Chalmers

The defendants, who are lawyers, were previously found in civil contempt for failing to comply with a Mareva injunction and production orders related to the misappropriation of millions of dollars from their trust account.

During the two-month period provided to purge their contempt, the defendants failed to produce the required financial documents or account for the missing funds, and one defendant traveled to Europe despite a court order prohibiting travel.

The court found that the defendants' conduct was deliberate, for personal gain, and showed no remorse.

Both defendants were sentenced to 30 days of incarceration to serve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

During pre-trial examinations in an Indigenous land claim, the plaintiff cross-examined the Crown's expert historian.

The Crown and Ontario objected to several questions, arguing they exceeded the expert's scope of expertise regarding pre-confederation Ontario land systems and strayed into Crown-Indigenous relations.

The court ruled on six objections, allowing questions that sought historical context for documents raised in chief, but sustaining objections to questions seeking opinions on matters outside the expert's specific research, such as the Indigenous perspective on the Crown's protective role.

The plaintiff, a lawyer representing advocacy groups in COVID-19 related litigation, brought an action for defamation, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and harassment against the defendants.

The defendants moved under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a SLAPP.

The court found that the impugned expressions, which criticized the plaintiff's legal approach and fees, related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to show that his claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences such as justification, fair comment, and absolute/qualified privilege.

The court concluded that the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed any unproven harm to the plaintiff and dismissed the action in its entirety.

The plaintiff, Humi Holdings Corporation, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent former employees and their new company from competing and using alleged confidential information to develop an embedded payroll software product.

The court admitted expert evidence from both sides.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the non-competition clauses were enforceable or breached, or that confidential information was misused.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favored the defendants.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The applicants sought a declaration that their insurer, CNA, had a duty to defend them in an underlying action for property damage caused by a liquid chlorine leak from their pool supply store into an adjacent unit.

CNA denied coverage, relying on the policy's pollution exclusion.

The court found that the pollution exclusion did not apply because the chlorine leaked into an adjacent indoor premises, not the natural environment, and the underlying claim was for property damage rather than environmental remediation.

The court declared that CNA has a duty to defend the applicants and awarded the applicants their defence costs incurred to date.

The defendants, a law firm and one of its partners, brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached an ad hoc fiduciary duty and aided and abetted a breach of an undertaking and a breach of the Business Corporations Act while representing a corporation in an employment matter.

The court granted the motion to strike without leave to amend, finding no facts to support a fiduciary relationship and holding that the claims for aiding and abetting were contrary to public policy as they would interfere with the lawyer-client relationship.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for insurance coverage and bad faith.

The plaintiff had suffered a cybersecurity breach resulting in fraudulent long-distance calls, and voluntarily reimbursed its customers and paid its vendors before submitting a claim under its Tech Insure Policy.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no coverage under the policy's insuring agreements, that the contractual liability exclusion applied, and that the plaintiff breached the voluntary payments clause.

The bad faith claim was also dismissed as the insurer's denial was based on a reasonable interpretation of the policy.

The defendants were successful on a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim in its entirety, with leave to amend.

The defendants sought costs of $41,979.61, relying on an offer to settle that would have allowed the plaintiff to amend his claim.

The self-represented plaintiff argued he was impecunious and that success was divided.

The court found the defendants were overwhelmingly successful and that the plaintiff's impecuniosity did not shield him from a costs award, though it was a factor in reducing the quantum.

Costs were fixed at $15,000 payable by the plaintiff.

The Crown brought an application for directions regarding the disclosure of plea correspondence between the Crown and a former co-accused who pleaded guilty and is expected to testify at the remaining accused's trial.

The former co-accused had objected to disclosure on the basis of settlement privilege.

The court held that the plea correspondence is relevant to the witness's credibility and is not protected by solicitor-client or settlement privilege, as it is not being used against the former co-accused.

The court ordered the Crown to disclose the plea correspondence to the remaining accused.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant at his residence and seized approximately 1kg of cocaine from a safe.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 right against unreasonable search were violated due to delays in facilitating access to a lawyer, questioning before he spoke to counsel, and an unjustified level 3 (strip) search at the police station.

