Dangerous driving causing death

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted William Craig Robson’s motion for release pending appeal and a partial stay of his driving prohibition after his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and raised significant legal issues, including the definition of “public” under s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code and causation in the context of dangerous off-road activities.

The court concluded that Robson did not pose a risk to public safety and that his continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the constitutionality of two sentencing provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) relating to deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSOs): ss. 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a).

The sentencing judge had found these provisions unconstitutional and imposed a DCSO sentence not otherwise available.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in her constitutional analysis and in failing to apply the impugned provisions and other relevant sections of the YCJA.

The Court substituted a sentence of 18 months’ probation and a 100-hour community service order, with credit for time served under the DCSO.

Jonathan Paypompee pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and bodily harm, and failing to stop after an accident.

The offences arose from a hit-and-run collision in Thunder Bay, Ontario, where Paypompee, driving without a license and under the influence of alcohol and crack cocaine, struck two pedestrians, killing one and seriously injuring the other.

The court considered extensive Gladue factors reflecting Paypompee’s Indigenous heritage, troubled upbringing, substance abuse, and remorse.

After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, including his lengthy criminal record and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, the court imposed a total sentence of seven years imprisonment, with credit for time served reducing the effective sentence to four years.

A lifetime driving prohibition and DNA order were also imposed, with victim fine surcharges waived due to hardship.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Arsenije Lojovic’s conviction appeal but allowed his sentence appeal, reducing his sentence from 10 years to 8 years (less pre-trial custody).

The court found that the trial judge erred by treating Lojovic’s bipolar disorder as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating one.

The decision reviews the proper approach to NCR (not criminally responsible) assessments and the role of mental illness in sentencing, emphasizing that mental health conditions can reduce moral blameworthiness and the weight of deterrence and denunciation.

The court considered the admissibility of two statements made by Lovepreet Singh, charged with dangerous driving causing death.

The first was a roadside statement to police while Singh was being treated for burns; the second was an audio-recorded statement at the hospital.

The Crown sought to admit only the hospital statement.

The court found that the Crown had not proven voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, citing concerns about an unrecorded pre-statement conversation, a partial caution, and potential inducement.

The hospital statement was excluded as involuntary.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Mason Perry’s appeal from a lifetime driving prohibition imposed as an ancillary order following his conviction for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving.

The court reviewed the facts, sentencing principles, and comparable cases, finding that the sentencing judge did not err in principle and that the prohibition was not demonstrably unfit.

The court emphasized the individualized nature of sentencing, the importance of public protection, and the relevance of mental health as a mitigating factor.

The decision confirms that lifetime driving prohibitions, though rare, may be appropriate in serious cases, especially where public safety is at risk.

This decision concerns the prosecution of Aysar Younes for two counts each of impaired driving/over 80 causing death and dangerous driving causing death, arising from a fatal collision on Highway 2 in Trenton, Ontario.

The court addresses the admissibility and reliability of blood alcohol evidence, the continuity of evidence, and the legal standards for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court finds the evidence of blood alcohol concentration and impairment reliable and sufficient, and concludes that Younes' conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, resulting in conviction on all counts.

Denrick Rose pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and breaching a release order curfew.

The offence involved driving at speeds exceeding 200 km/h on Highway 400 and King Road, with five passengers, two of whom urged him to slow down.

The vehicle crashed into a light standard, killing passenger Amelia Bal and seriously injuring others.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence plus a 7-year driving prohibition; the defence sought 2 years plus 5 years prohibition.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4.5 years with a 10-year driving prohibition, considering aggravating factors including deliberate prolonged dangerous driving, breach of bail, and victim impact, balanced against mitigating factors such as the offender’s youth, remorse, strong rehabilitative prospects, and harsh presentence custody conditions.

The decision also addresses the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on sentencing.

This criminal trial concerned Puneet Grewal, charged with dangerous driving causing death after he reversed his dump truck on a landfill site, running over and killing Kyrsten Sujanszky.

The Crown alleged that Grewal's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable and prudent truck driver, specifically by reversing without regard to Ms. Sujanszky's whereabouts despite an obligation to keep her in sight.

The court examined the circumstances of the site, the inherent dangers of reversing a dump truck, and the actions of both the accused and the deceased.

Ultimately, the court found that while Grewel's actions might have been careless, there was reasonable doubt as to whether they constituted a 'marked departure' from the standard of care, particularly given the uncertainties about how Ms. Sujanszky came to be in the truck's path and the site's own safety practice deficiencies.

Grewal was found not guilty.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained by police following a fatal motor vehicle collision, alleging breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the warrantless seizure of airbag control module (ACM) data was lawful under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, as police had reasonable grounds to believe it would provide evidence of an offence.

Similarly, the production order for medical records and search warrant for blood vials were deemed valid, as reasonable grounds existed to suspect impairment.

However, the search warrant for the applicant's cell phone was found to be overly broad and the subsequent search unlawful, infringing s. 8.

Applying the Grant factors, the court admitted the ACM data, medical records, and toxicology reports, but excluded all evidence obtained from the cell phone search due to the seriousness and impact of the breach.

A young person, T.M., challenged the constitutionality of sections 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

These provisions limit the availability and duration of deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSOs) for offences involving serious bodily harm, making them unavailable for youth in such cases and capping their duration at six months.

The Crown sought to dismiss the application.

The court found that these provisions violate sections 15 (equality) and 7 (liberty and fundamental justice) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reasoned that the provisions deny young persons a benefit (a community-based custodial sentence option) that is available to similarly situated adults, thereby perpetuating the disadvantage arising from their diminished moral blameworthiness and forcing youth into potentially harsher custodial sentences.

The court declared the impugned sections invalid.

