Manslaughter

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after striking the victim with his truck during an altercation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of accident, the use of after-the-fact conduct, and the fault element for murder.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the errors compromised the jury's ability to determine the fault element.

The Court dismissed the appeal from conviction but substituted a conviction for manslaughter and imposed a sentence of time served, as jointly proposed by the parties.

The appellants were convicted in relation to the death of a young man who was assaulted twice in one night—first by Manasseri inside a bar, and then by Kenny outside.

Manasseri was convicted of second-degree murder, and Kenny of assault causing bodily harm.

On appeal, both argued their charges were improperly joined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the joinder ground.

However, the Court admitted fresh expert medical evidence regarding the cause of death, quashed Manasseri's conviction, and ordered a new trial.

For Kenny, the Court applied the newly released Jordan framework, found the 68-month delay unreasonable, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellants attended a house party armed with loaded handguns.

During an altercation, shots were fired, resulting in one death and two injuries.

Both were convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for aiding and abetting murder, failed to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence for the aider or abettor, and improperly instructed the jury on the use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter for shooting his brother.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and by allowing the jury to consider the lack of bruising on the deceased's wrist without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the self-defence instructions properly conveyed the requirement of a defensive purpose, and concluding there was no realistic possibility the jury improperly speculated about the bruising evidence.

The applicant, a day care provider convicted of manslaughter in the death of an infant, sought a review of a single judge's order denying her bail pending appeal.

The single judge had found that while her grounds of appeal were arguable, they were weak, and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Chief Justice, applying the 'reasonable prospect of success' standard, agreed that the grounds of appeal regarding the admissibility of a statement and the trial judge's use of good character evidence were not sufficiently strong.

The application for review was dismissed.

The 18-year-old accused pled guilty to manslaughter after fatally stabbing a 14-year-old boy once in the chest during an altercation.

The accused, an Aboriginal offender with a tragic background of abuse and neglect, introduced a knife into a fist-fight after being provoked by a group of youths.

The court applied Gladue principles and weighed the aggravating factors of the victim's youth and the use of a weapon against the mitigating factors of the accused's background, guilty plea, and remorse.

The court sentenced the accused to 6 years in a penitentiary, less 20 months of pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a home invasion where the victim was beaten and shot.

At trial, a key Crown witness refused to testify, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his 13-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence, as the appellant had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the admission did not render the trial unfair.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning adequate and the verdict reasonable.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the 13-year term was fit for an aggravated manslaughter involving a preplanned home invasion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault arising from a gunfight on Yonge Street that resulted in the death of Jane Creba by a stray bullet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on how armed persons conceal firearms, by inadequately instructing the jury on the mutual gunfight theory of causation, and by refusing to leave self-defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that self-defence lacked an air of reality.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in 1971 for the death of his common-law wife and served over three years in prison.

Decades later, fresh medical evidence from multiple pathologists concluded the deceased died of natural causes following a fall, contradicting the trial evidence of blunt force trauma.

The Supreme Court of Canada remanded the case to the Court of Appeal.

On a joint submission with the Crown, the Court admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the appellant was wrongly convicted.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years in custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing he should have received enhanced pre-trial custody credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis and that the sentence was unfit because he did not bring the gun to the scene.

The Crown conceded the pre-trial custody issue, and the Court of Appeal applied the Summers framework to increase the credit to 39 months.

However, the court dismissed the fitness of sentence appeal, finding the sentencing judge had already accounted for the fact that the appellant did not bring the gun and that the sentence was fit given the aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his housemate, who subsequently died of a heart attack due to severe underlying heart disease.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury's finding on causation was unreasonable because the medical expert could not definitively state the stab wounds contributed to the death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to consider non-medical evidence, including the circumstances of the altercation, which reasonably linked the extreme stress and blood loss from the attack to the victim's death.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal barroom altercation.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding self-defence under sections 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to assess the lawfulness of the victim's assault from the accused's perspective rather than the victim's, and by failing to leave section 35 with the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed convictions for manslaughter, conspiracy to commit robbery, possession of a weapon, and wearing a disguise arising from a fatal botched robbery.

The court held that the trial judge erred in three respects: by giving an improper deadlock exhortation that suggested the majority view was correct, by failing to give a limiting instruction on bad character evidence led by one co-accused against the other, and by failing to provide a Vetrovec warning regarding a central accomplice witness whose credibility was seriously in issue.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from an entirely circumstantial prosecution based on motive, forensic evidence, and prior statements attributed to the deceased.

The principal issue was whether the jury charge was deficient for failing to distinguish direct from circumstantial evidence and for using pre-Lifchus language on reasonable doubt.

The court held that no formulaic circumstantial-evidence instruction was required so long as the jury was clearly told that guilt had to be the only reasonable inference proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also held that the Crown's speculative suggestions, the manslaughter instruction, and the cautions concerning hearsay evidence did not cause unfairness warranting a new trial.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The accused admitted killing his spouse but argued he acted in an automatistic dissociative state allegedly triggered by insulting words.

The Court clarified a general two-step framework for automatism, requiring the defence to establish a proper evidentiary foundation and then requiring the trial judge to determine whether the condition is mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism by reference to internal cause, continuing danger, and policy factors.

The majority held that the alleged condition was properly treated as a disease of the mind and that only mental disorder automatism should have gone to the jury.

The Court also held that disclosure of the defence psychiatric report caused no miscarriage of justice and that provocation may still mitigate sentence after reducing murder to manslaughter.

Both the conviction appeal and the Crown sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal due to errors in the trial judge's instructions on intent and intoxication, but ordered a new trial limited to the issue of whether the appellant was guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code to restrict the scope of a new trial before a jury, and ordered a full new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter as an available verdict for the jury.

The Court of Appeal had allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's cross-appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, restoring the trial conviction.

The majority held that based on the totality of the evidence, the trial judge did not err in refusing to leave manslaughter with the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in answering a jury question about the difference between second degree murder and manslaughter without commenting on provocation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even assuming the trial judge erred, no substantial miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the answer.