M. Rieger

The applicant, who suffers from mental illness and auditory hallucinations, applied for a bail review after being detained on charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault of a police officer.

He presented a new bail plan with a surety.

The court found that while the applicant's dangerousness is linked to his mental illness, the proposed plan did not provide adequate supervision to ensure he would remain medicated and stable.

The application was dismissed under the secondary ground.

The applicant, an Aboriginal man with a lengthy criminal record and mental health issues, sought a review of his detention order under ss. 520 and 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the justice of the peace erred in rejecting a proposed surety's credibility based on unproven information.

Conducting a de novo review, the court provided a detailed analysis of the newly enacted s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code, which requires particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal and vulnerable accused.

Applying these principles contextually to the applicant's history of breaches and the proposed release plan, the court concluded that detention was not necessary on the secondary or tertiary grounds and ordered the applicant's release on strict conditions, including electronic monitoring.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found 424 grams of cocaine and 28 grams of crack cocaine in his bedroom.

The Crown sought 4 to 5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 2 years.

The court considered the offender's lack of a criminal record, medical issues, and restrictive bail conditions as mitigating factors.

The offender was sentenced to 3.5 years imprisonment.

The accused, charged with criminal harassment, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The charge arose from an incident where the accused allegedly followed and watched a 13-year-old girl on her way to school, having previously followed her and a friend weeks earlier.

The court amended the indictment to conform to the evidence regarding the date of the offence.

The court dismissed the motion for a directed verdict, finding that there was sufficient evidence of 'watching' under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

During a criminal trial, the Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a witness to testify via Skype.

The witness was unable to attend court due to a high-risk pregnancy.

The defence objected, arguing the anticipated evidence was vague and bordered on bad character evidence.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of opportunity and held that trial fairness would not be undermined by the use of technology.

The application was granted, permitting the witness to testify remotely.

The Crown brought a motion to admit a 911 call placed by a complainant into evidence for the truth of its contents, arguing it fell under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule or the principled approach.

The court found the call inherently reliable but excluded it because its admission was not necessary, as the complainant was available to testify and had given a police statement containing the same facts.

The court also noted the recording's highly emotional tone would be overly prejudicial to the accused.

The accused, charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and criminal harassment involving six different complainants, applied to sever counts 7 and 8 from the indictment.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence across the counts to assist in identifying the perpetrator.

The court held that the similar act evidence application was premature and should be decided during the trial.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding a strong factual nexus between the incidents and concluding that the benefits of a single trial outweighed the risk of prejudice to the accused.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for sexual assault.

The accused argued his rights under ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were violated because he was not fully informed of the reasons for his detention, including that he was a suspect in several other similar sexual assaults and that the complainant was a minor.

The court found that the police failed to inform the accused of the full extent of his jeopardy, depriving him of the ability to make an informed choice about whether to speak to police or to obtain meaningful legal advice.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.