant, S.F., appealed convictions for three counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his wife, alleging errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, affirming that the judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence despite initial non-disclosure (attributed to fear of retaliation) and minor inconsistencies.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence and deferred to the trial judge's careful assessment of the complainant's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, G.C., appealed convictions for sexual assault and incest against his daughter.

The trial judge found the complainant credible but rejected two specific incidents of abuse as unreliable.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the R. v. W.(D.) analysis by compartmentalizing evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the evidence as a whole, applied the burden of proof, and was entitled to accept some parts of the complainant's testimony while rejecting others, without misapprehending W.(D.) principles.

The appellant, L.T., appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the imposition of a s. 161 order under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's discretionary decision.

The court emphasized that s. 161 orders are entitled to substantial deference on appeal and do not require the underlying offence to have been committed in prescribed circumstances.

The absence of an objection to the order at the time of sentencing was also noted as relevant to its fitness.

The accused, V.Z., facing sexual assault charges, brought a Stage 1 application under Criminal Code sections 276, 278.92, and 278.93 to admit evidence of prior sexual activity and text messages with the complainant.

The defence argued this evidence was relevant to the issues of consent and honest but mistaken belief in consent, particularly regarding a pattern of consensual role-playing and rough sexual behaviour.

The Crown opposed, arguing insufficient detail and that past consent does not imply future consent.

The court dismissed the application regarding actual consent but granted a Stage 2 hearing (voir dire) for the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, finding the proposed evidence capable of being admissible for that purpose, provided a proper affidavit from the accused is filed.

The appellant, J.L., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation, alleging errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment, including undue reliance on demeanour, incorrect use of the absence of exaggeration, and misapprehension of material evidence.

He also sought leave to appeal his global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility determinations were entitled to significant deference and that no reversible errors were made regarding demeanour, absence of exaggeration, or misapprehension of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a sentence exceeding the Crown's recommendation without first alerting the parties and providing an opportunity for submissions.

The sentence was reduced from three years and three months to three years.

The appellant, B.G., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The main issue was whether Crown counsel invited the jury to rely on impermissible racial or cultural stereotyping during cross-examination of defence witnesses and in closing arguments.

The court found that the Crown's questioning and address created a risk of the jury applying negative stereotypes about Indian culture, particularly regarding women's agency and truthfulness, which was not supported by evidence.

The absence of a specific cautionary instruction from the trial judge resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of 10 sexual abuse offences against his former partner's daughter.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's admission of evidence related to pornography and his surveillance of the victim's grandmother's house, as well as the Crown's cross-examination of its own witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned evidence was relevant and properly used for material issues or credibility, and that the procedure for refreshing witness memories was appropriate given the lack of objection at trial and absence of prejudice.

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual offences against two foster children, RY and TY, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding collusion among complainants, applied uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and failed to adequately consider tainting of evidence by police questions.

The Court of Appeal found that while there were minor misapprehensions of evidence, they were peripheral and did not affect the material assessment of credibility or the similar act evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of the burden of proof, and rejected the argument of uneven scrutiny.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault committed in 1989.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of alibi evidence, an alleged piecemeal approach to evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no reversal of the burden of proof, no error in the trial judge's approach to evidence or credibility findings, and concluded that the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, N.T., appealed convictions for sexual interference and assault related to his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, failing to explain the resolution of inconsistent evidence, rejection of his testimony, application of *W.(D.)*, or addressing the s. 43 Criminal Code defence.

He also claimed the sentencing reasons indicated an intent to convict for sexual assault rather than sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, with a clear path to conviction based on accepted Crown evidence.

The court clarified that the trial judge's reference to "sexual assault" in sentencing was shorthand for sexual interference and that the acquittal on sexual assault was a patent error in law, not rendering verdicts inconsistent.

The appellant, S.F., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in making impermissible use of prior consistent statements, misapprehending evidence concerning disclosure to a high school counsellor, and applying an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly articulated and applied the principles governing prior consistent statements, did not misapprehend the evidence, and properly assessed witness credibility without uneven scrutiny.

The appellant, Rejean Perron, appealed the imposition of a ten-year long-term supervision order following convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the sentencing judge not explicitly detailing why a ten-year order was imposed over a shorter term, the record and the psychiatrist's report, which indicated a high risk of recidivism and an undiagnosed behavioural pattern, justified the maximum period of supervision.

The court also noted the possibility of future reduction or termination of the order.

The appellant, D.R., sought release pending appeal from convictions for three counts of sexual assault, uttering a death threat, assault, and assault with a weapon.

The primary grounds of appeal concerned the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The court reviewed the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting the appellant's credibility and accepting the complainant's, finding that the trial judge had engaged in specific analysis of the sexual assault counts and properly considered the complainant's continued relationship with the appellant.

The court concluded that the appellant's credibility-based grounds of appeal did not meet the "not frivolous" threshold required for release pending appeal.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking continued protection findings for the child T.E.H., an order for deemed custody to the paternal aunt L.H., specific access orders for the mother and siblings, no access for the mother's partner, and discretionary access for the father.

The court found T.E.H. to be in continuing need of protection due to risk of emotional harm.

It granted deemed custody to the paternal aunt, L.H., prioritizing the child's best interests and Indigenous cultural identity.

The court made temporary access orders for the mother and siblings, but declined to make a "no access" order for the mother's partner or a discretionary access order for the father, emphasizing the court's obligation to impose specific terms and conditions for access.

C.C., a young person, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, J.M., testified that C.C. touched her buttocks without consent after she verbally protested.

The court applied the principles of consent from R. v. Ewanchuk and R. v. Barton, finding that J.M.'s subsequent "freezing" or passivity did not constitute consent.

The court determined that C.C. did not take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless in continuing the sexual touching despite J.M.'s protests.

The Crown proved both the actus reus and mens rea of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

C.C. was found guilty.

The appellant, Antonio Ricciardi, appealed his convictions for 17 serious offences involving three women, including attempted kidnapping, confinement, criminal harassment, assault with disguise, and robbery, and his global sentence of 14 years incarceration.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's comprehensive and fair assessment of the evidence or in the global sentence imposed for the long list of criminal offences against vulnerable women.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.