M. Bavaro

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 1,503 days.

After deducting 21 days of defence delay and 498 days of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay was 984 days.

The court found the Crown failed to establish that delays during the preliminary hearing or the period prior to the first scheduled trial date were exceptional circumstances.

As the remaining delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, the application was allowed and a stay of proceedings was granted.

The Crown brought a pretrial application to admit non-expert recognition evidence from the father and stepmother of one of the accused, who viewed video surveillance of the suspects.

The defence argued the evidence was inadmissible as the witnesses did not definitively identify the accused and their evidence was tainted by police.

The court held that the witnesses' long knowledge of the accused and their observations regarding clothing and physical characteristics were relevant to identification, and the evidence was admissible, with its weight to be determined by the jury.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel for a young person charged with second degree murder, alleging a conflict of interest because counsel also represented a Crown witness on unrelated charges.

The witness had given a confusing police statement suggesting the accused might be involved, but later testified at the preliminary hearing that he had no direct communication with the accused.

Both the accused and the witness provided informed waivers consenting to the representation.

The court dismissed the application, finding no realistic risk of adversity in interest and noting that independent counsel could cross-examine the witness if necessary.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge refused to hold a voir-dire to assess the competency of a conditionally accredited Amharic interpreter.

The trial judge insisted that a fully accredited interpreter was mandatory and invited the Crown to call no evidence when one could not be provided.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that there is no constitutional right to a fully accredited interpreter, only a competent one, and that the trial judge was obligated to conduct a voir-dire to determine competency under section 14 of the Charter.

The accused applied for an order permitting him to re-elect his mode of trial to judge and jury, dispensing with the requirement for the Crown's consent under s. 561(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued his previous re-election to judge alone was not informed or voluntary.

The court found the accused's re-election to judge alone was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that there was no evidence of a miscarriage of justice or Crown abuse of process.

The application was dismissed.