D. Lent

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breathalyzer results despite alleged Charter breaches and in failing to find a s. 10(b) breach regarding his need for an interpreter.

The summary conviction appeal court found no ss. 8, 9, or 10(b) Charter breaches and held the evidence was admissible.

However, the appeal court found the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice that the appellant's blood alcohol concentration proved impairment without giving the parties notice.

Consequently, the impaired driving conviction was quashed, but the conditional stay on the 'over-80' charge was lifted, a conviction was entered, and the same sentence of a $1,500 fine and a one-year driving prohibition was imposed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay drinking and driving charges against the respondent due to a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in failing to attribute certain scheduling delays—specifically the time taken to schedule a Crown pre-trial and a judicial pre-trial—to the defence.

When these periods of defence delay were deducted from the total delay, the remaining time fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him, and in failing to exclude evidence after finding a breach of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment were entitled to deference.

The court further held that the trial judge actually erred in finding a s. 10(b) breach, as the police properly offered duty counsel when the appellant's counsel of choice was unavailable, and that police observations made during the hold-off period are admissible.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's roadside admission of driving, finding it was statutorily compelled, and subsequently excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the respondent to testify only on the Charter voir dire after allegedly agreeing to a blended trial, and challenged the findings on statutory compulsion, adequacy of reasons, and the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving over 80mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no breach of section 8 of the Charter and in concluding that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge made no error in concluding that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion for the roadside demand and reasonable grounds for the breath demand.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, despite a delay caused by the police facilitating contact with duty counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired care and control and 'over 80'.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding reasonable grounds for the breath demand, in failing to find a section 9 Charter breach for his detention in the back of a police cruiser during the roadside screening test, and in providing insufficient reasons.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the Charter and reasonable grounds arguments, finding the officer had sufficient grounds and the cruiser detention was reasonably necessary due to heavy pedestrian traffic.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to correct the disposition, entering an acquittal on the impaired count and a conviction on the 'over 80' count.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving after being acquitted at trial of the related “over 80” offence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and improperly reversed the burden of proof in dismissing a Charter s. 8 challenge to the breath demand.

The Superior Court held that, when read as a whole, the trial judge correctly found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample.

Any misstatement regarding the burden of proof caused no miscarriage of justice, particularly since the appellant was acquitted on the over‑80 charge.

The appellate court further found no error in the trial judge’s factual or credibility findings and confirmed that impairment and over‑80 are distinct offences that may yield different verdicts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess alcohol, arguing his roadside admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible.

The summary conviction appeal court agreed the statement was compelled and its use to form reasonable grounds for a breath demand violated section 8 of the Charter.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's alternative conclusion that the breath samples were admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter, noting the driver's identity was discoverable through other witnesses.

The appeal was dismissed.