Dangerous offender

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The central issue was whether the appellant's violent conduct was intractable and untreatable.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by ignoring a gap in his criminal record and by failing to consider his circumstances and the potential for intensive treatment in the federal penitentiary system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered all evidence, including the appellant's history of violence, treatment resistance, and lack of motivation, and reasonably concluded that there was no realistic prospect of controlling his risk to the public through less onerous means.

The Crown sought to declare the defendant a dangerous offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence.

The defendant opposed, arguing the criteria for dangerous offender were not met, and sought a long-term offender designation instead.

The court found that while the defendant had committed serious personal injury offences and exhibited a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a "high likelihood of harmful recidivism" or that his conduct was "intractable." The court designated the defendant a long-term offender under s. 753.1(1) of the Criminal Code, imposing a total sentence of nine years imprisonment (with credit for time served, leaving 113 days remaining) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment for sexual assault and other offences, appealed his sentence and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying Gladue principles by requiring a causal link between his Indigenous ancestry and offending behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it unreliable and insufficient to undermine the sentencing decision.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied Gladue principles, finding no direct link between the appellant's Indigenous background (discovered later in life) and his moral culpability, and that public protection remained the paramount objective justifying an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence, appealed his sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to consider his treatability at the designation phase, contrary to R. v. Boutilier.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied Boutilier, considering treatability at both designation and penalty phases.

Even if there was an error, it caused no prejudice as the conclusion of untreatability would have been the same.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge confused "treatability with curability." The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marvin Smith, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to aggravated assault, intimidation of a justice system participant, and weapon possession.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge erred in interpreting "pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour" under s. 753(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, specifically regarding a six-year gap in his criminal history and the admission of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge correctly concluded the appellant exhibited a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour, notwithstanding the gap, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the high risk of reoffending and intractability.

The Crown applied for an order remanding the defendant, Gregory Eze, for an assessment under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code, to determine if he might be declared a dangerous or long-term offender.

The court found that the predicate sexual assault offences qualified as "serious personal injury offences" under s. 752(a).

The court then assessed whether there were reasonable grounds to believe Eze might be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender, applying a low threshold of "real possibility." Reviewing Eze's extensive criminal record, including multiple aggravated assaults and other violent offences, the court found a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour involving significant violence and physical control over victims, coupled with a lack of remorse and insight.

The court concluded that the Crown met the burden under s. 752.1(1), allowing the application for a 60-day assessment.

The appellant, Robert Sowell, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for child luring, transmitting explicit material to a child, possessing child pornography, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The sole ground of appeal was the sufficiency of the sentencing judge's reasons for rejecting a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order in favour of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient and responsive to the key issue of the intractability of the appellant's risk and treatability in the community, particularly regarding his willingness and ability to take sex drive reducing medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jamie Dunlop, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and the indeterminate sentence imposed after being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility regarding the extent of the appellant's participation in the assault.

The sentence appeal contended the sentencing judge erred by not acknowledging an accomplice's role and by focusing on general future harm rather than specific serious personal injury offences.

The Court found the trial judge's findings on the appellant's role were supported by evidence and that the sentencing judge correctly applied the dangerous offender test, despite not explicitly mentioning the accomplice.

Pierre Aragon was re-sentenced for aggravated assault after his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence was set aside on appeal.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the criteria for a dangerous offender finding were no longer met, proposing a finite sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding Aragon to be a long-term offender, and imposed a 7-year custodial sentence with credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Aragon's extensive criminal record, and the principle of proportionality, distinguishing his case from co-accused due to differing facts and antecedents.

The appellant, a dual status dangerous offender under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board, appealed the Board's decision declining a placement hearing and affirming his detention in a penitentiary over a maximum-secure forensic hospital.

The Board found the penitentiary placement appropriate given the appellant's extreme risk of re-offence, supported by uncontradicted expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, emphasizing that a court-imposed penitentiary sentence takes precedence for dual status offenders and that the Board's paramount responsibility is public safety.

The appeal was dismissed as the Board's findings were reasonable and amply supported by the record.

The appellant, Danny Correa, appealed his convictions for attempted sexual assault and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury on the intent required for attempted sexual assault, nor were the verdicts unreasonable or inconsistent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation, finding no material misapprehension of evidence or error in accepting the psychiatric risk assessment, despite a six-year gap in the appellant's offence history.

