A. Linds

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 1,503 days.

After deducting 21 days of defence delay and 498 days of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay was 984 days.

The court found the Crown failed to establish that delays during the preliminary hearing or the period prior to the first scheduled trial date were exceptional circumstances.

As the remaining delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, the application was allowed and a stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion seeking disclosure of police occurrence reports and investigative notes relating to interactions between the complainant, the accused, and the police shortly after the alleged offence.

The Crown argued the materials were third-party records subject to the regime under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the records were intertwined with the allegations, constituted the fruits of the investigation, and did not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the court ruled the materials were first-party disclosure governed by Stinchcombe and ordered their production.

During a criminal trial, the Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a witness to testify via Skype.

The witness was unable to attend court due to a high-risk pregnancy.

The defence objected, arguing the anticipated evidence was vague and bordered on bad character evidence.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of opportunity and held that trial fairness would not be undermined by the use of technology.

The application was granted, permitting the witness to testify remotely.

The accused, charged with criminal harassment, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The charge arose from an incident where the accused allegedly followed and watched a 13-year-old girl on her way to school, having previously followed her and a friend weeks earlier.

The court amended the indictment to conform to the evidence regarding the date of the offence.

The court dismissed the motion for a directed verdict, finding that there was sufficient evidence of 'watching' under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The Crown brought a motion to admit a 911 call placed by a complainant into evidence for the truth of its contents, arguing it fell under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule or the principled approach.

The court found the call inherently reliable but excluded it because its admission was not necessary, as the complainant was available to testify and had given a police statement containing the same facts.

The court also noted the recording's highly emotional tone would be overly prejudicial to the accused.

The accused, charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and criminal harassment involving six different complainants, applied to sever counts 7 and 8 from the indictment.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence across the counts to assist in identifying the perpetrator.

The court held that the similar act evidence application was premature and should be decided during the trial.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding a strong factual nexus between the incidents and concluding that the benefits of a single trial outweighed the risk of prejudice to the accused.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for sexual assault.

The accused argued his rights under ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were violated because he was not fully informed of the reasons for his detention, including that he was a suspect in several other similar sexual assaults and that the complainant was a minor.

The court found that the police failed to inform the accused of the full extent of his jeopardy, depriving him of the ability to make an informed choice about whether to speak to police or to obtain meaningful legal advice.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.