Paul Renwick

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a text message sent by the accused to a police officer inquiring about his mother's life insurance policy.

The Crown opposed, arguing it was self-serving hearsay.

The court found that while the text was presumptively inadmissible hearsay, it should be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement's substantive reliability was corroborated by other evidence and that fairness to the accused required its admission to provide a complete picture of his statements regarding the insurance policy.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied to re-open a pre-trial statement voir dire under section 551.3(4) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that fresh evidence showing he received pre-interview advice from a disbarred lawyer acting as a paralegal, rather than a licensed lawyer, undermined the original finding that his statement to police was voluntary and compliant with the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the fresh evidence could not have affected the original ruling, as the accused was not detained at the time and had explicitly declined to exercise his right to counsel even if he had been detained.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for charges of assault with a weapon and forcible confinement.

The appellant died before the appeal was decided, but the court exercised its discretion to hear the moot appeal due to its jurisprudential importance.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by allowing the Crown to raise the NCRMD issue without first making a full finding of guilt, including mens rea, as required by the first precondition in Swain.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, holding that an appellate court cannot substitute itself for the trial judge to make an initial finding of fact on mens rea.

The court also found the second Swain precondition was not met, as the appellant's evidence of delusions did not put his mental capacity for criminal intent in issue.

Had the appeal not been moot, the court would have allowed the appeal, quashed the NCR finding, and ordered a new trial.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter challenge to the requirement in the Criminal Code, the Juries Act, and a regulation under the Administration of Justice Act that all jurors be Canadian citizens.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was bound by the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, which directly addressed the issue.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown requested that the lesser included offence of manslaughter be left to the jury, relying on criminal harassment as the predicate unlawful act.

The defence opposed the request.

The court declined to put manslaughter to the jury, finding no air of reality to the predicate offence of criminal harassment.

Specifically, there was no evidence that the victim knew she was being harassed or reasonably feared for her safety, as the accused's surveillance was intended to be surreptitious.

The Crown and defence sought pre-trial rulings regarding the editing of police statements made by the accused, Mr. Lu and Mr. Dookhram, and an application for severance by Mr. Lu.

The court ruled on various excisions to Mr. Lu's statements, removing highly prejudicial opinions from his grandmother and questions about another witness's credibility, while retaining references to his homosexuality and the officer's interview techniques.

The court declined to edit out Mr. Dookhram's references to triads and fear, prioritizing fairness to him over minimal prejudice to Mr. Lu.

Finally, the court dismissed Mr. Lu's application for severance, finding the preference for joint trials was not rebutted.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit expert evidence and the defence brought applications regarding jury selection, editing a co-accused's statement, and admitting third-party suspect evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court ruled that the accused, an Indo-Caribbean man, could ask the standard Parks question during jury selection.

The court admitted the Crown's expert evidence on bloodstain pattern analysis and handwriting, finding it necessary and reliable.

The court declined to heavily redact the co-accused's police statement, opting instead for limiting instructions.

Finally, the court admitted hearsay evidence implicating a third-party suspect under the state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for simple assault against his former common-law spouse, which involved a kick to her ankle.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider the defence of property, misapprehending video evidence, and applying uneven scrutiny to credibility assessments.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of property because the appellant denied the act entirely, and concluding the trial judge's factual findings and credibility assessments were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant sought to exclude firearms found in his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following a prior ruling that the search warrant violated his s. 8 rights due to insufficient grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court applied the Grant framework and found the police conduct was serious, as the ITO contained misleading and unsupported statements regarding the suspects' movements between residences.

Given the serious impact on the applicant's privacy interests in his home, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite the seriousness of the firearms offences.

The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Section 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence.

The police had obtained warrants for three residences based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on confidential informant information and police observations following a shooting.

The court reviewed the ITO under the Garofoli framework and found that the evidence connecting the applicant's specific residence to the shooting was insufficient and largely based on conclusory statements by the affiant.

The court concluded that the warrant could not have validly issued for that address, resulting in a breach of Section 8 of the Charter, with the Section 24(2) analysis to follow.

The applicant, one of four co-accused charged with a home invasion, brought an application to sever his trial from his co-accused.

The joint trial was scheduled for a date when the applicant's counsel of choice was unavailable, largely due to the court's efforts to schedule the trial within the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant agreed to waive his s. 11(b) Charter rights if severance was granted.

The court granted the severance, finding that forcing the applicant to proceed without his counsel of choice, when he was not responsible for the scheduling conflict, would violate principles of fairness and the interests of justice.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to exclude his post-arrest statement to police, alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter and arguing the statement was involuntary.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach occurred when an officer questioned the accused en route to the station before he spoke to counsel, but admitted the subsequent 13-hour interview statement under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed the remaining Charter claims and found the statement voluntary, concluding the accused was not overborne by the length of the interview or the officer's use of the Reid technique, but rather chose to speak after being confronted with overwhelming incriminating evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and mischief, as well as a restitution order, arising from a road rage incident on a busy highway.

The trial judge found the appellant intentionally stopped his vehicle in front of the complainant's, causing a collision and subsequent altercation where the appellant damaged the complainant's vehicle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and met the legal tests for dangerous driving and mischief.

However, the court varied the restitution order, reducing it to exclude the cost of windshield repair, as the trial judge had not been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant caused that specific damage.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing serious firearms and drug charges to trial.

The court analyzed multiple periods of delay totaling approximately 57 months from arrest to the anticipated trial start, allocating time among inherent case requirements, defence delay, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

Although the applicant had been incarcerated for most of the period and experienced prejudice to liberty and security interests, the court found that most delay resulted from defence actions or inherent case complexity, including counsel availability and pre-trial litigation.

Institutional and Crown delay totaled approximately 11.5 months, falling within the acceptable Morin guidelines.

The court concluded that the delay was not unreasonable and that the applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been prejudiced.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The accused was charged with perjury under s. 131 of the Criminal Code for allegedly falsely testifying at a preliminary inquiry that he suffered from a medical condition affecting his memory and that he was receiving treatment from doctors for that condition.

The Crown relied on inconsistencies between the accused’s testimony at the preliminary inquiry and at a later murder trial, as well as medical evidence from physicians who had treated the accused shortly before the preliminary inquiry.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the falsity of the statements or that the accused knew them to be false, emphasizing that heavy marijuana use can affect memory and that the accused may have believed his symptoms were medically related.

The court found that although the accused appeared to be a reluctant witness and may have exaggerated memory loss, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not believe he had a medical condition affecting his memory.

As that essential element of the indictment was not proven, the charge of perjury could not stand.