dangerous driving

The offender pleaded guilty to impaired operation causing death, dangerous operation causing death, and impaired operation causing bodily harm after driving the wrong way on a major highway while highly intoxicated.

The head-on collision resulted in the death of one driver and catastrophic, permanent injuries to another.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, noting the offender's excessive speed, high blood alcohol concentration, and the extreme danger posed to multiple motorists.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 7 years in custody and a 14-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with firearms, drug, and dangerous driving offences after police investigated his parked vehicle for cannabis and alcohol infractions.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, excessive force via taser deployment, delayed right to counsel, improper muting of body-worn cameras, and an unlawful video-recorded strip search.

The court found a section 8 breach regarding the video recording of the strip search but declined to stay proceedings or exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The remaining Charter claims were dismissed.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The accused was charged with flight from police, dangerous driving, assaulting police officers, and drug possession following a traffic stop.

The accused argued her s. 9 and s. 10(a) Charter rights were violated because she was arbitrarily detained and not promptly informed of the reasons for her arrest, seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found no arbitrary detention under s. 9, as the officer had statutory authority under the Highway Traffic Act to check her sobriety.

However, the court found a breach of s. 10(a) because the officers failed to promptly inform her of the reasons for her detention and arrest.

Despite the breach, the court declined to exclude the officers' observational evidence of her subsequent flight and dangerous driving under s. 24(2).

The accused was found guilty of flight from police and dangerous driving, but acquitted of assaulting police officers, as she lacked the intent to apply force.

The drug charges were dismissed at the Crown's request.

The offender pled guilty to dangerous operation causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian in an underground parking garage while driving unlicensed.

The victim suffered profound, life-altering physical and psychological injuries.

The Crown sought 18 to 22 months of actual incarceration, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or fine.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, the court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence, comprising 9 months for dangerous driving and 3 months consecutive for failing to remain, along with a driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after driving her vehicle over her friend's foot and leg following an argument.

The accused claimed she fled in a state of fear or 'fight or flight' mode.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding she drove away in anger, not fear, and that her actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent driver.

The court also found the accused was wilfully blind to the injuries caused.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, over 80, and dangerous driving after witnesses observed him driving a white van erratically, including swerving, running a red light, and driving with his feet out the window.

Police followed the van to the accused's residence, where he was arrested.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing unlawful entry onto his property, failure to facilitate access to counsel of choice, and arbitrary detention.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding the police had an implied license to knock, fulfilled their duties regarding the right to counsel, and reasonably detained the accused due to his extreme intoxication and belligerent behavior.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown sought committal to trial of the accused on 17 charges, including dangerous driving causing bodily harm and attempted murder, following an incident where the accused repeatedly rammed his vehicle into a car driven by his sister-in-law.

The accused conceded committal on most charges but contested one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and four counts of attempted murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the accused on the dangerous driving count relating to his wife, finding no evidence her injuries resulted from the collision.

The judge committed the accused to trial for the attempted murder of his sister-in-law, finding sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill, but discharged him on the attempted murder counts relating to the other three passengers due to a lack of evidence of concurrent intent.

The youthful offender pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after crossing the center line and striking an oncoming vehicle head-on, causing significant injuries to two elderly passengers.

The Crown sought six to nine months of incarceration, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of prolonged dangerous driving and severe victim impact against the mitigating factors of a guilty plea, lack of prior record, and the offender's mental health struggles.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence and a four-year driving prohibition.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon following a road rage incident.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when police failed to provide a second opportunity to consult counsel after informing him of the additional assault charge.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the new charge significantly increased his jeopardy and moral blameworthiness.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the appellant's police statement under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment imposed after a re-trial for dangerous driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At his first trial, he had been sentenced to two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider the fitness of the original sentence before imposing a greater sentence, as the facts at the second trial were essentially the same.

The appeal was allowed and the original sentence of 18 months for dangerous driving and six months consecutive for failing to remain was restored.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed her conviction and one-month sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge found that the appellant drove away while the rear door was open and an intoxicated passenger was trying to exit, causing the passenger to fall and sustain injuries.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and held that the sentence was fit.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and failed to explain the marked departure finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehensions of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his failure to negotiate a curve and the testimony of witnesses in a trailing vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interpretation of the expert data was open to him and that he provided detailed, accurate reasons for rejecting the witness testimony as unreliable.

Sentencing decision involving an Aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to participating as the final courier in a human smuggling operation involving a family of five, together with related Customs Act and Criminal Code offences arising from a dangerous flight from police.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as central given the offender's callous treatment of vulnerable migrants, the profit motive, and the risk created to adults and children, but also gave substantial weight to rehabilitation, recovery from OxyContin addiction, Gladue principles, and the availability of strict community supervision.

Applying the Gladue and Proulx frameworks, the court held that a sentence of less than two years was fit, community safety would not be endangered, and a conditional sentence could satisfy punitive and restorative objectives.

A consecutive sentence totalling 24 months less one day was imposed to be served in the community, followed by two years' probation and ancillary orders.

The appellant applied to rescind an order dismissing his appeal of a dangerous driving conviction as abandoned, and to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that he was misinformed by trial counsel regarding the length of his licence suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, noting that the guilty plea was part of a broader plea bargain involving other charges.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant applying to set aside all of his convictions, as the interests of justice require a full consideration of the entire plea bargain.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge failed to apply the mens rea test later established in R. v. Roy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that driving at least 136 k.p.h. in a 60 k.p.h. zone constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person, satisfying the mens rea requirement.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 6 years net (8 years total) for 32 convictions, including break and enter, dangerous driving, and possession of stolen property.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his mental illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no causal link between his illness and his criminal conduct, and no evidence that a lengthy sentence would have a severe negative effect on him.

A corrigendum was later issued to correct an error regarding the sentence for breach of probation.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death while street racing after the other driver involved in the race lost control and died in a collision.

The court found that the accused and the deceased were engaged in a spontaneous street race at high speeds in a residential area.

The court held that the accused's participation in the race was a significant contributing cause of the deceased's death and constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, satisfying the elements of dangerous driving causing death.

However, the court found the conduct did not meet the higher standard of a marked and substantial departure required for criminal negligence.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death and not guilty of criminal negligence causing death.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, driving while disqualified, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, holding that the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence rendered the convictions unsafe.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal upholding the accused's acquittal on dangerous driving counts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that while there was evidence upon which a trier of fact could make a finding of dangerous driving, the failure to do so did not amount to an error of law.