The Crown applied to have Danyiel Walker declared a dangerous offender under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence or, alternatively, a determinate sentence of 20 years with a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Walker had pleaded guilty to numerous sexual offences against children and child pornography charges, and had a history of similar youth offences and a prior Children's Aid Society intervention.

The court considered expert psychiatric evidence, victim impact statements, and uncharged conduct.

The court found Walker to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour, persistent aggressive behaviour, and a failure to control sexual impulses, and concluded his conduct was intractable.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that lesser measures would adequately protect the public, citing concerns about the effectiveness of treatment and the limitations of community supervision, particularly regarding internet access.

The Crown applied to have Jean-Claude Breton declared a dangerous offender under section 753 of the Criminal Code, seeking an indeterminate sentence.

Breton had been convicted of eight charges, including forcible confinement and assault.

The court considered psychiatric evidence, including reports from Dr. Treena Wilkie and testimony from Dr. Amil Joseph, as well as Breton's extensive criminal history and institutional conduct.

Despite defence arguments regarding treatability and the unreliability of some assessments, the court found that Breton met the criteria for a dangerous offender, exhibiting a pattern of repetitive and aggressive behaviour and a high likelihood of future violent recidivism.

The court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser sentence would adequately protect the public.

The Crown brought a motion for certiorari and mandamus in a dangerous offender application, challenging the sentencing judge's decision to rule Victim Impact Statements (VIS) inadmissible without reviewing them.

The VIS related to uncharged conduct that had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Superior Court granted certiorari, finding that the sentencing judge erred in failing to consider the VIS before ruling on their admissibility.

The court directed the sentencing judge to hear the VIS in a voir dire, emphasizing the broad range of information required in dangerous offender hearings and the procedural fairness owed to all parties, including victims.

The appellant, Pierre Aragon, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possessing a weapon, and uttering a threat, and his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The convictions stemmed from a 2012 beating of Fernando Fernandes, a Loners Motorcycle Club associate, by members of a rival group.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the recognition evidence and extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, concluding that the sentencing judge erred in identifying aggravating factors and failed to provide sufficient reasons for several rulings, including the decision to recall witnesses and the constitutional challenge.

The sentence was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered before a different judge.

The appellant, Jamie Simpson-Fry, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, uttering threats, and breach of probation.

He argued that he was misled by trial counsel regarding the trial procedure, specifically by not contesting the Crown's statement of facts, and that the trial judge was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant understood the "nolo contendre" equivalent procedure followed at trial and that the trial judge was entitled to accept uncontested evidence.

The Crown applied to have Thomas Snowden declared a dangerous offender or, alternatively, a long-term offender, following his guilty pleas to multiple child pornography and breach of recognizance charges.

The court denied both dangerous offender and long-term offender designations, finding that the predicate offences did not meet the definition of a serious personal injury offence (SPIO) as there was no direct causal connection between Snowden's actions (possession/distribution of child pornography) and the severe psychological damage suffered by the victims, which largely stemmed from the original abuse.

The court also found no substantial risk of violent re-offending, which is required for a long-term offender designation.

Snowden was sentenced to a determinate sentence of 5 years, with 3 years credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 2 years in penitentiary.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his designation as a dangerous offender, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge's finding that the complainant's passivity was due to fear and not consent was upheld, with the Court of Appeal affirming that silence or passivity does not constitute communicated consent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, citing the appellant's history of sexual assaults and the intractability of his behavioural challenges, supported by expert psychiatric evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, and uttering threats to property, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's use of prior consistent statements, explanation of the complainant's conduct (Stockholm Syndrome), burden of proof, and reliance on the "ring of truth." The appellant also challenged the dangerous offender finding, arguing the trial judge failed to consider treatability and intractability at the designation phase and misapprehended expert evidence regarding recidivism and "burnout." The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no reversible error in the conviction or the dangerous offender designation and sentence.

The Crown applied under s.752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for a psychiatric assessment of an offender, prior to sentencing for aggravated assault.

The purpose was to determine if there were reasonable grounds to believe the offender might be found a dangerous or long-term offender.

The court, performing its independent gatekeeper function, found that the aggravated assault constituted a "serious personal injury offence" and that the offender's extensive criminal history and violent behaviour provided reasonable grounds to believe they might be found a dangerous or long-term offender under various pathways of ss.753(1)(a) and 753.1(1) of the Code.

The application was unopposed by the defence.

The court granted the order for a psychiatric assessment.