The court found breaches of both s. 10(b) and s. 8.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded the breaches were on the less serious end of the spectrum, had minimal impact on the accused as they did not lead to the discovery of the evidence, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment under Rule 49.09 after the defendant failed to comply with the terms of an accepted offer to settle.

The parties had settled the action for $90,000 payable in installments, with a term that default would result in consent to judgment for the outstanding balance plus $10,000 in costs.

The defendant defaulted on the final $30,000 and failed to respond to the motion.

The court granted judgment for the outstanding $30,000 plus $10,000 in costs.

The applicant sought a prescriptive easement in the nature of a right of way over a private, undedicated road to access her residential property.

The application was unopposed by the respondents, who included a cancelled corporation and an estate.

The court found that the applicant and her predecessors in title had continuously and openly used the road for over 20 years prior to the property's conversion to Land Titles.

The court granted the application, finding the elements of a prescriptive easement were met and ordering rectification of the register under the Land Titles Act.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to approve a settlement under s. 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act regarding $195,110 in seized currency.

The currency was seized from a safe during a drug trafficking investigation.

The parties agreed to a settlement where $39,022 would be paid to the respondent's mother, and the remainder forfeited to the Crown.

The court found the currency was likely the proceeds of unlawful activity and approved the settlement as a reasonable compromise in the interests of justice.

The defendant brought a motion pursuant to Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to have two actions arising from the same motor vehicle accident tried together.

The parties in both actions consented to the order.

The court granted the motion, finding that the actions arose out of the same occurrence and that it was in the interests of justice for them to be tried together or one after the other.

The defendant brought a motion to vary an Amended Judgment to reflect a settlement agreement between the parties.

The parties consented to the amendment, which provided for a lump sum payment in exchange for relinquishing interests in certain properties.

The court granted the motion pursuant to Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the parties were seeking relief other than what was originally awarded.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment under Rule 49.09 after the defendant defaulted on a $90,000 settlement agreement.

The motion was initially adjourned by an Associate Justice for lack of jurisdiction and directed to proceed in writing before a judge.

The court found that the motion materials had not been properly served on the defendant, as no formal lawyer of record existed.

The motion was adjourned to allow the plaintiff to properly serve the defendant pursuant to Rule 16.01(4).

The applicant law firm sought an interpleader order regarding $83,831.83 held in its trust account.

The funds were originally part of an escrow agreement related to construction liens.

After the liens were settled, a judgment creditor of one of the contractors served a notice of garnishment on the applicant.

Both the property owner and the judgment creditor claimed entitlement to the funds.

The court granted the interpleader order on consent, allowing the applicant to pay the disputed funds into court as it claimed no beneficial interest and faced competing claims.

The plaintiff, YMCA, brought an ex parte motion to amend its Statement of Claim, obtain a Mareva injunction, and issue Certificates of Pending Litigation against multiple defendants.

The plaintiff alleged it was the victim of a $2.2 million fraud involving a government training program, where an employee conspired with various training companies to process fraudulent applications and receive kickbacks.

The court granted the amendment to the pleadings and issued the Mareva injunction against all defendants except one, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud and a real risk of asset dissipation.

The court also granted Certificates of Pending Litigation for properties where the plaintiff traced the stolen funds, but denied it for a property purchased before the fraud occurred.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 1,503 days.

After deducting 21 days of defence delay and 498 days of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay was 984 days.

The court found the Crown failed to establish that delays during the preliminary hearing or the period prior to the first scheduled trial date were exceptional circumstances.

As the remaining delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, the application was allowed and a stay of proceedings was granted.

At a judicial pre-trial, the court addressed several procedural issues for a self-represented accused facing a jury trial.

The Crown was directed to bring its application to appoint counsel for cross-examination of the complainant in writing.

The court also ordered the Crown to provide the entire disclosure package to the accused and remanded the matter to allow the accused to decide whether to bring applications under s. 11(b) of the Charter or s. 276 of the Criminal Code.