The appellant, Haleigh Hutchinson, appealed the length of a 10-year driving prohibition imposed after pleading guilty to dangerous driving causing death.

The collision occurred when the appellant was driving significantly over the speed limit, resulting in the victim's death.

The sentencing judge imposed a conditional sentence, a probation order, and a 10-year driving prohibition.

The appellant argued the judge erred in principle by relying on a benchmark case (R. v. Frickey) and by failing to consider a pre-sentence license suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court affirmed that deterrence and denunciation are paramount sentencing objectives in dangerous driving cases and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the overall sentence.

The court found the distinctions from Frickey were not material enough to warrant a shorter prohibition and that the judge's discretion regarding credit for the pre-sentence suspension was not erred.

The defendant, Evan Beedawia, was sentenced after being found guilty of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The court considered statutory aggravating factors, including the death of one person and serious injury to another, the offender being remunerated, and operating a large commercial vehicle.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal or driving record, youthfulness, strong family support, and genuine remorse.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence but found that a penitentiary term was not required due to the lower moral blameworthiness of the conduct, which was characterized by acts of omission and negligence rather than intentional acts.

A conditional sentence of two years less a day was imposed, followed by three years of probation, along with a seven-year driving prohibition and other ancillary orders.

Brandon Lake pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death.

The collision occurred while he was driving at excessive speed and had failed to take his prescribed seizure medication, despite a known history of epilepsy and prior driving suspensions related to his medical condition.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two years less one day and a driving prohibition of at least 25 years.

The defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court found Lake's moral blameworthiness to be very high due to his disregard for license conditions and medical treatment.

A conditional sentence was deemed inappropriate given his history of non-compliance and the risk to public safety.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day custody, a 10-year driving prohibition, a s. 109 order for 10 years, a DNA order, and a s. 743.21 order.

This is a sentencing decision for Darrin Obermok, who pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The charges arose from a collision where Obermok ran a stop sign at high speed (105 km/h in a 60 km/h zone) with alcohol in his system, resulting in the death of a two-year-old child and severe injuries to the child's mother.

The Crown sought a 4-6 year jail sentence, while the defence requested an 18-24 month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing that a penitentiary term was necessary given the gravity of the offences and the offender's responsibility, particularly in light of the 2018 legislative amendments increasing maximum sentences for such crimes.

The presence of alcohol was deemed a significant aggravating factor.

Obermok was sentenced to five years imprisonment and a 15-year driving prohibition.

The defendant, Arielle Wall, was charged with impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and having a blood alcohol concentration above 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

The court dismissed the dangerous driving charge due to a lack of evidence regarding the manner of driving.

For the remaining charges, the court relied on expert testimony regarding blood alcohol concentration and its effects on driving faculties.

The defendant's blood alcohol concentration was found to be between 103 and 107 mg/100mL at the time of the blood sample, and calculated to be between 120-127 mg/100mL at the time of the collision.

The court concluded that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, which contributed to the fatal collision.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired driving causing death and having a blood alcohol concentration above 80 mg, and not guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

Margaret Park-Romain pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death.

The court considered victim impact statements, the offender's background, and sentencing principles, including the disparity between sentences for dangerous driving causing death and impaired driving causing death.

The judge emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, imposing a three-year penitentiary sentence and a five-year driving prohibition, plus the period of imprisonment.

Brady Robertson was sentenced for four counts of dangerous driving causing death, four counts of causing death while having excess THC in his blood, and one count of dangerous driving from an earlier incident.

The Crown sought a 23-year jail sentence, while the defence proposed 7 years.

The court considered aggravating factors including the profound victim impact (four deaths, including three children), the offender's extensive and irresponsible driving record, egregious driving conduct on two separate occasions (including fleeing police and driving with suspended licenses and no insurance), and drug consumption (THC and flubromazolan) while driving.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth (20 years old at the time of offences), lack of an adult criminal record, guilty pleas to some charges, expressed remorse, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions exacerbated by the pandemic.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity, and considering Gladue principles due to the offender's Indigenous ancestry, the court imposed a sentence of 17 years imprisonment.

After deducting 34 months for pre-trial custody, the remaining sentence is 14 years and 2 months.

A 34-year driving prohibition and an in-custody DNA order were also imposed.

The court declined to order delayed parole eligibility, finding no demonstrated need for additional punishment beyond the significant penitentiary term.

This is a sentencing decision for an offender found guilty of Dangerous Driving Causing Death and Dangerous Driving Causing Bodily Harm.

The incident involved the offender unsafely passing vehicles at high speed on a curved road with double solid lines, resulting in a head-on collision that killed one person and caused severe, permanent injuries to two others.

The offender, a 27-year-old first-time offender with no prior criminal or traffic record, expressed deep remorse and suffered significant injuries himself.

The Crown sought 3-4 years immediate incarceration and a 5-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence under two years and a 2-year prohibition, highlighting the absence of typical aggravating factors (alcohol, prior bad driving, etc.).

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day for dangerous driving causing death (concurrent with 16 months for bodily harm), to be served under house arrest with electronic monitoring, and a 4.5-year driving prohibition.

The judge concluded that a penitentiary sentence was not necessary, and a conditional sentence with strict conditions adequately addressed accountability, denunciation, and deterrence given the specific mitigating factors.

Drak Paul pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and fail to remain causing death after a fatal collision where he was speeding excessively (125 km/hr in a 60 km/hr zone), fled the scene, and was uninsured.

The court considered aggravating factors including the extreme speed, police pursuit, flight from the scene, and lack of insurance, alongside mitigating factors such as his youth, lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, and good rehabilitation prospects.

The court imposed a global sentence of two years (18 months for dangerous driving causing death, 6 months consecutive for fail to remain causing death) and a five-year driving prohibition, plus a DNA order.